


JPRS-NEA-91-052
26 AUGUST 1991



JPRS Report



Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

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Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

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Poll Results of Settlement Issue Vis-a-Vis U.S. Funds

TA0307151991 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Jul 91 p A6

[Text] The Teleser Research Institute was commissioned by the MA'ARIV to conduct a poll to study the public's views on two current controversial issues.

The following questions were asked, with a breakdown of the responses:

1. If the United States makes conditional the granting of guarantees for immigrant absorption loans with a stop in the settlement drive, do you think the Israeli Government should:

| | Percent |
|---|---------|
| Stop the settlements in order to receive U.S. funding | 44.9 |
| Or continue settlement and fund immigrant absorption by imposing additional taxes | 34.5 |
| None of the above/look for other means | 6.2 |
| No position | 14.4 |

2. Following the media disclosure of the special IDF [Israel Defense Forces] units in the territories, a public debate has arisen. There are those who claim that the existence of these units should not have been disclosed because doing so might endanger the safety of the soldiers and might result in the IDF being accused of excesses. On the other hand, there are those who claim the disclosure deters the Arabs in the territories and does not endanger the soldiers. With whom do you agree more:

| | Percent |
|---------------------------------|---------|
| Those supporting the disclosure | 24.0 |
| Those opposing the disclosure | 41.7 |
| No position | 34.3 |

The survey was conducted in nationwide telephone interviews among a representative sample of 500 interviewees, both men and women, above the age of 18.

Shamir, Arens, Levi Gain in Popularity

TA1806114491 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Jun 91 p A1

[Text] Finance Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i and Construction and Housing Minister Ari'el Sharon suffered a drop in popularity in June. On the other hand, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, and Foreign Minister David Levi became more popular. These are the findings of a statewide poll conducted by the Pori Institute at MA'ARIV's request.

Moda'i's popularity dropped by 6 percent, and he is now the least popular senior minister, while Sharon's popularity dropped by 3.3 percent. Arens' popularity went up 5.5 percent, and he is now the most popular senior minister. There was also a 2.6 percent increase in the prime minister's popularity. A small increase of 0.7 percent was marked in Levi's popularity.

The poll was conducted among a representative sample of 1,200 men and women age 18 and over throughout the country.

Poll Reveals Rabin, Shamir Preferred as Party Leaders

TA1407080791 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Jul 91 p 2

[Poll by Hanokh and Rafi Smith]

[Excerpts] Yitzhaq Rabin is the public's most popular choice to head the Labor Party, according to a Smith Research Center poll conducted last month.

Although party leader Shim'on Peres was a clear favorite among Labor voters, Rabin was preferred twice as much as Peres among the general public, according to the poll of 1,100 Jewish voters carried out between June 23 and 30. [passage omitted]

The poll asked the public: "Whom do you prefer to be the head of the two major parties?" [passage omitted]

Table No. 1

| Labor candidates | Labor | All | Total |
|--------------------|--------|--------|------------|
| | Voters | Others | Population |
| (in percentages) | | | |
| Yitzhaq Rabin | 26 | 36 | 34 |
| Shim'on Peres | 38 | 10 | 17 |
| Ora Namir | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| Mordekhai Gur | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Others (*) | 12 | 11 | 11 |
| No person selected | 10 | 34 | 28 |

* Including Moshe Shahal, 'Uzi Bar'am, Gad Ya'aqobi, and others.

Table No. 2

| Likud leader | Likud Voters | All Others | Total Population |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|
| (in percentages) | | | |
| Yitzhaq Shamir | 35 | 13 | 19 |
| Binyamin Netanyahu | 14 | 18 | 17 |
| Moshe Arens | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Beni Begin | 11 | 12 | 12 |
| Ari'el Sharon | 19 | 8 | 11 |
| Dan Meridor | 2 | 7 | 5 |
| David Levi | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Other candidates | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| No preference | 1 | 24 | 18 |

Favored Likud Political Leaders Reported in Poll

TA3006085491 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 30 Jun 91 p 2

[Poll by Hanoch and David Smith]

[Text] The public has a much better idea of who they find acceptable among Likud politicians than they do among Labor figures, according to a survey conducted by the Smith Research Center in May.

The survey of 1,200 Jewish voters also showed that the public prefers up-and-coming young politicians to the old guard.

The question asked was: "With the exception of the top leaders (Yitzhaq Shamir and Ari'el Sharon for the Likud, Shim'on Peres and Yitzhaq Rabin for Labor), who are the two people most acceptable to you in the two major parties?" It was an open question, i.e., persons could name anyone they pleased, but those surveyed were asked to choose figures in each party, regardless of the respondents' political affiliation.

Beni Begin emerged as the most acceptable politician in either the Likud or Labor, while David Levi had the highest acceptability among party supporters, but relatively little outside the Likud. Dan Meridor, on the other hand, had wider support outside the Likud than in his own party.

In the Labor party, though, there was no figure who really garnered much support, although Hayim Ramon was chosen by nearly one-fifth of Labor supporters.

| Likud leaders | Entire Sample | Just Likud Supporters |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Beni Begin | 22% | 26% |
| Moshe Arens | 20% | 27% |
| Binyamin Netanyahu | 20% | 19% |
| David Levi | 16% | 28% |
| Dan Meridor | 15% | 10% |
| Ehud Olmert | 3% | 5% |
| Roni Milo | 3% | 3% |
| Moshe Katzav | 2% | 2% |

| Labor Leaders | Entire Sample | Just Labor Supporters |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Hayim Ramon | 12% | 18% |
| Moshe Shahal | 6% | 11% |
| Ora Namir | 5% | 7% |
| 'Uzi Bar'am | 5% | 9% |
| Mordekhay Gur | 5% | 11% |
| Yosi Beilin | 5% | 8% |
| Yitzhaq Navon | 4% | 4% |
| Avraham Burg | 3% | 5% |

Prime Minister's Advisers Profiled

91AE0467A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Jun 91
p B8

[Article by Menahem Rahat]

[Text] Only rarely does the public learn how far Yitzhak Shamir's advisers are from justifying their titles. There are more than a dozen formal advisers in Shamir's court, and another dozen hidden advisers and favorites moving around there off and on. But in spite of their closeness to him, some more and some less, they never succeed in forcing their opinion on Shamir. He listens to his advisers, endlessly reads position papers and analyses, and finally crystallizes his own decision.

"Nu, tof (Yiddish pronunciation of "Tov-Good")," he will murmur at the end of the decision-making process, will wave his hand in the air in a slow motion of negation, and will advise himself how to behave. Perhaps because of this, they burst into laughter this week in his office, when they heard of Secretary of State James Baker's accusation about the advisers surrounding him, who torpedoed the peace efforts. Among those laughing was also Yitzhak Shamir: "The decisions in this office," he made it clear to whoever still needs it, "are all made by me, and not by my advisers."

This has been his way since he first occupied the Prime Minister's seat in September of '83. The advisers advised, the favorites suggested, but in the end the decisions were always his. Thus it was with truly important matters, thus it was also on little topics. For example, when he gathered the Likud ministers for the crucial consultation in the coalition crisis of spring, 1990, when the unity government was dismantled, most of the advisers spoke—and among them Arens, Meridor, Milo, Olmert, Katzav, and Nissim—of the ruin of the Likud regime, on a background of the refusal to say "Yea" to Baker, and of Shas's wandering into the arms of the Ma'arakh. Almost all of them suggested to Shamir that he say yes, and to go forward until the next crisis comes along. Shamir listened quietly and at last gave his decision, "I thank you all for agreeing with me, to say "no" to Baker."

The Prime Minister has surrounded himself with 13 people who bear the title of adviser, and with a dozen hidden advisers, whose whole advantage is in that he is ready to listen to their opinions, he is ready to talk with them. They are all discreet. They are all conspiratorial. The Shamir's past of underground activity and secrecy turned his preference for discretion and secrecy into his second nature. There, in the Shamir court, everything happens in absolute silence. The people there almost float, whisper among themselves, pass like swift shadows along the length of the halls. Discretion is the name of the game.

In the company of those he talks with, the informal advisers, stands out a group of favorite ministers, who are usually turned to for specific subjects: with Arens, he will converse about security matters, and topics concerning the movement; with Moshe Nissim, he will discuss internal party matters and everything touching the very Orthodox; with Dan Meridor, he will work on topics of foreign policy and law; Roni Milo will give advice in internal party and media topics; and he prefers Ehud Olmert for legal matters, and especially for managing the tactics of the exhausting coalition negotiations.

Once a week he will devote an hour to private discussion with each of the three former members of the inner circle: with Levi, he will discuss foreign relations; with Sharon, matters of construction and settlement; and with Moda'i, economic matters.

Shamir's formal court is built of two circles of advisers. In the first circle are five—Yosi Ben Aharon, managing director of the ministry; Elyakim Rubinstein, government secretary; Yosi Ahime'ir, head of the office, and political liaison; Avi Posner, media adviser, and "foreign minister" of the office; Brigadier General 'Azri'el Nevo, military secretary. They have the first places in the kingdom. They are the closest advisers, but their advice is only a basis for modifications.

Among themselves, relations are "correct." There is almost no treading on corns or undermining. They all made sure this week to paint a picture of an idyllic

situation. As opposed to the wars of Gog and Magog which went on in the office of Shim'on Peres, in his various roles, the situation in Shamir's office is really surprising. Team work. When there was somebody who deviated from the consensus and created confusion, like the political adviser Arye Makel for example, the members took the trouble to kick him outside, to the position of general director of the broadcasting authority. Today, by the way, they are sorry about that appointment: "Anyone who sees the diary of events on television on Sabbath eve, every Sabbath eve, is likely to think by mistake that it is the news diary of the PLO," a senior member of the office, who was one of those who pushed Arye Makel into the broadcasting authority, and Yosef Bar'el into the television management, says sadly.

Those who remain feel themselves privileged to work with Shamir. Ben Aharon and Rubinstein, Ahime'ir and Posner, define the way they relate to Shamir as esteem. Avi Posner: "It is truly a great privilege, an historic privilege, to work with a man like this." Eli Rubinstein: "Shamir's nerves of steel arouse admiration. He never slides into sentimentality. It is definitely a privilege to work by his side."

Four out of five, excluding the military secretary, submit suggestions to Shamir for speeches at events where he is the guest of honor or the central speaker. When a speech must express the depth of the attachment to the Land of Israel, the speech is ordered from Ahime'ir or Ben Aharon. Ben Aharon or Rubinstein write speeches on political subjects. When there is a need for a speech in excellent French, Avi Posner will do the job, and when a speech in English is needed, the adviser for foreign affairs, Harry Horowitz, will submit the first suggestion.

Shamir does not present the speeches prepared for him just as they are given to him. He reads very carefully, fixes things here and there, changes words, adds whole sections of his own and puts the speech through a second printing. Sometimes he writes his speeches himself.

When Secretary of State Baker spoke this week of the advisers torpedoing the peace process, he was referring to two of them, who are closer to Shamir on political topics than anyone else: Yosi Ben Aharon and Elyakim Rubinstein. Except that they themselves deny any possibility of influencing Shamir. Eli Rubinstein: "It is a foolish insult to the Prime Minister. What is Shamir, some kind of puppet that people direct on what to do and what to say? It does not even begin to be that way. The last thing it is possible to throw at Shamir is that in political subjects he is "somebody's puppet."

Then what are those two doing around him anyway?

Elyakim Rubinstein, whom the Prime Minister prefers to call Eli, and whose friends call him Elyukim, tries to characterize his role as adviser: "What actually remains for him, the adviser, if Shamir is the one who really begins and ends the decision? We have cumulative experience and historical memory, and knowledge of how negotiations are carried out, and ability to help draft

a document or to fix up a document here and there. That is all. The decisions themselves are one hundred percent his."

Even so, Shamir appreciates the stands of the team of political advisers closest to him, Ben Aharon and Rubinstein. He sees in them professional men with experience, faithful to his basic stands, to the principle of unity of the Land of Israel. He has unreserved confidence in them and they live up to the trust. They have never been caught leaking information. Completely by chance, and in contrast to their boss' way of life, they are both religiously observant.

Yosi ben Aharon, about 60 years old, is the right-wing marker around Shamir. He says aloud what Shamir is thinking. This is actually a division of labor between them. When Shamir cannot throw criticism at James Baker, on one hand, or David Levi on the other, he sets against them Ben Aharon, who does the errand with great gusto. When David Levi would like to let loose at Shamir, he prefers to shoot in the direction of Ben Aharon. He said recently in the Knesset: "The things said in the Prime Minister's office do not always come out of the mouth of the Prime Minister. This causes serious harm, which dismays the Prime Minister too." This week, in his comments about the advisers, Baker adopted the Levi method. He intended to hit Shamir, and instead punched Ben Me'ir.

General Director Ben Aharon is also the address for fire extinguishing. He said recently to Baker's advisers, headed by Dennis Ross, after hearing them express satisfaction over understandings that had been reached privately between Baker and Shamir. "When Shamir speaks English, he does not always pay attention to details." And according to another version, he even said things that could be understood to mean that one should not take too seriously what Shamir said to Baker.

From Ben Aharon's point of view, the whole world is black and white: Jews on this side and Gentiles on the other. His loyalty to the Land of Israel does not know boundaries, and if it depended on him, he would settle the land on the east bank of the Jordan too. His speech is soft and quiet, but his stances are tough: against a Palestinian state; for not giving up an inch. His faith is summarized in "Fear not, my servant Jacob"; and if you have to rely on a miracle, then why not: "The whole existence of the Jewish people has been contrary to the world process. All our existence has been a rebellion against international convention, and therefore the rules that apply in the world as a whole, do not apply so much to us."

Until he joined the Foreign Ministry as a cadet in 1956, he had worked as a salesman in a Jerusalem shop. His excellence led him to the embassy in Washington, in the days of Ambassador Rabin, to the position of adviser for Middle Eastern Affairs, in which he served six years. After a time, Rabin, who was already Prime Minister, suggested that he serve in the role of aide to the general

director of the Prime Minister's office, to handle the disengagement agreements with Egypt. Later, he returned to New York, and was assistant general consul in Atlanta. When Shamir succeeded Dayan as Foreign Minister in 1980, he looked for a director for his office and the lot fell on Ben Aharon, who entered the position in January, 1981. He has been linked to Shamir ever since.

Elyakim Rubinstein actually sees himself spending the rest of his career on the Supreme Court, by way of the office of legal adviser to the government. He is also a hawk in his political outlook, but more moderate. Rubinstein stood out in the activity to keep the Camp David initiative progressing, when he was legal adviser to Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. To this day he has clung to Camp David as the only road to a political solution.

Rubinstein, 44, is the strange bird in the Prime Minister's office. A folkloristic character. An absent-minded professor, a jester, a lover of Yiddish. For everything, he will find a witty remark, or a joke, or an suitable Bible passage. Those who love him call him a brilliant genius; his critics prefer the title of "busybody."

Yosi Ahime'ir is the man who sits at the top in Shamir's office. The definition of his role—spokesman and head of the office, but actually he is [Shamir's] personal secretary. He spends more time with Shamir than anyone else in the office. His office is also physically the closest to Shamir's. Ahime'ir manages Shamir's calendar, and also decides who will see him and who will not. He sorts the hundreds of letters which reach Shamir every day and decides which to put on his desk, and which to pass on for a routine, noncommittal answer. His position as the one who makes the everyday decisions, gives him rare power against the members of the center, and even Knesset members and Ministers. Now 48 years old, he was taken from the news desk of "Ma'ariv" in 1984 to work by Shamir's side. His central function was, and still is, to "soften" Shamir's image, to market him to the media, to the public, and within the Likud.

Brigadier Azri'el Nevo, 44, is in charge of relations with the army and with the various intelligence agencies. He calls himself "the intelligence waiter." He sits at the highest defense summit in the State, looks at the most confidential intelligence material. He began his job in the office in 1981, as military secretary to Menahem Begin, and since then also served Peres when he was Prime Minister, and now Shamir. Not considered somebody who is capable of influencing Shamir's decisions.

Avi Posner, 53, the veteran media adviser, is especially adept at communicating with the foreign press, because of his expertise in English, French, German, and Spanish. In his room the television is on nonstop to CNN. The New York Times dubbed him the most effective Israeli spokesman during the Gulf war.

And there are also advisers from the more distant circles, some more important and some less. Amos Rubin, the

economic adviser, and Yig'al Karmon, the adviser on terrorism, are more dominant, because of the importance of their roles. Less known to the public are Hayim 'Amar, adviser for welfare matters, who also arranges Shamir's visits around the country; Simha Etya, adviser for matters concerning status of women; Harry Horowitz, adviser on relations with World Jewry. And there is also the adviser for special topics and the settlements, Mikha'el Dekel, who is also a personal friend.

The two remaining advisers see Shamir only twice a year, at the ceremony of raising a glass with the workers in the Ministry before Rosh HaShana or Passover: David Yitzhak, 45, a native of Soviet Georgia, who calls himself "professor" and claims that he speaks "at least 20 languages." He joined the office as a special adviser when the Georgian immigration arrived in Israel, and since then nobody knows what he is actually doing there; And Yisakhar Katsir, formerly a butcher, 57, native of Afghanistan, an independent small businessman in Jerusalem and formerly consul in Atlanta. Nobody in the office remembers when he received the title of adviser, but this does not keep Ahime'ir from passing on to him the hundreds of letters that come from every world nuisance to the Prime Minister, so he can answer them and sign the great and glorious title—"Adviser to the Prime Minister."

Work of Deputy Ministers Examined

91AE0563A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 19 Jul 91 pp 15-17

[Article by Carl Schrag: "House of Ill Depute"; italicized and boldface words as published]

[Text] Deputy Science and Technology Minister Ge'ula Kohen sent her driver to the garage with her car late last week. He phoned the office with the bad news: a problem in the gear box would keep the car off the road for at least a full day. One of her assistants wasted no time making arrangements for a temporary stand-in, and she rushed to tell Kohen that everything was in order. "You'll have a car here within an hour," she told the deputy minister in her Jerusalem office. "A Volvo."

Kohen didn't care about the brand name. She had just one question. "Will my mobile phone be in the car? I can't go a full day without my mobile phone." The aide promised to make arrangements for the phone to be at Kohen's disposal.

"Before I got it a year ago, I might not have believed it," Kohen said, "but the mobile phone has become such an important part of my work routine. When I'm in the office, I just don't have time to talk on the phone. When I'm in the car, I make calls constantly. I get so much done that way."

Kohen dismissed the notion of a mobile phone being a luxury, saying, "if someone wants to work hard, the car and the phone are not luxurious perks. If someone does not really work, then the salary is a luxurious perk."

Nobody ever accused Ge'ula Kohen of resting on her laurels, or of doing nothing to earn her salary. But she is the first to admit that the country has too many deputy ministers, and that her post is one of those that should not really exist.

"If a minister does his work well, there is no reason why most ministries need a deputy minister," she said. Particularly large ministries may need deputies, but Science and Technology is clearly not in that category. Nevertheless, she said, "Tehiya was not about to give up on something that all of the coalition members got when the agreement was drawn up a year ago."

That coalition agreement set the scene for today's absurd situation. With 13 deputy ministers, in addition to 21 ministers (of whom 19 are MKs), more than one-quarter of all Knesset members enjoy a ministry post. Perhaps the best way of underscoring the significance of their numbers is to note that Israel has more deputy ministers today than it had ministers in David Ben-Gurion's first government.

From the public's point of view, that makes for an awful lot of government cars, mobile phones, drivers, aides, fancy offices, expense accounts, trips abroad, and all of the other trappings of public posts. From the point of view of good government...why discuss good government in a situation where the main idea was to create a coalition at all costs?

Deputy Ministers Efrayim Gur (Transport) and Eli'ezer Mizrahi (Health) hold their posts not because of their long and gradual climb within a party apparatus, but because of their willingness to discard past allegiances and throw their support behind Yitzhaq Shamir at a particularly sensitive moment in the spring of 1990, when Shamir's ability to glue together 61 mandates looked questionable. Gur left the Labor Party after long and apparently agonizing deliberations; in the end, the promise of a deputy ministership—first in Communications, later in Transport—sealed the deal.

Coalition members are quick to stress that the Labor Party offered at least as many plum assignments to the people and parties it tried to woo into a coalition last year. In the end, the Likud's offers won the day, so Labor MKs have taken to criticizing the situation. "I can understand them," said Deputy Education and Culture Minister Pinhas Goldstein. "If I had not gotten this post, I would probably be complaining too."

"That's the price of democracy," many deputy ministers have said repeatedly in the year since the government was formed. Indeed, in Israel's super-pure strain of democracy, where any tiny voice with a Knesset seat or two can swing the balance of power, "the price of democracy" often seems equitable with blackmail and payoffs. And the market prices have never been higher.

"It is a heavy price to pay, because it isn't worthwhile," said Hebrew University Professor of Political Science Yitzhaq Galnoor. "There have been deputy ministers in

the past who got their posts as political payoffs, but today there are more than ever."

And while handing out plum jobs has always been a reality in this country's evolving political culture, Galnoor noted that today's deputy ministers occupy spots from which they can supervise the continued divvying up of extra funds to their own followers. "It doesn't end with the office, the car and the secretary," he said.

Not all deputy ministers can be accused of using their seat near the center of money and power to further their own backers' well being, but in some cases, actions speak louder than words. Deputy Housing and Construction Minister Avraham Ravitz threatened to resign recently because he was unhappy with the treatment accorded ultra-Orthodox non-profit organizations that want land to build homes. With Moledet constantly threatening to bolt the coalition and other defections always a possibility, Ravitz knew that pulling his two-man Degel Hatora faction out of the coalition did not sit well. It didn't take long for the lands to be promised.

If the political payoffs ended with the distribution of a few extra deputy minister posts, political scientists say, the problem might not be so serious, but the deputies are just one of the more attention-getting jewels in a crown of political payoffs and dealmaking that have little to do with the public good.

"Deputy ministers are not so expensive in and of themselves," says Galnoor. "But they are part of an unprecedented usurpation by the coalition of all national resources. Deputy ministers themselves are not the problem; you could say that the problem is that they have lost all sense of proportion and shame."

Hebrew University political science Professor Peter Medding traces the evolution of the system from the early days of independence when, he says, "the doctrine of collective responsibility was used quite successfully to maintain coalition discipline."

"Until 1967, the government was able to act as a single unit, despite the fact that it was a coalition government," says Medding. "[Former premiers] Ben-Gurion, (Levi) Eshkol and (Golda) Meir were able to keep ministers in line."

In those days, however, Mapai enjoyed a strong position that no party enjoys today. It was able to set the rules and tell potential coalition partners, "Take it or leave it." Today, with more parties needed to make a coalition, a free-for-all has emerged. Medding calls it, "Last in, best-dressed. If you create the coalition majority, you get a lot of blackmail power."

In the good old days, deputy ministers usually were appointed only in the largest ministries, such as defense and education, or in cases in which the prime minister held additional portfolios and therefore could not devote full-time attention to each post. Shimon Peres, for

example, served as deputy defense minister when prime minister Ben-Gurion held the portfolio.

Of course, back in those days, a minister usually picked his own deputy. That made sense, considering that a deputy minister should exist to help his minister apply his world-view to the task at hand. (The Education and Culture Ministry was an exception; the Mapai minister had a deputy from the National Religious Party to handle the State Religious school system.)

Today, most deputy ministers serve under ministers from different parties, and few of the ministers actually chose their own deputies.

Ravitz claims this serves the broad public interest. "If the minister saw things exactly as I see them, I would have nothing to do," he says. According to this view, it's a good thing that Ari'el Sharon doesn't see eye-to-eye with his deputy, because that gives Ravitz what to do in the ministry.

"On his own, Sharon would not have taken a deputy minister," says Ravitz. "He might have taken another aide or adviser."

Rather than causing him insecurity, Ravitz insists, "That does not bother me at all. I am in this position as part of a coalition agreement, just as he is in his position because of the coalition agreement."

That isn't the way things began. The deputy minister model comes from Britain, where the post is used as a stepping stone for up-and-coming politicians. By serving under a minister of the same world-view, they gain experience and work side-by-side to carry out a particular vision.

Ge'ula Kohen says she was willing to take the deputy post only at Science and Technology, where she could serve under the man she calls "my minister," Tehiya leader Yuval Ne'eman. A top aide to Eli'ezer Mizrahi, on the other hand, says the deputy health minister is fulfilling an important job under Minister Ehud Olmert by addressing the problem of kashrut in the nation's hospitals. It's a safe bet that neither Olmert nor anyone else from his own Likud party would have put that high on the agenda at the Health Ministry.

Mizrahi may be happy, but Medding certainly is not. "This explosion of deputy ministers is another example of the balkanization of the system," he says. "Most of these appointments were used as a way of keeping the coalition together. This is the first time we have had cases of deputy ministers who have no apparent responsibility, people who got their jobs because they were willing to throw their support behind this party or the other."

"You cannot blatantly hand out goodies and maintain a semblance of a constitutional system," says Medding. "This is another manifestation of the depth to which political leaders have sunk in Israel. It brings the system into disrepute in the eyes of the public."

Ge'ula Kohen freely admits that the Science and Technology Ministry has no need for a deputy minister. "Now that I am here, I am doing a lot of important work," she says, "but a good minister can do it on his own."

Deputy Education and Culture Minister Pinhas Goldstein, who has ministerial responsibility for sport, believes it is high time for a Ministry of Sport. Nevertheless, he openly admits that he believes the number of ministers and deputy ministers has gotten out of hand. Stating a sentiment heard often from deputy ministers and their aides, he says, "There should be reform. There should be limits on the numbers of ministers and deputies. But as long as the current situation prevails, I am doing a good job."

Kohen does not see it as an economic issue. The money spent on unnecessary deputies is minimal, she says, when compared to so many larger outlays, such as the moneys distributed each year to religious institutions. Nevertheless, she says, the situation is not good, and points to the need for reform.

"If a decision were made tomorrow to cancel all of the deputy minister posts, I would accept that," says Kohen. "Of course I would be disappointed, because I like what I do, but that isn't what really matters."

[Boxed item, p 15]

Paying for Service Rendered—How much Does a Deputy Minister Take Home Every Month?

Deputy Ministers complain that they go home with less money each month than they earned as MKs. Sources in the Knesset Finance Committee, which deals with—among other things—salaries to MKs, ministers and deputies, say this is true, as far as it goes, but it goes further.

MKs and deputy ministers earn the same gross monthly salary—NIS [new Israeli shekels] 7,015 at last count. Ministers get an additional NIS 700 per month. However, deputy ministers get a company car, which plain old MKs don't get. The government makes a calculation of "imputed income" to reflect the value of personal use of the car each month. Bottom line: deputy ministers pay income tax as if they had an additional NIS 910 per month of income, meaning that their pay slips show about NIS 440 less deposited into their bank accounts each month than into the accounts of MKs. Anyone who thinks he can maintain a new car for NIS 440 per month, including insurance and depreciation, would say the deputies get a raw deal.

The cost to the taxpayer, of course, goes far beyond the salaries—which the deputies would get anyway—and the car. That's just the tip of the iceberg of extra costs incurred by many of the deputies once they get into office and start distributing funds.

[Boxed item, p 16]

The Baker's Dozen

The ranks of MKs who hold the post of deputy minister in the current government continue to swell.

Last week, 'Ovadya Eli was appointed Deputy Defense Minister. In a refreshing change from the norm, Eli comes from the same party as his new boss, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, and the two Likud men are expected to work well together.

The deputies run the gamut from those who are, for all intents and purposes, ministers to those who, for all intents and purposes, do nothing. "Some of the deputies have no responsibilities at all," says Deputy Housing and Construction Minister Avraham Ravitz. The political scientists call such appointments political payoffs, and they insist that they cause great damage to the system and the nation as a whole.

On that note, here are the 13 deputies:

Yosef Azran (Shas), Finance

Yiga'el Bibi (National Religious Party), Environment (there is no full-time Environment Minister, and the Prime Minister—who officially holds the portfolio—has his hands full, so Bibi's responsibilities are broad.)

Ge'ula Kohen (Tehiya), Science and Technology, with responsibility for absorbing immigrant scientists. She also serves in the aliya cabinet.

'Ovadya Eli (Likud) Defense, with responsibility for home front preparedness

Moshe Gafni (Degel Hatora), Religious Affairs

Pinhas Goldstein (The Zionist Idea), Education and Culture, with ministerial responsibility for sport

Efrayim Gur (Unity for Peace and Immigration), Transport, with responsibility for immigrant affairs and the war on traffic accidents

Shmu'el Halpert (Agudat Yisrael), Labor and Social Affairs, with responsibility for the National Insurance Institute

Eli'ezer Mizrahi (Geulat Israel) Health, with responsibility for religious hospitals and kashrut enforcement at all hospitals

Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud), Foreign Affairs

Menahem Porush (Agudat Yisrael), Labor and Social Affairs (a de facto minister except that the Council of Tora Sages will not let him hold a ministerial post in the Zionist government)

Avraham Ravitz (Degel Hatora), Construction and Housing, special responsibility for the housing needs of Orthodox non-profit organizations

Avraham Verdiger (Agudat Yisrael), Jerusalem Affairs

Arens Meets Hebron Merchants

TA0807063391 Jerusalem QOL YISRA'EL in English
0400 GMT 8 Jul 91

[Text] Defense Minister Moshe Arens and senior Army officers met yesterday in Jerusalem with members of Hebron's bureau of commerce, who were elected in a citywide vote last month. The meeting centered on the economic situation in the territories.

One of the bureau's representatives said afterwards that the meeting was cordial. He said the representatives issued to the defense minister a list of 14 requests for measures meant to ease the situation for residents of the territories. They included a request to lower taxes and commercial fees and to cancel orders that limit the residents' freedom of movement.

Israel's coordinator of activities in the territories, Major General Dani Rothschild, has rescinded the order to body search residents of the territories crossing between Jordan and Israel at the Allenby Bridge. Instead, soldiers will search only a sample of those crossing the bridge. A QOL YISRA'EL reporter says the move will make the crossing from one country to another less time-consuming.

Syrian Intentions Toward PLO in Lebanon Analyzed

91AE0489A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Jul 91
p B3

[Article by 'Amos Gilbo'a: "The Voice Is That of the Lebanese Army but the Hands Are Syrian"]

[Text] The Lebanese Army deserves a tip of the hat. It is still a weak army, with outdated equipment, with ethnic loyalties. It does not have the strength or ability to confront the armed Palestinian force on Lebanese soil, to dismantle its weapons or enter the refugee camps. But this week it was moved by pent-up hatred, and perhaps what is more important: Syrian backing.

This is the same army that is well known to many in the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]. I got to know it back in the days before the civil war in Lebanon and afterward, when it fell apart, when Israel conducted "peace talks" with the regime in Beirut after the Peace for Galilee campaign. They were nice guys who liked the good life, loyal first of all to themselves and afterward to the sect they belonged to: Shiite, Christian, Druze, Muslim Sunni. They always admired the IDF, feared the Syrians and hated the Palestinians with a passion.

That hatred was fanned by constant degradation and deliberate cruelty. Once I witnessed it when I was scouting Palestinian roadblocks. I did not understand how they could keep quiet, officers and soldiers in uniform, as Palestinian terrorists took their weapons, slapped their faces and kicked them in the butt. They

kept quiet because they were weak, because there was no strong government behind them. The Palestinians were simply strong.

This week the Lebanese Army won back some of its self-esteem. It entered the jaws of the Palestinian lion in Sidon for the first time in many years, fought in the Palestinian strongholds east of the city and was successful. It deserves a tip of the hat, but we should not put on blinders.

If we are talking about tipping hats, then the Syrians deserve a double portion. The saying that "the wicked (and those who are not particularly just) get others to do their dirty work" applies to this situation. Once it was the Christians who did the job, once the Druze, once the Shiites, once the various leftist organizations and only when there was no choice was Syrian blood spilled. This time the Lebanese Army did 'Assad's work in a very kosher way. The Lebanese defense minister is the Syrian spokesman, and most of the Lebanese Army officers are now considered loyal to them, after passing the filter of Syrian "field security."

What do the Syrians want and what is their game?

—For appearance's sake they want it to appear as if the Lebanese Government and Army are sovereign and independent.

—They want it to be the Lebanese Army that strikes the Palestinians.

—In the final analysis they want a political arrangement that will allow 'Arafat to maintain his forces' presence in South Lebanon, in the refugee camps, in exchange for cooperating with Syria in a "political process" and a renunciation of independent decisionmaking by the PLO.

—The Syrians' final objective is to gradually create a situation in which, under the guise of extending Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory (except, of course, those areas controlled by the Syrian army), pressure will begin to build to bring the Lebanese Army down to the international border with Israel and to do away with the security zone. In Syrian terminology this is called: "Liberating South Lebanon from the yoke, of Israeli conquest."

This is the problem now facing Israel, because the voice is that of the Lebanese Army, but the hands are those of Damascus. Were it a question of a real army and an independent Lebanese government wanting to impose "law and order" on South Lebanon (as in the case of Jordan, September, 1970), we could accept it. But the situation in Lebanon is entirely different.

South Lebanon is swarming with Hizballa people, whom the Lebanese Army does not and will not touch because they are protected by the Syrians; with the Palestinian terrorists there will finally be some kind of arrangement; the Lebanese Army lacks the ability, the firmness and the staying power to prevent armed activity against us; the

Syrians, of course, do not care if that continues so long as it does not involve friction between them and the IDF.

A dish with an unpleasant political and defense aroma is now cooking up in South Lebanon.

PLO Structure, Activity in Tunis Described

91AE0488A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
5 Jul 91 pp 10-11,19

[Article by Bo'az Bismut: "A State Within a State: The PLO in Tunisia"]

[Text] It is impossible to be in Tunis without coming into contact with the PLO, especially when you are an Israeli. My Israeli passport caused a small "traffic jam" around the counter at the incoming passenger terminal in the Carthage airport. Tunisian guards very politely asked me to wait in a side office. 'Abu 'Ahmad arrived. A well-tended mustache, fluent English, modern glasses and a pin with the Palestinian flag attached to his blazer. 'Ahmad also had a corner of his own in the airport, except that he represents the PLO there. The PLO in Tunis, you have to understand, is like a state within a state.

'Abu 'Ahmad, like the rest of his Palestinian colleagues in Tunis, arrived here after the war in Lebanon. He would prefer to be in his own country. Not Lebanon, of course: but in Palestine. And if not, then Tunis certainly constitutes a rather successful temporary solution for him and his people. "Live and let live"—that is the motto that the Tunisians broadcast to their guests: Behave properly here and, in exchange, you will get a lot of rights. And it works. The Reuters correspondent in Tunis 'Abdel 'Aziz Barushi says that since the Palestinians arrived not a single incident has been logged between the hosts and their guests. "Relations are very good," he says.

The Palestinians have almost total independence in Tunis. It is enough to look at something as apparently banal as the way the Palestinians drive in Tunis to understand that. A local policeman will not bother stopping cars with the letters RS on the license plates, i.e., "Temporary Resident." Those cars are almost always driven by Palestinians.

In October 1985 the PLO headquarters, located in the Hamamasht suburb, was bombed. Before the bombing, not only the headquarters was there but also almost the entire Palestinian settlement. After the bombing they decided to disperse.

This week I visited there. After a short trip on the Jafiya highway leading to Tripoli, the capital of Libya, about 20 km from the capital, Tunis, we arrived in Hamamasht, 500 km from the sea.

Two cars, a Mercedes and a BMW, with the RS temporary residency license plates, are leaving the place, though the second is Libyan. The drivers look at me and

at the driver who is chauffeuring me. By the way, they do not like strangers here, but, on the other hand, no one stops us from coming in.

On the right there is a blue sign inscribed "To the Dead Martyrs of October 1985." On the other side, a monument to their memory. I get out of the car. I want to take a picture. An old man sitting opposite tells me that "photographs are not allowed here." He is, apparently, the guard.

About 100 meters from there is the office of the PLO. Yes, in Hamamasht. In fact the PLO people decided to disperse after the bombing, but they did not flee the place. Their sense of honor does not let them leave because of what happened.

Outside the office there are about ten guards. Three of them are in khaki uniform. Two sit on a car. Almost all of them have mustaches. They look at the car that is bringing me with a penetrating look. No one stops us. No one asks questions. On the way out a Bordeaux-colored Peugeot makes sure to follow us. So that we do not, God forbid, photograph the monument.

We come to the crossroads. The light is red. We stop. The bordeaux-colored car overtakes us and goes on through. The red light, after all, is for Tunisians...

Who are those PLO people in Tunis? How do they live? Do they believe in peace at all? Are they interested in it?

Basam 'Abu Sharif's house is located in the 'Al Manuah neighborhood. There are pretty white, well-tended villas, mostly new, in this prestigious housing area. Basam's villa is neither more nor less beautiful than the neighboring ones, but it is more conspicuous because of the guards.

It is easy to identify where the Palestinian leaders live in Tunis: Security people patrol around their homes. Tunisian policemen also take turns in the guard duty. "We have to guard them. They are our guests and we promised to provide them shelter and security," a Tunisian source told me and added: "You know what a shame it was for us when the Israelis attacked them in 1985. It was as if we were not concerned about them"

In Basam's house I was asked to come in and wait inside. No, not on the upper floor, where Basam lives with his family, but downstairs, in the security personnel office. A simple wooden table, two chairs, and two beds. The room is very simple but very clean. On the opposite wall hangs a Palestinian flag. On the other walls are lots of postcards. All of them have the same inscription: intifadah.

There are also photographs of the intifadah hanging on the walls. For example, an IDF soldier dragging a Palestinian lad, or a soldier confronting a woman. "You see? This is what is happening today in Palestine," they tell me.

I asked them if there was any hope at all for peace. "Peace will come at the end of the world," they answered me, "it is impossible for there to be any peace between the two peoples."

But in Tunis, as everywhere, there are all kinds of people. There are pessimists and optimists, radicals and moderates. There are also those who want to talk, and they talk.

Concerning talking, according to Israeli law, it is illegal to talk to the PLO. But, as we said, people talk. A lot of Israelis, even from the right, violate that law—so I was told here. Abie Natan told me that at the PLO headquarters, in the 'Al Manuah neighborhood, there is a document containing the names of 200 Israelis who have talked with the PLO.

On the eve of my departure from Tunis I dined with Abie in the hotel when Jibril, one of 'Ahmad Jibril's people, ("the first deportee of the intifadah," as he presented himself), arrived at the hotel. He also spoke of that document. According to what he had heard, a lot of Likud people, including a number of ministers, would be embarrassed if their names were to be made public. Abie Natan saw the document himself, but is not about to volunteer the names. "I think they are doing the right thing, so why get them into trouble with the law," he says, in an obvious show of fairness.

Jibril is approaching 40. He is very intelligent, sharp, quick-witted. He speaks excellent Hebrew. He is more astute about the mysteries of Israeli politics than many MK's in Israel. He explains why David Levi has no chance of becoming prime minister under present conditions in Likud, asks who among the contenders is the leading candidate and wonders if Rabin would really be different from Shamir...

The man declares that he wants peace. From the great deal of assistance he provides his friend Abie, he gives the impression of being serious. But he is also stubborn. If the years go by and there is no peace on the horizon, he would not hesitate to try the other way.

On the way back to the ground floor in Basam's villa, the young guards are no less polite than the Tunisian police who greeted me. No wonder; a considerable number of them are Tunisians, who work for the PLO. Others came from Lebanon. It is easy to know who is who. The French speakers are Tunisian; the English speakers are the "Lebanese." One of them makes sure to bring me coffee.

The favorite topics of conversation among the security personnel are soccer and cars, as with young guys the world over. "Do you drive fast?" they want to know. For them, fast driving is good driving.

The young man who brought me the coffee says he took part in the war in Lebanon. He lived in West Beirut. I did not like that war, he says. He recounts how when they would find a bomb, they would toss a coin to decide who would dismantle it. "Stupid war," he says about the war in Lebanon, while asking if he could buy the newspaper

I write for in Tunis. I explained to them that YEDI'OT AHARONOT is an Israeli newspaper. They smiled broadly.

At the PLO headquarters they were very busy this week. It was bad timing for Abie Natan to submit his questions then. And his answers. It began with the death from cancer of 'Abdul Rahman Rahim, one of the PLO leaders in Amman. It continued with the events in Lebanon.

On Monday the PLO leadership met at headquarters to discuss the situation. I went there during the course of the discussion. There were dozens of bodyguards in the place, theirs shirts hanging outside their pants to cover their pistols. "We can carry as many weapons here as we like," they said.

Within the headquarters, several meters from me, 'Arafat and all his leadership were gathering. Outside there were tens of bodyguards. And I was there. Undoubtedly a strange feeling.

The Tunisian authorities, as we said, give the PLO people a free hand. Up to a limit. George Habash and Hawatmeh are persona non grata in Tunis. 'Abu 'al 'Abbas cannot go there at all, a Tunisian source told me. Tunisia is willing to host a PLO state within its borders so long as it is the moderate factions.

The PLO continues its media war from Tunis. The PLO chiefs work until the early hours of the morning. Their support for Saddam Husayn in the Gulf war does not make their life easy now. The money from the Gulf has stopped coming in. There are those who believe that the rift between the PLO and the Gulf states is temporary, that the money will still come back to the PLO. Meanwhile, at the PLO they are tightening their belts. When their people travel around the world, they no longer go to hotels but, in order to save money, sleep at the homes of friends, instead.

There was one moment that I will not forget in the four days I spent in Tunis as a YEDI'OT AHARONOT correspondent. That was when Abie and I were arguing in a loud voice in the hotel restaurant in Hebrew and one of the diners, an English citizen, apparently identified the language, and, by the expression on his face, nearly fainted from astonishment. A loud conversation in Hebrew in the Hotel Hilton in Tunis. There is, by the way, no law against it.

On Tuesday my presence there began to be disturbing. There were those in the PLO leadership who raised an eyebrow: Why all of a sudden is an Israeli journalist looking into the PLO in Tunis? It was explained to them that it had to do with a meeting with Abie, who attracts wide coverage and interest in Israel.

PLO people are sensitive to anything written about them. The FAX machine works overtime, and every article that appears in Israel connected directly or indirectly to the PLO is sent here.

On Wednesday I left Tunis. On my departure from the country I again managed to surprise the police at passport control. Even after I had passed through and was on my way to the waiting area for the Tunis-Air flight to Paris, another detective waited for me, who asked for additional particulars. As on my arrival, I heard once more the same sentence: "It is only a formality."

"You can come back here whenever you want," he told me.

Antoine Lahd on Prospects for South Lebanon

91AE0504A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 19 Jul 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Antoine Lahd, commander of South Lebanon Army, by correspondent Ari'ela Ringel-Hoffman]

[text] Last Sunday, wearing a white suit, bright striped shirt and soft leather shoes, General Antoine Lahd seemed quite at ease. The meeting that took place in one of the grander hotels in Tel Aviv, was carried on in English, with the interpreting done by Minerva Lahd, wife of the general. The couple's children wandered around the lobby. You could see that this was not the first time they had come to the place.

Every few weeks, Lahd gathers his family and travels to Tel Aviv for a long weekend. Less than an hour's flight brings them from one world to another. More frequently, he arrives at the city alone, usually for a series of concentrated meetings with members of the Ministry of Defense and the Army.

From the lobby of the hotel—with the sea view from the window, and the yellow sand—Lebanon seems far away, the deployment of the Army in the South less threatening. And, at any rate, maybe the time has come for Lahd, a man no longer young, with the difficult trauma of the assassination attempt, to take things easier.

General Lahd is 61, married at a rather advanced age to a much younger woman. He is father of a son, "almost Bar Mitzvah," and a daughter, almost six years old. The SLA (South Lebanon Army) rests on his shoulders. He knows that he is more than a commander. More than another soldier who knows how to prepare his men for battle. And today more than ever.

Is he tired? "Yes. I am tired. When I came to the south, I had a goal, a mission I had to fulfil. Today, after the assassination attempt, I am much weaker, but I cannot give in now. As long as I can carry out my function, I will not retire."

When Lahd was asked, during the interview, to try to paint a picture of the status of Lebanon in coming months, he said that in Lebanon it is impossible to guess what will happen in the next 24 hours. When he spoke of the South, he mentioned the Hizballah organization more than once. He said that what happens in Beirut

does not necessarily influence the South. It will take time, he made clear, much time, until the sounds of the concert that took place this week on the dividing line in Beirut, between the Muslim and Christian neighborhoods, reach the South. But he is optimistic, he said. Being where he is, you have to be optimistic.

Three days after the meeting, a soldier from the army he commands, the South Lebanese Army, was killed, and three soldiers of the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) were killed. In both instances there were encounters with members of the Hizballah.

The freedom of action that the members of the organization still have also worries General Lahd, in the context of the city of Jezzín. The "Iron Triangle," the area where the men of the Hizballah are concentrated, constitutes an easy point of exit for whoever wants to cut off the Jezzín enclave from the south. "We protected Jezzín," he said, "in difficult conditions. We shed much blood and put in efforts toward guarding the safety of its people. We can not abandon them now. Anyone who wishes to enter Jezzín, he said, will have to talk to me first. Jezzín is not an Israeli matter. It is a Lebanese matter, and I am responsible for it."

During this vacation in Tel Aviv, Lahd met with a number of people, including Uri Lubrani, coordinator of actions in Lebanon, and the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ehud Barak. The question of the future of Jezzín was certainly on the agenda.

The Lahd family lives in Marj, in a low stone house not far from headquarters. If not for worry over his personal safety, the General could cover the distance from here to there by foot. The house is surrounded by a strict guard. Assassination attempts have taught those who need to know that Lahd is constantly a target.

As we have seen, the family spends some vacations in Tel Aviv. Once a year, more or less, the family goes overseas, usually to France. In Paris, Lahd feels at home. Both he and his wife speak fluent French, and he is quite fond of French cuisine.

If he had not found himself in South Lebanon stepping into the shoes of Major Sa'd Hadad, France might have been a real alternative for them. At least for a time.

The Israeli romance with Lahd also began with an acquaintance that began in Paris many years before. We are speaking of the years 1973 to 1975. Lahd was studying then in the military academy. Studying together with him was reserve Brigadier Menahem Eynan. In 1982, Eynan, commander of a division in Lebanon, sought him out in Shuf. The mayor of Dir al-Qamar passed the message on to Beirut. The two met. Lahd, who had lost the contest for the position of chief of staff, had retired from the Lebanese army. The matter of the south came up only later. An Israeli agent in Beirut established contact with him, arranged a meeting

between Lahd and the commander of the **national intelligence unit**, Brigadier Dagan, and his second-in-command, Colonel Y.

The meeting took place in the home of Camille Shamun, and with his blessing. This was the first meeting with a well-known military personality. Not another man of the South sprouting up to become commander of a tiny militia, whose soldiers camp their tanks by the house at day's end, but a military man with a splendid record. The Israelis offered him a position of strength from which he could fly.

Later, there was a meeting with Moshe Arens, then minister of defense. "Does Israel have intentions of ruling South Lebanon?" Lahd asked. "We have an interest in living at peace with our neighbors to the north," said Arens.

Lahd was not naive enough to think he would receive a different answer. But he felt it right that the question should be asked. In Lebanon, he thought, there are already the Syrians, the Libyans, the Iranians, and the Palestinians. Israel at least defines a limited objective: Guarding the security of her northern inhabitants and seeing to order in the security zone. "The moment it becomes clear to me," he said, "that in reality other things are happening, I will retire from the business, or organize an opposition movement."

This did not happen. Lahd has already stayed in the security zone for seven years. The SLA (South Lebanon Army), during the time of his command, and this has already been recorded, turned into an organized army, with close to 3,000 soldiers. From an army with a Christian majority and a Christian orientation, it became a "Southern" army, with a Shiite majority, Druze soldiers and Christian soldiers all together. Over the years, the IDF turned over most of the positions in the security zone to SLA control, and the general feeling in the army is, that the results are better than they could have expected when the general took command.

In General Lahd's terms, Jezzín is a symbol. Something of the serenity in which the interview was being carried out disappears when we arrive at the question of the enclave's future. Jezzín is Lahd's "baby." The Lebanese army's deployment in southern Lebanon, around the city, creates serious pressure for the general today.

If what happens in the security zone is a result of the Israeli interest in the place, Jezzín is an expression of Lahd's efforts to give legitimacy to the South, to prove that he also controls a place Israel apparently has no interest in. What happened in East Saïda—a Christian neighborhood in Jezzín which was burned during the civil war, and whose citizens who escaped murder fled—says Lahd, will not happen again. The lesson of East Saïda calls for this.

Within a month, Lebanese media have said, with the agreement of Syrian sources, that the Lebanese army is going to control the enclave. The Lebanese Secretary of

State, Shaukhi Fahuri, said that the subject of Jezzín will be solved by diplomatic means.

Anyone who says that Jezzín is a test case for the Israeli position with relation to the south, will not be taken seriously in the army. Damaging the autonomy of Jezzín would cost the Israelis dearly, they say, and would bring about the unraveling of the security zone.

More than once, the State of Israel has succeeded on showing the wrong card in Lebanon and losing local support. Lebanon cannot let this happen again. Lahd knows this, even if he does not say it openly. But he also knows, that without Israeli support in his battle for the city, he will not succeed in standing up to the pressure that comes from Beirut, with the backing of Syria. Most of his last meetings have been to clarify this position.

In the Office for Coordination of Activities in Lebanon, headed by Uri Lubrani, they are careful to insure that things be really clear. "No agreement concerning the city," says Lahd, "will be accepted without me." And they agree with him on that. They agree that Jezzín is his responsibility, and whoever wants to arrive at an arrangement there, will have to speak with Lahd.

Lahd sees himself as a Lebanese patriot. The security zone, according to him, is Free Lebanon. He was born in the Shuf mountains, in the village of Katara. He joined the army at an early age. The vicissitudes of life and the mysteries of fate brought him to the South. He never imagined that he would someday find himself cooperating with the Israelis, setting limits for the deployment of his country's army.

In Beirut, he says, there is established a puppet government set up by the Syrians. The Syrians are stirring the Lebanese pot, as a woman [would do] stirring pots that belong to her. First, he says, they sent the Palestinian guerrilla organizations to Lebanon, armed them and turned them into an agitating and inflaming factor. Now they are making arrangements with them, through the Lebanese army.

The Lebanese agreement with the Syrians, he says, is an agreement between the weak one who has no choice, and the strong. This is a Syrian conquest by nonmilitary means.

Perhaps of all the possibilities, is this the solution that harms Lebanon least?

The best arrangement for the Lebanese is that everyone should leave and leave us to mind our own affairs. That the Syrians should leave Beirut; the Israelis should leave the zone and that the Iranians and the Palestinians should also stop meddling in Lebanon.

In Israel, they say that no new situation has been created that should require a change in policy concerning the security zone. As long as the different organizations have not laid down their arms, as long as they continue anti-Israeli activities, there is no reason to hurry. It is

necessary to follow the events very carefully and to make decisions with care, Lubrani said this week.

Israel, at this moment, is sitting at an observation post. No soldier moves from his place. Lahd will deal with the future of Jezzín. The security zone, in the meantime, is outside the negotiation package. Any negotiation package.

General Lahd has been in the security zone for seven years. "My hair," he says "has turned white here." An assassination attempt was made on his life. He came out of the incident a different man. Thinner, grayer, with a right hand he cannot move and health problems that are not simple and in need of continuing attention. After the assassination attempt Gen. Lahd is not the same man.

In the winter of 1988, I interviewed him for the first time. A profile on the commander of the SLA after four years in the command. To prepare for the interview, I visited Majadiyah, an SLA training base, Hatzbiya, a Druze city at the north east corner of the security zone, a number of villages, including Shiite villages. The tour was well guarded. Lahd spoke then of fear. "You learn to live with it," he said, "I am a military man, and a military man knows that he may die in battle. The possibility that a young woman might put a bullet into him at point-blank range, leaving him lying in his blood until he is saved at the last moment, would have seemed far out indeed.

In the winter of 1988, we also spoke about the Lebanese "war of independence." The uprising, that would burst out in the south and move northward. Lahd, though he was very careful in his analyses, spoke of his responsibility to the entire Lebanese people. Of the possibility that the South would actually bring about, under his leadership, such a struggle, even if limited as he would have wanted it. "Today," he says, "the dream of my life is Free Lebanon." "I am not sure," he says, "that this will happen during my time, but I am sure that it will happen. The Lebanese people survived a long string of conquerors and overcame them all. It is only a matter of time."

Today he will no longer say that a war of independence of the sort he dreams of is a struggle he will be able to lead himself. And in any case, he says, the Middle East is filled with surprises. Who can know what will happen tomorrow.

And can we guess what will happen in another five years?

Lahd smiles. "Either Israel and Syria will divide Lebanon between them, or there will be another war and its results will decide what will be the fate of the Lebanese."

Do you see a possibility that Israel will arrive at an arrangement with the Syrians at the expense of the Lebanese?

He says that the basis of the relations with Israel is common interest. It is true that with the years personal friendships have also emerged, and he has acquired

many very good friends in the State, but he does not delude himself. It is not personal friendships that will decide the south's fate, just as they will not decide his personal fate.

MK Nissim on Labor Projections for Immigrants

91AE0501A Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew 26 Jun 91
pp 2, 11

[Article by Moshe Nissim]

[Text] In the State of Israel, as in the rest of the world, we must make a distinction today between the business sector and the public sector. In the public sector, the burden is on the shoulders of the public: the State budget, the budget of the local authorities, the Histadrut budget, the budget of the Jewish Agency. It makes no difference. Therefore, this is a heavy burden on the State of Israel.

In contrast there is the business sector. The business sector is industry, commerce, and also services. The time has come for us to open our eyes and understand that industry and commerce without services are truly impossible. Industry grows, commerce grows, and services must grow at the same time. It is needless to say how important this is right now, when we are crying out for a healthy level of employment.

Among other things, I am weighing the possibility of suggesting that the same incentive for additional employees be applied to the entire business sector. Every additional job place, whether there are five or 10 workers, is worthy of incentives.

The Income Tax Commission must deal with thousands of factories and companies, and this is not easy. But, because of the importance and the seriousness of the hour, we are apparently going to have to make this effort.

I want to praise Knesset Member Gal, both because he has made such a suggestion, which I have said has first priority in our program, and also because he has agreed not to go through the legislative system, because it is not desirable to take steps like these through legislation, but rather through administrative means. I want to strive to not only expand this plan to cover more sectors and also smaller numbers of workers, but also to extend the plan beyond ten months. This is still under consideration and I hope we will arrive at a favorable conclusion.

With respect to the cooperative stores, I am sorry that we do not have the power to intervene. We do not have any legal means to force cooperative stores to sell to this person or that person. There is commercial freedom. We are not responsible for supporting cooperative stores to the extent that we can limit their commercial freedom. So, we have no means to deal with that problem.

The development of an infrastructure for transportation, i.e., roads, railroads, ports, communication; development of a tourist infrastructure, of an infrastructure for

water, energy—all are projects worthy of pointing out so as to expedite initiatives [for their approval]. Every plan that is ready and can be put into action, should be carried out immediately, without taking the budgetary deficit into account. Development of infrastructures is a positive undertaking even if it creates a budgetary deficit.

Only someone without eyes in his head can say that we should depend on nature when the nation is struggling with the greatest national mission that the State of Israel has ever faced.

There has been criticism of our investment plan, that is to say, of the State's guarantee to investors. First of all, there is no additional involvement here. We do not give both a grant and a State guarantee, but we do exchange a grant for a State guarantee. This is less involvement, less risk, less budget. But also more security for the investor, because here there is sharing of risks. For the investor, this is important.

One more thing: There is still no book written on the new reality facing us. We will write that book.

When I hear comments by people who speak against State guarantees, I say that as a rule you need to limit State involvement as much as you can. But not in this period. This is a special period for the State. Jobs are not going to fall out of the sky.

It is impossible to import employment. It is possible to import a prefabricated house, but employment cannot be imported. One has to produce, and nothing is harder than that.

I see how every state is worried about its employment problems. I see how ambassadors apply to ministers for lone places of employment in their countries. For there is a world war going on today; there is competition for exports, for markets, that is to say, for employment.

The point is that we need to act today with sense, with common sense, not precipitously, but quickly, in order to activate programs with a government guarantee, to expand employment.

The subject of the removal of special protection for Israeli-made products is very important for the Israeli economy. I mentioned before the subject of competition. Today, the name of the game in the entire world, in eastern European countries, as well—they have learned this—the name of the game today is competition. The ability to compete is the national mission of every state, through guidance of economy and economics. A policy for the removal of protection will serve our ability to compete, as strange as it may seem. So we need removal of protection. As I see it, removing protection is necessary at all times, but at a time when we are concerned about high unemployment, it is unfeasible to rush removing protection; it is unfeasible to remove protection thoughtlessly, or in other words: without common sense.

We have to use removal of protection to solve problems of the economy, i.e., to adapt industry and bring it up to competitive levels. This will create a situation where after workers are laid off, new, more competitive factories will rise, and absorb these workers. This is usually the goal when protection is removed. But, in a period of high unemployment, like ours today, it is impossible to do this extemporaneously. On this subject there have been varying opinions. We have concentrated not on the actual principle of the need to remove protection, but on the question of how to do it.

The main issue: How to do it. Should we do it so that five years from now, automatically, everything without exception and without taking national or other considerations into account—we remove protection, levy tariffs, and lower tariffs to nothing; or, work through legislation. I opposed removing protection through legislation at this time, not only because of the timing, but because carrying out a program of removal of protection through legislation reduces completely our ability to maneuver in international agreements, and I do not want us, under any circumstances, to lose our ability to maneuver.

So, it was decided to extend the time allocated. We are not speaking of five years with respect to factories, carriers, or especially sensitive branches, but of seven years, and the end will not be at zero but at 12 percent and for raw materials, 8 percent. For several years, we operated on what is called "automatic licensing." That is, a license must be granted but it is done more quickly. Therefore, we have control. We promised that the most serious considerations would be given in determining tariff rates. We promised that in sensitive branches there would be not only percentage tariffs, but also fixed tariffs. A fixed tariff solves the problem because a fixed tariff can sometimes be 300 percent, not 50 percent or 70 percent. There are other conditions, that contribute to protecting execution of a project of removing protection sensibly, logically, and in a methodical way.

In 1990, we invested more than 50 million shekels in the development of substructures, as opposed to 10 to 15 million shekels in the past. Also, in 1991, there will be a budget about the same size range. We developed, and will develop, industry and industrial parks all over the country. I would say desirable development, in order to attract investment. The advantage is not only in the fact that we have changed the law and now expeditiously grant permits for building and industrial projects, such as in the building of dwellings. But we also recommend action be taken so that there will be many infrastructures, to facilitate the building of industrial structures, and welcome investors. So that there will not come a time when an investor cannot find a structure. This is actually being carried out in the field.

I also see small businesses as a very important source of growth. We have basically a good plan, without any bureaucracy. We have developed a training project for all small businesses, to which we contribute 75 percent of

the cost, in order to lead, direct, and advise every small entrepreneur through every step. When we speak of small businesses, this does not mean only small industry and workshops, but also trade, services, clinics, homes for the elderly, everything where the entrepreneur has business responsibility.

I see this as a great objective, and I hope that we do perfect our program, and that it will reap some benefits.

The State of Israel, local investors and state budget do not have enough capital to create 500 thousand work places within three years. This requires large investments, and must come to a great extent from foreign sources. Foreign sources meaning both Jews and non-Jews. Everyone who wants to invest in Israel will be blessed. We turn, of course, also to non-Jews. There is not a shadow of a doubt that this is true.

I have spoken to the Jews through the Committee of Presidents and the Federations. There were days when support for the State of Israel needed to be expressed through donations of money for financing budgetary projects. Today, this subject is among the smallest item regarding our needs. The problem affecting the State of Israel is no longer those 300 to 400 million dollars gathered for absorbing immigration, for its direct absorption, but rather investment. And not investment of 3 million dollars, of 2.7 million dollars, of another 2 million dollars, and another 5 million dollars, but a dunam and another dunam, a penny and another penny adding up to billions! This is the what the Jewish people must do.

Here is where interest begins. I say this with complete assurance. I feel this is where interest begins, no more than that. We have, thank God, several good ideas, like the subject of the "Atari" plant (I will not spell out details) and other projects of that kind, smaller but also important. Our problem is investment. I say to the Jews of the Diaspora: we do not ask you to invest in Israel out of emotion, or out of Zionist attachment, not at all. These two things do not go together. We do not ask you to invest in order to contribute or perform acts of charity for Israel, but to invest so that you will earn money. And I say with complete assurance that in the State of Israel there are advantages for foreign investors, unmatched by any other country in the world.

I said that here is where interest begins. Details are still not sufficiently known, and because of this, I demand that the government allow us to conduct aggressive marketing of all our projects, of every component in our plan, to encourage these investments, so that Jews and non-Jews will become aware of them.

I want to say that Israel today also has an excellent workforce, and overall its expenses are lower than that in Western countries. In addition, we have free trade agreements with the United States and Europe, and we constitute today a golden bridge for an American investor who wants to market in Europe, and vice versa.

Therefore, the Jewish people must wake up, and we will do all that we possibly can to alert it to its responsibility.

Results of Labor Party Membership Poll

TA0207113391 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 2 Jul 91 p 12

[Report by Michal Yudelman]

[Excerpts] The Labor Party's membership poll reached 140,657 paying members by Sunday midnight, a figure which surprised even the pollsters, who had expected 40,000-50,000 at the most.

Party secretary-general Mikha Harish and poll committee chairman Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer told a news conference yesterday that the updated poll figures were a revolution in the party, ending the era of deals among party leaders to determine its leadership. [passage omitted]

Of the membership forms already analyzed, some 60 per cent are new members; 53 per cent are between the ages of 18 and 46; 54 per cent are men; and five per cent are new immigrants.

The number enrolling from the Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem areas reached 40,000 and from Beersheba 5,000. It is estimated that some 30 per cent of those who sent in membership forms did so in groups, from their work places, but only some 20,000 enrolled from Histadrut-related institutions. Some 40 per cent of the members enrolled privately and independently. [passage omitted]

Peace Conference Issues Reviewed

TA0208151191 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Aug 91
p 1

[Analysis by Yosef Harif]

[Text] At times, it seems like something unexpected descended upon us yesterday. But the truth is that what happened yesterday had already been concluded between Baker and Shamir on the morning before yesterday—but the two played the game through to its entirety. It was important for each of them to inform the world of this accomplishment at a special event.

Baker was rewarded with glory, as the man who diligently and patiently paved the way to a peace conference. Shamir, for his part, registered a not insignificant diplomatic achievement to his credit.

In reality, it is still unclear whether the last obstacles en route to a peace conference have, indeed, been removed. It is fair to assume that, during face-to-face talks, Baker understood the restrictions and limitations of Shamir—until he sounded the long awaited "yes" in public from this perspective, it must be hoped that, this time, Baker will stand by his words—given that a number of his commitments have melted away in the past.

The obstinance of Shamir paid off this time and even granted him an accomplishment; objectively, he had no alternative. He had to respond positively to the American proposal, at a time when the "whole world"—including Syrian ruler Hafiz al-Asad—has responded positively. But Shamir has conditioned his positive response on the acceptance of the Israeli position on the question of Palestinian representation at the conference—and, in the end, he won the praise of Baker.

Israel will indeed compromise on the question of the participation of a United Nations observer at the conference—but only thanks to the personal commitment of Baker that the United States will make efforts to cancel the United Nations resolution which equates Zionism with racism. As to the continuance of the conference—it was promised that it will not reconvene without Israeli consent.

All the commitments and understandings of the United States will be grounded in a memorandum of understanding.

And still—the Prime Minister was not haughty yesterday. He says that he is aware of the awesome difficulties which still face Israel. He is not euphoric like Foreign Minister David Levy—and he is not a pessimist like Ari'el Sharon, who yesterday said that—in his assessment—"the conference is rigged from the start." Sharon pointed to an interview Assad gave to THE WASHINGTON POST in which the interviewer summarizes her impression that there is no sign of Assad having changed his positions on fundamental issues, but he believes that the American administration is demonstrating sympathy for his basic needs and desires.

Shamir himself said that there is no reason to not go to a conference. "What is there to fear? If something becomes tangled en route to the conference or during its course, I promise you that I will not hesitate to say no." Yesterday, people in his office finished what Shamir was not prepared to say: "Asad is still Asad, but Shamir is still Shamir, too."

Jewish Settlement in Gush Qatif Described

91AE0450F Tel Aviv THE JERUSALEM POST
MAGAZINE in English 7 Jun 91 pp 16-18

[Article by Ron Kampeas: "Gaza's Conflicting Faces"—first paragraph is THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE introduction]

[Text] Gaza is not just rock-throwing mobs and burning tires. For Jewish settlers, the Qatif region is their well-tended home, and one which they are determined to keep and develop.

If you think of Gaza, you might think of what has been described as "the most crowded patch of land in the world": Of 650,000 Palestinians packed into 140 square kilometers—400,000 of them in refugee camps. You might think of the place where the intifadah started, the

home of several of those who roamed the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem stabbing people to death. Above all, you might think of the strip of land mooted by Israelis—publicly on the left, in whispers on the right—and recently among the Palestinian leadership as the first territorial concession Israel could make for peace.

If you think Gaza and have been there recently—as a soldier, as a journalist or otherwise—you might think of squalid refugee camps, of angry, stalking, stone-throwing youth, the pop of guns spitting rubber, or the wailing sirens of UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] ambulances.

But there are at least 4,000 people who would like you to think pastorally, of placid beaches and lazy summer days; of some of the most advanced agriculture technology in the Middle East and in terms of a Jewish future in what many Israelis punningly refer to as Azazel ("hell"). For the first time since the beginning of the intifadah, their arguments are beginning to take hold.

Slick, colorful brochures aimed at the national-religious sector advertising the recently revived Hof Deqalim Hotel have been finding their mark. The hotel, which once had its electricity cut off because of non-payment of its bill, is now packed on weekends. The brochures, crowded with shots of a tennis-playing and jacuzziing young religious couple, promise: "The pleasure is all yours."

Gaza settlements council head Tzvi Hendel is especially proud of the hotel. "The fact that people are coming—even from the national-religious sector—shows that the barriers are breaking down," he says. Hendel, who has lived in the strip since the early 1970s, cites the hotel as a sign that settlement in Gaza is moving into its second phase. "We conceived of two phases when we came here, like a sand dune has two layers of vegetation," says Hendel. "The first phase is like the layer of green you see on sand dunes everywhere: the vegetation spreads itself thinly over the whole area. The second phase, the vegetation that thrives on deeply set roots, comes with cultivation. That is what is happening now."

Hendel, who lines his desk with postcards of Club-Med style scenes from life in Gaza, says that despite Gaza's bad reputation, he is an optimist. "When I came here, we would set up our tents at a likely site, and the next day, we would find that the winds had moved whole hills a meter or so one way or the other, ruining our projections for a village. Now look," he says sweeping a hand towards the boom-town village of Neve Deqalim outside his office window.

Hendel lists the 16 Jewish villages housing 4,000 residents throughout the Gaza Strip. New residents, who must be accepted by absorption committees representing the townspeople, are predominantly recruited through the national-religious network. "There are villages from north to south, but most are concentrated in Gush Qatif." He points to a shaded in area on the southern part of his wall map of the Gaza Strip. "The Gush," as

residents refer to it, is flanked by Rafah on the south, Khan Yunus on the east, the Muwasi coast on the west and a strip of refugee camps to the north.

"In Gush Qatif, there was only Egyptian state land in 1967, and not even state land that was cultivated by locals," says Hendel. "In Judaea-Samaria, Israeli appropriation of state land allegedly squatted on by Palestinians for generations has caused legal battles and raised international controversy. Not even Beduin were living here."

Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, a Gazan lawyer discussed as a possible mayor for Gaza City, confirms that the land was state land and was unpopulated duneland. "But it was state land meant for the residents of the Gaza Strip, not for settlers. Gaza is too small for Israeli land acquisition. Any non-Arab presence in the strip is felt immediately. And yes the dunes were uncultivated—but Palestinians could have cultivated them as easily as Israelis. In fact, the settlers' agricultural output is extremely limited."

Hendel remains an optimist because he does not believe that an Israeli government will give up the strip, if only for strategic reasons. He says that Labor MK [Knesset Member] Mordekhay Gur, who was military commander of the strip in the early 1970s, has assured him that, for security reasons, Israel will not leave. "Look, who are we going to give it to?" Hendel asks. "The Egyptians don't want it. We can't just walk out because it will cause bloodshed—there are all the factions here you have in Lebanon plus the pro-Jordanians and the pro-Egyptians," Hendel said.

Abu-Rahmah counters that this thinking is "very stupid." He says: "Two or three thousand people can't resist several hundred thousand others. What is needed is a will to coexist. That will bring peace." Abu-Rahmah believes that the "relinquish-Gaza-first" option poses difficulties but is "okay" within the context of a peace settlement.

Alan and Roberta Bienenfeld are confident their four small daughters will grow up in Neve Deqalim. "Whatever will be will be," Roberta says, "but this is part of Eretz Yisra'el just like all of Jerusalem is part of Eretz Yisra'el." The Bienenfelds moved to the Gaza Strip in 1980 after visiting a friend there.

"I fell in love within hours," Alan says. "We were living in Tel Aviv and I thought: 'Tel Aviv is too much like New York, and I made 'aliya partly to get away from New York. This is the lifestyle for me.'" The Bienenfelds live in a large, suburban-style villa. "We started with the standard, small cottage, and found we could build on as much as we wanted, so we did," Roberta explains. "Except back in the U.S. people don't understand about the lifestyle, and they can't believe our jobs." Roberta, formerly a trade-magazine editor, is now a produce controller at a tomato greenhouse on a nearby moshav. "It's physical work; my mother isn't happy about it."

Alan, formerly employed in his family's clothing business, now sweeps the streets of Neve Deqalim. "Call me a sanitation engineer," he says, laughing. "I like it, it's outdoor work, I listen to my radio which hangs from the garbage pail, people invite me in for drinks."

"Here," says Roberta, "Our little girls go out and play and we don't worry about them. I can't say the same for our nieces and nephews in the States." Both Roberta and Alan are from beachfront communities in New York, and they treasure the nearby unpolluted beach. "Three of the girls are already swimming," Roberta says.

That day, some girls from an Ashdod boarding school were enjoying the beach. ("We love coming here," says Shani, 15, emerging from the water with her friend Ilana. "We're not worried because we know that because it is Gaza it will be extra-secure.") A few hundred meters away, a group of Palestinian youths dropped bicycles and began to enjoy the water themselves.

Despite a shared love for the beach, the difference between the Palestinian youths' lifestyle and that of the Bienenfelds is as pronounced as the difference between the detritus on the Arab beach and the gleaming hotel overlooking the Jewish villagers' beach.

More than Judaea/Samaria counterparts, Gazans are reliant on Israel for income. Prior to the Gulf War, 60,000 Gazans worked within the Green Line; since then, owing to an increase in terrorist attacks on Israelis, the number permitted to cross into Israel has fluctuated between 5,000 and 15,000. The monetary crunch has impacted on the Gazans: instead of stones, Israelis visiting the area today are more likely to encounter begging, shoeless children demanding bread and shkalim.

A Gazan returning home is just as likely to reach his house on a dirt road as on an asphalt road. Open sewage still runs through streets crowded with tin and cinder-block shacks in the refugee camps. Inside the houses, the scene is different: new appliances attest to the relative prosperity prior to the war. But children are more likely to be home, as schools are still shut down following disturbances.

Two Palestinian minors were killed in intifadah-related incidents in March, according to the Betzelay human rights organization. On the day this writer visited Gaza, Palestinian sources reported a series of clashes with the army throughout the refugee camps. They said two Palestinians were injured in Rafiah in an intifadah-related clash. The army denied knowledge of the clashes. Gazan police reported that masked youths beat and burned to death a 19-year-old allegedly caught raping a six-year-old neighbor in the village of Bani Suhaylah.

This contrasts sharply with the clean, paved streets and the modern bustling schools of the Jewish villages. There is no open sewage in Neve Deqalim; instead the town council recycles sewage water for its gardens, thus circumventing the recent water-saving regulations.

Greenery flourishes in Neve Deqalim, in contrast to the yellow dust coating the refugee camps to the north.

"We were isolated during the war," says Abu-Rahmah, "and when you isolate any country, what do you think happens? The economy suffers badly. We are jammed in some places 200,000 people per square kilometer."

Hendel disputes these numbers. "I hate the more-crowded-than-Singapore myth," counters Hendel. "The Dan region—area A—is six times as crowded as Gaza. Once, I even calculated Gaza excluding the desert and I figured out that Greater Tel Aviv is still four times as crowded."

"Look, I will happily share equal rights with someone who will coexist with me, even if he does not share my goals. But why should I extend my hand to my declared enemy?" he asks. Hendel is especially irked by claims that the Gaza settlers live well off government hand-outs. "We make our own way here," says Hendel.

He cites the area's tomatoes as an example. "Two years ago we represented Israel and won a worldwide competition for tomato-growers held in Florida. The Florida farmers were furious. They held the competition to trumpet their own wares. They said the competition was misjudged. THE NEW YORK TIMES got interested, and checked with the experts. We still had the best tomatoes. Publicity like that," he says with a smile, "you can't buy for money."

Eli Shalmon, a greenhouse worker at Moshav Qatif, remembers the competition. "People who talk about giving back Gaza only understand it through their reserve duty experience in some refugee camp, or worse, through the media," he says. Shalmon is bagging plants for the European market—plants normally grown in Europe in the summer, but cultivated in the amenable Gazan climate throughout the year.

"Forget the ideology—we would be giving up the most advanced agricultural technology in the Middle East," he says. "We would be giving up an incredibly high level of professionalism." Shalmon straightens up and stretches his back. Behind him, one can see the dusk lights of Khan Yunus, the crowded Gazan city that hugs Gush Qatif.

"Look at this greenhouse," he says glancing towards the tropical array of greens, purples, yellows and reds. "Five years ago, I knew nothing about growing plants."

There are those among the settlers who abjure the practical aspects of retaining the strip, and stress the ideological. "Everyone talks security, security, security," says Rabbi Tzvi Schwartz, the interim head of the Yamit Yeshiva in Neve Deqalim, coming home from teaching during the oppressively hot day. "This is the advantage the Arabs have over us: we say land/security, they say land/sanctity. Who do you think has the more convincing claim in the end?"

Schwartz has seen the claims argued before, as one of a core of Neve Deqalim settlers who was evacuated from the Sinai town of Yamit in 1982 as part of the peace agreement with Egypt. "Sadat said: 'This land is mine.' Israel said: 'This land is a buffer.' Of course, Sadat won the peace." Schwartz sighs. "I just wish the left would establish that all the land is absolutely Jewish—it did once, years ago, you know—and then talk about giving up land for peace. That I could understand."

Schwartz maintains that he would view the evacuation of Gaza with equanimity. "Moving is no big deal, it's not traumatic," says Schwartz. "I've done it once—although my kids who were born here may have difficulty understanding why this is not considered Israel." Still, he speaks sadly of life in Yamit. "All that is left is the Sephardi synagogue," he says. "It's overrun with goats, and the Egyptians will tear it down soon, I understand. I've tried to visit several times, only to be turned down for a visa at the last moment each time."

Schwartz, who won recognition several years ago for establishing a Zionist yeshiva while an emissary in heavily haredi Antwerp, Belgium, says he would move if it was in exchange for peace. "Of course, I believe in an integral Eretz Yisra'el, but, you know, as a Zionist, I realize there is a greater miracle than the lands liberated in 1967: the establishment of the state in 1948. I will not jeopardize that, that unity of purpose among Jews both left and right."

Hendel reflects that same line of thought. "There are no hardline extremists here," he says. "Remember, most of the settlers were recruited through the National Religious Party and its affiliates." But Hendel, in Gaza for nearly 20 years, finds it difficult to think of anywhere else as home.

If the Gaza Strip is relinquished in the near future, Abu-Rahmah might have an offer for Hendel, Schwartz and the others. "I believe that there is the possibility an arrangement for continued Jewish residence in a Palestinian Gaza is the framework of a peace agreement," he says. It remains to be seen whether that sort of peace agreement is one the Jewish settlers can live with—with pleasure.

Gush Qatif and the Immigrants

Following the recent Soviet 'Aliya, some Russian can be heard on Gaza streets.

Jewish residents of the Gaza Strip are sensitive about the issue of the arrival of new immigrants to Gush Qatif. "Maybe 30 families have arrived with the recent aliya," says Gaza Council head Tzvi Hendel. "And those who have arrived have come by word of mouth—you know, one guy comes, then his sister, then her in-laws, etc."

Russian can be heard in the streets. Hendel explains that some of the Russian speakers might be factory workers bused in from towns and settlements just over the Green Line, like Ashqelon or Netivot. Whatever the case,

tensions have already arisen between the predominantly secular Soviet Jews and the religious settlers of Gush Qatif. "They bused a couple of hundred in for Passover," says one man, "and we hosted a few. They knew nothing. It was a travesty."

However easy or difficult it is for the immigrants to get into Gush Qatif, the area is virtually free of Arabs. Employers using Palestinian labor within Gush Qatif must, for security reasons, obtain certificates to allow them entry, and then each settlement issues certificates of its own. Often, the Arab laborers in the area also possess a host of certificates issued by the army as well, which they eagerly display to guards posted at entrances to the settlements.

Neve Deqalim hosts the one bank in the area, and local employers often pay the Arab workers with checks drawn on the bank. The catch: the Palestinian laborer may have a certificate allowing him entry into one of the neighboring settlements—say Ganey Tal or Qatif—but since he does not work in Neve Deqalim, he does not have the papers allowing him access to the bank—and he is left holding a check.

A More Than Kosher Holiday

An effort to make—and market—part of Gaza as a carefree, spacious resort for the religious.

Jose Gutfeld intends doing for tourism in Gush Qatif what tomatoes did for agriculture. Gutfeld, in the Israeli hotel business since the 1950s, manages the Hof Deqalim Hotel. The hotel, originally a cooperative of local moshavim, was closed two years after opening in 1987. Gutfeld is nonetheless optimistic.

"Private enterprise is different from a moshav-run enterprise," he smiles.

Gutfeld, who took over as general manager just a month ago, is also optimistic because, since being reopened by businessman Eytan Ben-David last year, the hotel has already developed a weekend market. "We specialize in a religious market," says Gutfeld, who is secular. "We're not just kosher—we know for instance that after prayers on Saturday morning, you leave out cake instead of bread because blessing the bread is too complicated."

Gutfeld wants to attract guests during the week as well, and eventually aims to target the American Orthodox market. "There's no reason, Gush Qatif can't be an Eilat for the religious, complete with horseback riding, scuba diving, the lot."

This schizophrenic approach, emphasizing both religious values and the hedonistic yuppie life, is strikingly evident in the hotel brochure. The woman in the brochure must be modestly dressed throughout, but how do you get across the body building room, the sauna, the jacuzzi? Easy: male beefcake is evidently kosher, and half-naked muscular young men romp throughout the brochure.

Gutfeld says he decided to take the job as hotel general manager "within hours" because he believes in the area's potential. But what if Gaza is returned? "Please, I'm a businessman, not a politician."

Ben-David, who has dropped by for a chat, is more than willing to wear both political and business hats. Ben-David's mixing of politics and business dates back to his days as a Jerusalem municipal councillor representing a breakaway faction from the National Religious Party in the early 1980s.

During the evacuation from Yamit in 1982, Ben-David, "the most ideological" of a Jerusalem clan with real estate and jewelry concerns, bought up businesses abandoned by non-ideological settlers in Yamit willing to accept government reparations. "I had the supermarket running right up until the last days of the evacuation," he notes.

His experience in Yamit acquainted him with Gaza. "I am here both for business and ideological reasons," says Ben-David, who has returned to the NRP [National Religious Party] fold. "After one year, we are breaking even. But we are also breaking down psychological barriers between the State of Israel and the Gaza Strip."

"The fact is, the main road [from Erez junction near Ashqelon] is so heavily patrolled, it is not safe. But I broke down psychological resistance by pushing for the building of an air strip. Now you can fly straight to Tel Aviv for just NIS [New Israeli Shekels] 35 [about twice the price of the bus trip]. The flights are hardly used, but it seems to make people feel better knowing it exists."

Ben-David also pressed for a new road to Gush Qatif. The road, due to be completed this month, connects Gush Qatif to Kisufim, within the Green Line, meaning that the traveler has only to traverse a few hundred meters of heavily secured Gaza Strip road between Israel and the strip's Jewish villages.

"Of course, I would like to retain all of the Gaza Strip," Ben-David says, "but I am a realist. By developing Gush Qatif, I am guaranteeing an Israeli buffer between a possible Arab entity in the north and Egypt in the south."

A Fate Up for Debate

Different views on the pros and cons of 'Gaza First.'—CONTACT staff

In recent months, several local politicians have proposed that Gaza should be the focal point of a first step towards a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and neighboring countries.

While the idea has gained much momentum, it has a certain appeal, due largely to the fact that increasing numbers of Israelis view Gaza as a population time bomb with no historical, economic or strategic value.

In order to gauge the feasibility of the "Gaza First" idea, CONTACT asked for the views of a number of prominent political and academic figures.

We asked them whether the possibility of establishing a Palestinian entity in the Gaza Strip, as a preliminary step toward a wider settlement, is a realistic prospect.

—Avi Pazner, Prime Minister's Media Adviser: "It would be a serious error to deal with Gaza differently from the way we deal with Judaea and Samaria. In the Camp David Accords, there is no separate treatment of Gaza.

"The idea of establishing an 'entity' is not a good one. We need to negotiate about the future of the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza on the basis of Camp David. We offer all of them to enter into negotiations for full autonomy for a transitional period of five years. During that time, negotiations will begin over a permanent status for Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

"I do not believe in partial solutions or in unilateral solutions. Israel cannot force autonomy on anybody. I believe in direct, face-to-face negotiations between the parties, perhaps with the help of others, such as the U.S., in an effort to reach an agreement which will enable us to coexist in peace and security."

—Yosi Beilin, Labor MK: "From an Israeli point of view, if Gaza is demilitarized and has open waters and skies, it does not pose a security problem. I propose offering a state in Gaza immediately, and simultaneously offering autonomy in the West Bank as we work for a settlement with the Arab states. The minute we leave the area, I believe we can get a great deal of money for rehabilitating it. Rehabilitating Gaza will cost about \$4.5 billion, including housing, industry and a major tourism infrastructure, but it will never happen under Israeli rule. Israel can give up Gaza with no problem. There exists a greater consensus about Gaza than about the West Bank. This step seems more realistic than trying for a comprehensive settlement on Gaza and the West Bank. It's a good way to show good faith and to make a serious first step."

—Al-Asad Ha'Ezani, Tehiya MK: "Any compromise will bring about the end of the Jewish state. The key to any peace agreement lies in Asad's hands. Asad means 'lion' in Arabic, and as long as the lion is hungry, nobody else will eat. If anybody tries to begin a peace process with us, Asad will kill them. He will not let anybody do anything until he is sure he has control of the Golan.

"Peace is not possible, in the Arab eyes, without Jerusalem, but no one can take Jerusalem without taking Hebron and all of Judaea and Samaria. No one will take Jerusalem without a guarantee of the Golan, just as no one will take Gaza without a guarantee of Jerusalem.

"Gaza is the center of the flash point that begins every war, because it is filled with refugees from Jaffa and all

southern Israel. We thought we could sweep the problem under the carpet, but we were wrong. We created the problem of Gaza, so we have to solve it. Where will the heads of households there work if not in Israel? Gaza has 360 square kilometers and about 600,000 inhabitants. As a country, that is crowded, but Greater Tel Aviv is even more crowded, to say nothing of Manhattan. The solution to the problem is integrating it into Israel."

—Prof. Galia Golan, Peace Now: "[Gaza first] can be realistic if it is quite clear that this is just a first step toward a total resolution. You cannot have a state exist just in Gaza, but you can start anywhere in a step-by-step process. I would not want to stop there, because it is a very small area with a very, very large population.

"You'd have to have some sort of government there. If it was done in a vacuum, there would be a risk of Gaza being ruled by Muslim fundamentalists. If it was part of a broader process, there would be wider involvement by the moderate Palestinian nationalist.

"We are not talking about unilateral withdrawal without security arrangements. If it is part of a process and is accompanied by security arrangements, it could be feasible."

—Dr. Dore Gold, Senior Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University: "Strategically, the Gaza Strip has considerably less importance than the West Bank because the territory with which it is contiguous, Egyptian Sinai, is an area where Israel has a peace treaty and full security arrangements.

"Furthermore, Gaza does not have the topographical features of the West Bank, where the central hill range provides a natural barrier protecting most of Israel's population and industrial capacity.

"However, one must take into account the implications that any separate arrangement over the Gaza Strip will have for the West Bank; it is far more likely that such an arrangement would escalate the intifadah to levels that have not yet been witnessed.

—Joseph Alpher, Deputy Head, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: "It is realistic, particularly on a unilateral basis, but it is not advisable. Were Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip, a PLO mini-state would probably emerge virtually overnight.

"Even if one supports the notion of a Palestinian state, this would not be an advisable way to achieve it, because Israel would be granting statehood without getting anything in return. The precedent would generate increased unrest in the West Bank and heightened international pressure on Israel to withdraw unilaterally there also.

"Israel could try to negotiate the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state in the Gaza Strip as an interim measure. In this case, it would only be able to do so by talking to the PLO, and it is not certain that the PLO

would agree to an interim territorial solution such as this. Here, at least, Israel could insist on safeguards and reciprocal concessions by the PLO. Logic would appear to dictate that anyone who proposes unilateral withdrawal from Gaza first try the route of negotiating the issue with the PLO in order to ensure Israel's regional and international interests.

"Finally, any move toward autonomy or statehood in Gaza is likely to run aground on the shoals of PLO-Hamas rivalry, which could turn the Strip into another Lebanon."

Increase in Firearms Use, IDF Countertactics

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[Article by Ron ben Yishai: "Fewer Stones, More Firearms"]

[Text] Late at noon, at the time of the Baker visit last week, the Hebron market buzzed with people and animals. Trucks loaded with merchandise blew exasperated horns, trying to extricate themselves from the traffic jam. Peddlers hawked their wares with parched throats, and women in traditional Muslim garb pressed around stalls loaded with fruits and vegetables. From time to time the eye caught a thick-bearded Jew in a knitted skullcap, a woman in headdress with a child, who were swallowed up by the bargaining, shoving crowd.

The time for closing the stores, according to the dictate of the intifadah leadership, had come and gone, but the merchant standing at the entrance to his store was in no hurry. He did not even try to hide the Israeli merchandise that was placed openly for all to see on the shelves. He answered my questions in a loud, angry voice. "We are fed up with the mess. We want to live and make a living like human beings," he said, with the sweat dripping down his face. "The time has come for someone to stop this. Let there be a solution already. We cannot continue like this any more." Many of the passersby who crowded around us nodded their heads and afterward moved politely aside to make room for the six sweaty reservists who passed through the place on foot patrol.

A few months ago such a situation would have been inconceivable. Such treasonable words in the center of the Hebron market and, even more, for the ears of an Israeli journalist, would have sufficed to get the speaker placed on the collaborator list. Today it is a different story. The passive majority, especially in Judea and Samaria, has despaired and tired of the intifadah, which for the past ten months, since the Temple Mount events, has not advanced Palestinian interests by even a millimeter. Worse than that, many of the accomplishments of the first years of the intifadah have been eroded by the strong gusts of "Desert Storm."

On the eve of that war there was a feeling in the territories that it was worthwhile to hold tight since in a little while, really a little while, Saddam would land a

missile blow on Israel. Afterward he would come to pray in Jerusalem and would bring with him, on the decks of the Republican Guard tanks, the wished-for Palestinian state. When the war ended, the Palestinians were left with a defeated Saddam, with the disappointment of the real effect of his missiles on Israel and with a PLO savaged and torn apart from the inside and with its international status lower than it had ever been. All of those factors delivered a crushing blow to Palestinian morale and hopes.

The economic situation, too, which had not been bright even before that, worsened significantly in the wake of the prolonged weeks of curfew at the time of the battles. And if all that were not enough, the unbridled rampages of the masked men began at the same time, which finally made it clear to the population that the uprising not only was not going anywhere, but that it was also out of control and had become dangerous to the Palestinians themselves.

That was enough for the passive majority to decide to retire from the fray. It now demands from the leadership, both the PLO and that of Hamas, to get its life back to normal. The confused activists, the established leadership people, are afraid of losing all support from the population and are therefore loosening the yoke as much as they can. They are expanding the hours of store openings and looking the other way when, in front of their very eyes, instead of total and gloomy dedication to the national effort, the populace is now trying to weave a bit of happiness into their daily lives. The store in Shekhem, displaying luxurious bridal gowns and the municipal amusement park, which has returned to operation, are just a few of the indications of that. Even in the city of Gaza, when Hamas decrees a strike, the stores are in fact closed without exception, but the beaches are full.

In its original form the intifadah is rapidly dying out in Judea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem. Even particularly traumatic events like the Temple Mount incident, for example, cannot fire up the crowds for more than three or four days. The daily commercial strike is violated right and left, and the detailed instructions in the placards of the United National Command (UNC) and the Hamas leadership often remain a dead letter. Sometimes the populace even shows open opposition to attempts at compulsion on the part of the hard core activists.

Nevertheless it is still not possible to assert that the intifadah is dying. What has happened to it has happened to other national uprisings, in other times and places; they did not achieve what they set out to and they spent too long a time treading water. The Palestinian uprising, too, has lost the active support of the crowds, that are exhausted both economically and spiritually, and has become the almost exclusive inheritance of several thousand activists and shock committee thugs. The latter have not lost their motivation and are feverishly searching for a way to keep the uprising alive in world public opinion—and once again hitch the crowds to their wagon.

These facts create a somewhat confusing picture of what is going on in the field. It is a picture typical of an uprising in a period of transition and loss of direction. On the one hand several of the traditional characteristics of the intifadah have died out: the demonstrations, the hurling of stones, and the manifestations of civil rebellion requiring active cooperation from broad layers of the population; on the other hand, acts of armed terror and personal terror have risen sharply (especially knifings), committed by what are termed the small "hard core" of activists. Some of them are organizational people and some are local thugs.

The immediate goal of these activists is to recapture the headlines and cause a harsh military reaction against the entire population. That reaction would again bring the crowds to the streets, and they, the activists, would again be their leaders. Another goal is to force the populace to remain within the framework of the intifadah—through terror and fear. Many of those murdered and tortured on the charge of cooperating with the authorities were innocent people whose only crime was that they purchased Israeli merchandise or made an appeal to the civil administration for assistance.

In the areas of Rafiah and Khan Yunis, this primitive "recipe" works. Not so much because of the army's methods of operation, but because of the grinding poverty there that has reached almost catastrophic proportions. The loss of places of work in Israel and the lack of alternate local employment have created a situation in which any unusual event is sufficient to start a general conflagration. In order to calm the excited populace and prevent escalation, the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] imposes a curfew for several days. The locals do not go to work. The economic situation becomes even more serious. The masked men again appear on the streets. They run into a group of Israeli Arab impersonators. One of them is shot—and the whole cycle starts all over again.

In the first years of the intifadah even the violent core of activists more or less turned away, despite the UNC or Hamas leadership. Even the shock committee of the most inaccessible village would not dare to deviate from the maneuvering room allowed it by the placards. Today they act on their own, without accounting to anyone. Nevertheless, we need to distinguish between three types of violent activists:

The first group are the people from the organized terror gangs of the old school. Their people belong to established organizations that pay their salaries and transmit operating instructions to them via passwords broadcast from one of the terrorist radio stations. Weapons and sabotage material are smuggled to them from Jordan, from Egypt, or by sea. The number of these gangs is not large, and most of them have been exposed by the Shin Bet, which is busy, among other things, trapping them. For that reason, most of the gangs that have remained in the field have been dormant, or nearly dormant, in the years in which the intifadah was spontaneous and the entire population was active.

Now, when the populace has withdrawn from the fray, and the prestige of the established Palestinian organizations is low, their time has come. Residents of the territories can tell you that among those gangs there is one, whose people belong to George Habash's Popular Front, whose only mission is to threaten Palestinian leaders who would agree to talk with Israel outside the dictates of the PLO-Tunis. To the extent that they do so, the gang is charged with taking those leaders out.

The second type, the wildest and cruelest, is the local thugs, the masked men. Their natural habitat is the Casbahs of the large towns, the refugee camps and the far-off villages. They began as the local enforcement arm of the intifadah, within the framework of the shock committees and popular committees. Afterward their people entertained themselves with marches intended to portray them as the popular Palestinian army on the way. Most of them are uneducated, for whom violence has become a way of life and even a source of livelihood.

Today they act as local street gangs, lacking central direction, who impose terror on the populace in places where they are beyond the reach of the IDF or the Shin Bet. There are among them people who honestly believe that they are the keepers of the flame of the intifadah. Others knowingly serve base and even criminal interests of local elements.

In Gaza, where most of the masked men support Hamas in one way or another, they set themselves up as the guardians of morality and have caused the wholesale murder of women suspected by them of prostitution. In Hebron and Shekhem they overturn stalls displaying Israeli merchandise, collect taxes for the intifadah and punish thieves. In Tul-Karim and Jenin they murder anyone who has intensive dealings with the civil administration.

But lately there has been a change. The public criticism leveled at them on all sides within the Palestinian camp has caused many of the members of these gangs to feel that they are travelling the wrong path—which will bring them to their end. In order to repent and merit rehabilitation, many of them have turned their violent activity against the IDF and against the Jewish settlers in the territories. This turning point finds its expression in the drastic increase in recent weeks in attempts at strikes with firearms and sabotage materials.

In contrast to the established terror gangs, the groups of masked men do not get weapons or financing from abroad. They also do not have regular training in the use of standard weapons and sabotage materials. Luckily most of their strikes thus far have been amateurish, carried out with improvised weapons and sabotage material, and the results have been correspondingly poor.

The bomb that exploded last week in the 'Othni'el settlement on Mount Hebron without causing damage is an example of that: an iron pipe filled with flammable material extracted from match heads. In Shekhem I also saw a variety of improvised pistols.

"For the time being it is our good fortune that their intentions in no way match their achievements," says a senior military commander in Judea and Samaria. But the transition process of the masked men from local gangs to terror gangs has only begun. Even now the masked men possess a not inconsiderable amount of standard weaponry. Most of it was stolen from the IDF and sold at inflated prices by criminal elements. The big hit is the M-16 rifle.

There is no doubt that if the masked men decide to establish themselves as terror gangs acting against Israelis with firearms, they will also win aid and succor from abroad. "We know how to deal with serious hostile terrorist activity. We have successfully dealt with firearms and terrorist devices in the past and we will do so again in the future," says a commander in the Hebron area. In villages south of Mount Hebron and the slopes of the Judean desert, the territory that Colonel A. is in charge of, a number of armed gangs are now operating, but he is not particularly concerned: "Give us time and we will produce results." He is convinced that the Shin Bet and the IDF's new method of operation in the territories will provide a proper response to the problem, even if the masked men establish themselves as regular terror groups.

But within the IDF they are concerned about this increase in the savagery of the intifadah more than any other recent phenomenon. "Serious hostile terrorist activity is not a stone. You cannot solve the problem by bullet-proofing the car windows or firing plastic bullets," says a senior IDF commander, "especially when thousands of Jews travel each day on the highways of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip."

One of the expressions of this concern is the effort that the chief of staff is investing in the issue. Since taking up the job, Ehud Barak has made frequent trips to the territories. He lands on short notice in one section or another of Judea, Samaria, or Gaza, does away with opening lectures and ceremony, takes the commander with him and walks around with him and with his people a whole day in the field.

Once, they say, he went out for a tour of the territories dressed in civvies with people from the Arab impersonator unit, in order to get a feel for the way they work. The result was a drastic change in the IDF's methods of operation. The number of impersonator teams and certain other units was increased very significantly. The same was true for the intelligence-gathering teams and the equipment at their disposal. Many strongholds were done away with, and in their stead the emphasis was placed on mobile activity, planned rather than routine.

By the way, the order of battle serving in the territories was also reduced somewhat. Instead of dispersing forces to move along regular routes in fixed areas, the commanders in the area now have mobile forces that are concentrated and available for any activity they might conceive. By means of those forces, they can react

quickly to any event that occurs or initiate point activity in places where it is worthwhile to concentrate the effort. The amount of imagination, reliability and initiative that the commanders display will determine their success.

"This activity creates uncertainty among the activists and masked men and forces them to invest effort in self defense and precautionary devices. Instead of reacting, we are pursuing. We are acting like an army and not like police at a demonstration, and that is a refreshing change that also affects the morale of the troops serving with us," says Col. Tz., a senior commander in the Shekhem area.

The third type of violence, personal terror, also reflects the growing frustration of the population and the loss of faith in the ability of the tradition intifadah to provide a response to the anger and feelings of the individual. The continuing wave of this kind of terror began last October after the inflaming of religious passions following the events of the Temple Mount. Knifings, running people over and kidnapping are the means generally taken by people looking for revenge and personal redemption.

In the Ramallah area there is a unique phenomenon of a multiplicity of female knife wielders, seeking through their actions to purge their names of real or imagined guilt attributed to them. The knife wielder or the person who runs someone over does not need advance planning or advance preparations or consultations. It is therefore hard to expose them in advance and frustrate their actions. Even the means taken thus far to limit and filter the entrance of Arabs from the territories into Israel has not helped much. This problem still awaits a solution, if such a solution exists at all.

The Palestinian establishment, which controlled the intifadah until recently, dissociates itself from violent activity and looks for its own means to maintain the uprising and the achievement of its objectives. But its activists, too, are not all of one skin, and are divided into groups that differ from one another in intellectual ability, ideology and the organizations that its people belong to. Thus, alongside the increasing armed violence, you can find a supermarket of nonviolent methods for carrying out introspection and preserving the intifadah.

The Jerusalem leadership—Faisal Husayni, Yonatan Kutib, Hana Ashrawi, Sari Nusaybah and others—have chosen to struggle democratically, in the Western way. Together with a Palestinian intellectual class that supports them, they have begun a public campaign of self-criticism and introspection congresses. The process has not yet concluded, but it seems that this group has decided to cast its lot with the political process and with Baker. It is now investing most of its efforts in convincing the PLO leadership in Tunis to grant it authority to negotiate in the name of the Palestinians.

Internally the Jerusalem leadership is trying to exert its traditional influence to rein in the groups of masked men

and ease the economic burden that the intifadah imposes on the populace. But the members of this group know that their influence on the field is slight and that their efforts will be of no value without the support of the other group of leaders known in the civil administration as "the second echelon of leadership in the territories." We will call them "the young leadership."

This group is composed of young people in their twenties and thirties. The large majority of them are past "soldiers" of the intifadah, who participated in the violent street activity of the first years of the uprising. They received their preparation as leaders in the "universities of the intifadah," which were in the detention camps—and they now claim the crown of authentic leadership of the territories. They look down a bit at the Jerusalem leadership, and there are those among them who call them "the salon leadership."

Despite the competition and the fact that they are not at ease with each other, they still have a rather broad common denominator. Otherwise their members could not act together as members of the United National Leadership. Both of them are composed of members of organizations belonging to the PLO, mostly Fatah people, together with people from the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and the Communists. Both of them share a deep dissatisfaction with the activities of the violent echelon of the masked men, who stir up the populace.

Both of them still cling to the idea that the intifadah must not slide into broad civil violence, into an armed struggle with firearms. The fear is that an armed struggle would play into the hands of Israel, which would acquire legitimacy in world public opinion to deal with it as it would deal with a regular terrorist movement. The PLO leadership in Tunis also shares this view, well recalling how its dialogue with the Americans was broken off following the strike it initiated on the beach at Nitzanim last summer.

The young leadership carries on its process of introspection and its settling of accounts with the masked men, on the pages of the Palestinian newspapers published in Jerusalem. That is natural since many of its people are reporters who sat in prison and returned to work, whether within the framework of the Palestinian papers or within the framework of various "information offices," which are nothing but propaganda offices under the auspices of Palestinian organizations.

As pragmatic people interested in what is going on in the territories and who do not trust high politics, the people of the young leadership stress that time is not on their side. They feel powerless in the face of the waves of immigration, the momentum of construction in the territories, Israel's political successes—and they want to use the profits that the intifadah has harvested thus far. The impression you get from talking with them is that

they are ready for autonomy tomorrow—if it were possible. The program that they are consolidating has three components:

1. Easing the daily life of the populace.
2. Continuing the "Sumud" (firm stance) in the vital components of the intifadah until the balance swings again to the Palestinian side.
3. Building representative Palestinian institutions that would conduct the daily life of the Palestinians.

"You will say that these are the institutions that will one day serve autonomy; we will say that these are the national institutions for the state that is on the way. The main thing is that something should move already," so they say more or less to Israelis who talk to them. It is no wonder that this group ardently supports every election program held in the territories, as, for example, the elections for the Chamber of Commerce in Hebron.

Minister 'Arens and his coordinator for territorial affairs, General Dani Rotshild, have long recognized the not inconsiderable number of points of agreement between the interests and ideas of the young leadership and those of the Government of Israel. Especially with regard to establishing the basis for an independent Palestinian regime in the territories. The heads of the civil administration in Judea and Samaria, and also in Gaza, miss no opportunity to talk with the people of this group—in order to advance further elections for Chambers of Commerce and for committees of Mutual Assistance Leagues. Thus, with careful movement, one step at a time, it will one day be possible to arrive at elections for local and municipal councils, and those who are elected will represent the Palestinians in negotiations with Israel over the establishment of autonomy. That, in fact, is the 'Arens alternative to the Baker plan. For the time being it is at the embryonic-experimental stage, but if the overall peace process should fail, it would become an option that would be seriously discussed.

The third group of activists are the Hamas people. In their view Palestinian soil is holy soil and cannot be divided—and they are therefore opposed to political negotiations—in fact, to any change in existing modes of operation. Nevertheless, they, too, are careful not to tighten the rope too tightly on the exhausted populace and are therefore sitting, for the time being, on the fence. They are allowing Fatah and the PLO to conduct contacts with the Israelis and foreign bodies, while watching very carefully. Wherever it is convenient for them and they can derive advantage, they join in and participate. In the elections for the Chamber of Commerce in Hebron, for example, they allowed their people to take part and even won an overwhelming majority.

In that fact Hamas sees public vindication of the claim of its leaders that they enjoy the support of at least half the population of the territories. The civil administration doubts that. The estimate is that in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem the Hamas supporters constitute about a third

of the overall politically aware population. Supporters of Fatah are the majority. In the Gaza Strip about forty percent support Hamas, forty percent, Fatah, with the remainder divided among the other groups.

In general the civil administration is trying to act in a way that will encourage the constructive tendencies in the territories and calm the area. Alongside the attempts at conversation with the leadership, the administration is focusing on steps intended to ease the hardship of the passive majority. The assumption is that at a time when the populace is tired and confused and looking for some way to raise the quality of life in the field and improve the economic situation, the circuit of those willing to take an active part in the intifadah will correspondingly decrease.

Thus, for example, in Judea and Samaria about 20 new permits were recently issued for the construction of local plants that will create local employment for workers who lost their workplace in Israel. The application of the law encouraging capital investment, with certain changes, to the residents of the territories is another step in this direction—just like the simplification of the bureaucratic procedures that the residents encounter when they require the services of the administration.

For the time being the populace is welcoming these steps and is ready to take part in their application. But the last word has not yet been spoken. The increased activity of the IDF and the Shin Bet against the masked men is likely to sabotage those objectives the administration is trying to achieve. If a real political process should develop, that might cause even more of an increase in the phenomenon of armed violence in the territories; and the willingness of the residents and the leadership to participate with the administration would once again dwindle, because, among other things, they would expect the political process to pull their chestnuts from the fire without any effort on their part. What little cooperation achieved thus far is fragile and delicate, and as long as this transition stage of the intifadah continues, any political change or other unusual event in the field is likely to cause a setback.

Temple Mount Repairs Linked to Extremist Attitudes

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p 3B

[Article by Me'ir ben Dov]

[text] For several years, a group called "Ne'eman Har HaBayit" (Temple Mount Faithful), led by Gershon Salomon, has been working toward rebuilding the Temple, in spite of the fact that this is impossible, for both Halakhic (Jewish legal) and political reasons. Their present tack is to try to show that the Muslim Council and the Wakf are systematically destroying archeological relics on the Mount. To examine this complicated question, we must review the history of the construction on the Temple Mount.

The day before the Roman legions broke through to the Temple Mount, in the year 70 AD, Titus gathered all the officers of his forces for an emergency meeting on the Mount of Olives. In the meeting, they discussed the future of the Temple Mount site, which seemed decreed to fall into their hands. Titus believed that the Temple Mount was different from other holy places, and declared, "How can we Romans, the protectors of art and architecture, destroy a structure that is the pinnacle of human architectural capacity, in both its form and its proportion?"

Fate saw it differently, and after the Roman legions invaded the site, groups of zealot fighters climbed to the top of the Temple Mount, and continued to fight and shoot desperately at the enemy legions.

In spite of Titus' entreaties, the fighting did not stop, and in the end led to the burning of the Temple and to a war of annihilation by the Romans. The western wall of the Temple remained standing (not the Western Wall of today, on the Temple Mount site, as many mistakenly think.) All four supporting walls of the Temple Mount remained in place. The tops of the walls were destroyed, and their stones ended up in the paved roads that were laid along the walls of the Temple Mount.

At the end of the Bar Kokhba rebellion in 135 AD, Emperor Hadrian decided to finish the construction of the temple in honor of Jupiter Capitolinus. It was not difficult to repair and renovate the Temple Mount, and after only a short time, the site had returned to its original state. But the Christian emperors of Rome, who came after him, decided to eradicate the pagan temples, including the temple to Jupiter on the Temple Mount. They not only damaged the pagan temple, but also the Temple Mount site, whose fall and destruction Jesus, the Christian Messiah, had foretold.

Twice during the hundreds of years of Roman-Byzantine rule, the Jews found themselves standing on the brink of building and renovating the Temple and the Temple Mount. The first time was in 361 AD, the year that Julian, whom the Christians called "the heretic," took the throne as emperor. Julian wanted to cancel the privileges the Christians had won, and to return to the Pagan-Belien world, with the worship of the emperor at its core. And because the enemies of your enemies are your friends, the emperor turned to the Jews, and called upon them to go and raise the ruins of their temple. This work was cut off at its height, because that emperor was murdered at the end of two years, and a new Christian emperor rose in his place.

The second time was in 614 AD, when Khosrau, king of Persia, invaded the territory of the Byzantine empire, and arrived with his armies almost at the gates of Constantinople, the capital. During his military campaign, he was helped greatly by a large Jewish army, counting sometimes as many as 25,000 Jewish youths from the Galilee. The reward for their service was to be national liberation, a kind of autonomy on the Cyrus

model, centered around the renovation of the Temple and the Temple Mount site, and on reestablishing Jerusalem as the Jewish capital. But after only three years, Khosrau went back on his decision, preferring to sign new border agreements with the Byzantine authorities, including the return of Palestine, which froze the building efforts and left the Temple Mount in its ruined state.

The Temple Mount took a crushing blow when the Byzantine Christians returned to Jerusalem. Emperor Heraclius, after the Persian attack, returned to Jerusalem, and "paid back" the Jews for their support of Persia. He decided to wipe the Temple Mount off the face of the earth. And indeed, in the archeological excavations carried out there, it was found that the heaviest, most essential, destruction is from this period (the first half of the 7th century AD, before the Arab conquest). But this time too, fate turned against those who plotted against the temple mount. Only ten years passed, and in the year 638 AD, Jerusalem fell before 'Omar ibn al-Khattab, the second Arab Khalif, and one of the greatest Arab leaders, who stopped the destruction of the temple mount.

Only a few years passed, and in the year 660 AD a talented and daring army commander, Muawiya ibn Marwan took the reins of government of the Arab empire. He who had been commander of the Arab armies in Syria and Palestine became Khalif, founder of the first dynasty of the Muslim Empire, the Umayyad dynasty. Muawiya and his heirs understood that Jerusalem, which was holy to the Christians must from now on serve also as a Muslim holy city, because Arab tradition took a difficult passage in the Koran and interpreted it as meaning that Muhammad went on a miraculous journey on the back of a mythical animal, al-Bur'ak, and at the journey's end, Muhammad ascended skyward for a concrete and important meeting with Moses, Elijah and Jesus.

Since the precise locale of this story is not given, they connected it to Jerusalem and especially to the ruined Temple Mount. The Kalifs of the house of Ummayyad restored the ruined walls of the site, and the four walls of the Temple Mount. This work of renovation required the building of the great open spaces—in effect, a kind of restoration and reconstruction of the spaces which had been built for Herod's construction of the square on the Temple Mount site—which in our day are known by the popular name "Solomon's stables." Later they built the two most important buildings on the mount: the Al Aksa mosque and the Dome of the Rock structure, which are among the most ancient and important of the early Muslim architectural structures, and gave the mount the appearance it still has today.

After further failed attempts at restoring the Temple and the Mount, especially after it was taken by the Muslims, these places became a symbol and a focus of longing by Jews for a rebuilding that would only happen in the end of days, when the Messiah comes: meaning that in an

elegant way, it distanced Jewish religion and philosophy from the pagan symbolism of the sacrificial offerings.

For more than 1,300 years, the Temple Mount has kept this appearance. But it was the reconstruction work on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, at the beginning of the 60's, that pushed King Hussein of Jordan, the ruler of Jerusalem in those days, to order the beginning of activities for preservation, reconstruction and care of the Temple Mount and its structures.

The damaged glazes on the ceramic tiles were replaced by exact replicas from the workshop at Ktahya in Turkey, and the lead dome was replaced by a gold one, to return it to its former glory.

The restoration activities gathered speed after the Six Day War, both in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in the Christian quarter, and by the Wakf authorities on the Temple Mount and its environs. The large amounts of money that flowed to the Muslim religious authority from Saudi Arabia and Jordan came in order to prove to all that Islam not only speaks in praise of Jerusalem, and especially of its holy Temple Mount site, but also carries out what it says. In this framework, archeological gems on the Mount and below it were cleaned, among them the Golden Gate and Solomon's stables. These activities of preservation and reconstruction have not harmed the Jerusalem architectural gems, but rather have brought general improvement. Thus, for example, in Solomon's stables are ancient relics from the days of the second temple, among them an enormous bow from Herod's time, and a rock adorned and engraved with stones, from the western Hulda gate, which were carefully preserved; thus, also, the decorated vaults from Second Temple times below the Al Aksa mosque, and the covered passageway on the western side of Hulda Gate. The Wakf authorities have not interfered with researchers who have to come to explore the locale. They let me photograph, measure, and draw them, and even gave the team we had recruited for the work scaffolding and electricity.

The second stage in developing the site and beautifying the surroundings was done by careful tending of gardens, by paving roads on the site with stone, and by bringing garden soil from outside and planting olive trees—activities that served as a pretext for the Temple Mount Loyalists' claim that the additional soil is hiding archeological finds; the Antiquities Authority claims, on the contrary, that the layer of soil is only protecting the ancient relics, if there actually are any on the Mount.

At any rate, we need to understand that the relics of the past on the north-west Temple Mount, that the petitioners claim have been covered for olive planting, are only a few, and it is even possible that these relics are from the period of Muslim rule on the Temple Mount site, and not from Herod's time. Also, concerning the building of the paved prayer areas, there are some who claim that they do not damage the relics at all; this activity was carried out over the existing area, and it

helps to guard the relics of the past that may not even really be hidden beneath them.

The history of the Temple Mount shows that it was actually the Byzantine conquerors who helped to destroy it, and not the Muslim conquerors at all, and concerning the Wakf's present attempts at repair, it seems that the accusation by the Temple Mount Faithful about hiding relics of the Jewish past by planting olive trees and dumping soil is debatable.

In any case, the High Court of Justice is going to decide the case, after the arguments on both sides have become clear.

Druze-Jewish Relations Discussed

91AE0469B Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST*
in English 21 Jun 91 pp 10-12

[An interview with Fahmi Halabi by Ron Wegsman: place and date not given; "On Jews and Druze"; first paragraph is *THE JERUSALEM POST* introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] This year's successful strike of the Druze community in demand for equality for its local councils was the result of a long process of political maturing. Fahmi Halabi, one of the new generation of Druze leaders, discusses the strike and his life-long relationship with the Jewish community.

When the heads of Druze local councils spent a week demonstrating in front of the Knesset in May, you couldn't find a dissenter with a magnifying glass. Everyone, from ministers down, said the demonstrators were right—the Druze have not been receiving their fair share.

The council heads went home after the government agreed to meet their demands. But promises had been made before. The Druze still complain of discrimination. This time, however, they expect the promises to be kept.

Mention Druze to the average Jewish Israeli, and he will probably think of Daliyat al-Karmil. The village, located on top of Mount Carmel, 10 kilometers from Haifa, is a mecca for weekenders who come to shop or eat. It is a routine stop on the package tours offered tourists from overseas, who are brought here with the promise that they will see a typical Druze village. What many actually see is inexpensive bamboo furniture, falafel in a large, thin pita, and, perhaps a few men with shaven heads wearing colorful hats. They often leave knowing no more about the Druze than before.

Three flags are displayed in Daliyat al-Karmil's newly constructed council building: the Israeli flag, the five-color Druze flag also flown by Druze in Lebanon and Syria, and the flag of the local council. Municipal business is conducted in an Arabic sufficiently peppered with Hebrew phrases so as to be unintelligible to anyone who

does not know both languages. It is a sort of Israeli-Druze patois—an idiom all its own.

Like other Israelis of his generation, Fahmi Halabi, 42, grew up with the state. After completing elementary school in Daliyat al-Karmil, he attended Ironi Alef High School in Haifa. He served in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], then completed a bachelor's degree at Haifa University. Two years ago, running at the head of a local list called Change Now, he was elected head of the local council. His election marked a rejection of the old guard, and the coming of age of a new political force: secularly educated, empowered not by clan loyalty but by the methods and maneuverings of modern politics.

CONTACT: Was the strike and demonstration in Jerusalem worth the trouble?

Fahmi: There's no doubt about it. It wasn't only worth it, it was essential. It was essential that the Druze council heads, the leadership of the Druze community, take a drastic step in the direction of equality between Druze community and the Jewish sector. It was called for after 43 years.

As you know, the Druze community supported the State of Israel and the Jewish nation even before the establishment of the state. In 43 years, the Druze have proven themselves in every aspect of life. I don't mean just the army or the security services, but every aspect of life—the connection with the Jewish people, the relationship with the state, loyalty to the state. Just like every citizen who lives in a country and gives what is expected of him. It's only natural that this citizen, if the state has something to give, demand that it give to him equally. In my opinion, the demonstration was the correct step. It was even a little late. The Druze should have taken these steps many years ago.

[Question] This wasn't the first Druze councils went on strike to demand equality.

[Answer] As far as I know, this was the first time it was done in this way, on this scale. Before, there were only spontaneous, disorganized actions. This strike wasn't a spur-of-the-moment thing. It was part of a process. Many Druze council heads were elected only in the last municipal elections. Until you learn the job and get to know the system, it takes time. We established the Forum of Druze Local Council Heads; it took us time to organize the forum and select its chairman. All the time we spoke about the need for equal rights, about the low budgets, about government agencies' dismissive attitude towards us. Time passed until we reached the point, you could say, of ripeness.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the results?

[Answer] Before we set out we established goals for ourselves: minimal demands that had to be met before we would return to our villages. We achieved all of the defined goals. I know that there may once again be delays

and foot-dragging. We council heads will set up a committee to follow up the implementation of the agreement. We won't sit quietly; we'll constantly check which things have been done, and which we may have to fight for again.

This struggle is not just over money. You know, money is very important. You need budgets, and everything you do costs money. But the Druze community, the leadership that led this struggle, saw in it something beyond the question of money. What do I mean? I mean our self-respect. Our self-awareness. We are citizens who were born in this country, especially my generation. The Druze lived in this country in good neighborly relations with our Jewish brothers, sharing common lives in various fields, and yet the government turns a blind eye to our needs. We spoke with clerks on the district level, we spoke with ministers, with the prime minister, with the president. We spoke with every person who is supposed to deal with issues of concern to us. None of them took our complaints seriously. So we arrived first of all at the self-recognition and self-awareness inside the community that there is something we have to change. Either we really are a community that is a full partner in everything that happens in the country, or it's just a matter of, as they say, "use 'em and lose 'em."

I think the druze community has reached a certain political maturity. A new leadership has arisen in the Druze community. In the last municipal elections, a genuine revolution took place within the towns. Today, there's a different approach to council leadership, a different approach to local government. Today the local council is not a mukhtar or a shaykh, not the head of a tribe or clan, but a person who knows that his job is, first of all, providing public services. He needs to have management skills, he needs to know how to establish ties with the government, he needs to maintain good contacts with the population and to be systematic. This new leadership has more initiative and more understanding. It has a more Israeli attitude.

[Question] As a child, did you see yourself as Israeli in every way, or did you have a different identity?

[Answer] Listen, I was born in this village. I absorbed the Druze education, tradition and experience. But I went to high school in Haifa, and that certainly influenced me. There, I came into contact not only with a Jewish population, but with an urban population. Living the whole Israeli experience in the city—that certainly provided an Israeli side to my personality.

[Question] Why did you go to Haifa to study?

[Answer] It was natural because there was no high school in Daliyah. Today, it's a legitimate question, because there are still many people who send their children to school in Haifa. That's one of our local problems—the problem of educational system. Many things have been done, but the bottom line is that there's still a lot to fix. I think the number of our students in the universities is still among the lowest in the country.

[Question] In other words, today there's a high school but it's no good.

[Answer] There is a new high school serving both Daliyah and 'Usfiyah, which has been in operation for two years. And according to the reports I'm getting, the school is going in the right direction. It's on a good level, more subjects are being added, and the teachers and parents are satisfied with it. I think that in two to four years' time, our educational system will be a good one.

[Question] Were there other students from Daliyah in your school?

[Answer] In those days the village was still relatively small, and the educational awareness was still small. It was an agricultural, rural village. We're talking about 1964. In my class, I remember, there were six children from the village. In those days transportation was harder too. Probably, many parents who wanted to send their children to school didn't have the financial ability.

[Question] How were your relations with the Jewish students?

[Answer] Ironi Alef was a mixed school. We studied in a special class for minorities. There were students from 'Usfiyah and from different villages in Galilee. Relations in the yard, in play, were very good. There were no particular problems during the time I studied there. There are always fights, you know, among youths, but it was all within the realm of the ordinary.

[Question] So in your class there were Druze and Christian and Muslim Arabs, but no Jews?

[Answer] Exactly.

[Question] Did you develop ties of friendship with the Jewish children?

[Answer] Yes. There were ties of friendship and we visited each others' homes.

[Question] After high school you were drafted into the IDF. Where did you serve?

[Answer] In the minorities unit. It was a special infantry unit.

[Question] Today, do you have personal friendships with Jews, beyond purely business dealings?

[Answer] Yes, certainly.

[Question] And is that true of most of the people in Daliyah?

[Answer] I think so. I think today just about everyone in Daliyah has Jewish friends from school or the army. In my opinion, our generation is Israeli in every way. Today we want to be blue-and-white. What do I mean? Today a young Druze is no different from a Jew, except for the ethnic element. We're born in the same place, go through all the same experiences, the same problems—youth,

Gadna, army, work, reserve duty. We live along the same paths. So why should youth in Haifa enjoy all the benefits, while young Druze 10 kilometers away receive fewer services and still have no sewerage system, running water or electricity. It doesn't make sense.

We feel that this is our country. We want to live well in this country and to be integrated in every aspect of its life. We identify with the flag and the other symbols of this country. We serve under the flag. We're Israelis—blue-and-white, as I said. What's the difference? We're Druze. We have our own religion. We worship the same God, but in our own way. There are unique things in our tradition and history which we need to preserve. Everything else is the same.

[Question] Jews come to Daliyah to find bargains or inexpensive food. Tourists are brought here to see a 'typical Druze village.' Do you think there's something fake in this?

[Answer] I think that's the nature of a market. The tourist who comes on a Saturday, let's say, or a holiday, doesn't come in order to establish a relationship. He knows there's a market where you can buy things and get things to eat and drink. This relationship is transient. The visitors to the market don't go into the town. They don't get to know the Druze or the Druze culture. People who come to the market see what looks like a booming market and think Daliyat al-Karmil is a rich village. They don't see the problems in the town. But I think that's natural; it's the same if you go to a Jewish town where there's a market. Nevertheless, the market does have a positive influence. Especially with the intifada, for people to come to a Druze town and feel secure—that's also a contribution of the Druze community to the country as a whole.

[Question] So many people come to the market, shouldn't this be a wealthy place? Why not use that money to meet local needs?

[Answer] That's one of the misleading things. I hear this from a lot of people. They don't know that altogether the market provides a livelihood for 10 families. If you add associated activities, it might provide a living for 20 families. Most of the village has no income, no benefit from the market. In fact, there are many people who suffer because of the market. If you were to ask around, you might come to the conclusion that most people want to close the market. On Saturdays and holidays there's sometimes such a traffic jam on the main street that a resident can't get from one neighborhood to the other. If he has to make an urgent trip to Haifa—if someone needs to get to the hospital, say—he can't get out of the village. This causes a lot of anger, a lot of tension and bitterness.

If you go into the village and walk around, you'll find that this is a village that is, even today—and I use a harsh word—backward. There are entire neighborhoods without electricity. I have no doubt that Daliyah has the

potential to attract investment that will create employment for more people, and that's the direction we want to move in. We are planning to establish a municipal corporation to do the basic work of exploring the possibilities and opportunities open to the town, to create a situation in which the residents benefit from the market and the tourist business that passes through.

[Question] You were active in the Citizens Rights Movement [CRM]. Are you still affiliated with that political party?

[Answer] Before I decided to run for the council I was an active member of the CRM. But I realized that if I ran on a CRM list locally, my chances of being elected would be nil. The CRM has good principles. I think its platform is very progressive, especially in the matter of citizens' rights, which is one of the things the Druze are fighting for. But its voters, in terms of numbers, are still not enough. So I decided to run on an independent list.

After the election, little by little, I realized that my party would have to be the party that could provide budgets. As a council head, my job is not to solve the Palestinian problem and not to negotiate a package deal for the economy. My job is to attract resources for the development of Daliyat al-Karmil. Also, in the Union of Local Authorities I decided to support Maxim Levy and Eli Landau. The Likud won the Knesset election as well. I developed good relations with Maxim Levy, and so it turned out that today I'm closer to people in the Likud. Because of my work and the developments in the Union of Local Authorities, I'm closer to people in the government. In my opinion, that's the way things work. A council head has to be "close to the table." That means close to the governing party, and not always for ideological reasons. I'm not concerned with ideological matters now. What keeps me busy day-to-day are these papers you see on my desk.

[Question] Do the Druze in Israel have contacts with Druze on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon and Syria?

[Answer] The contacts with the Druze on the Golan Heights are natural, because the Golan is by now a part of Israel. Today a person who lives on the Golan is Israeli. In Lebanon, after 1982, contacts were established, first in the Shuf mountains and later in the security zone. With Hasbaya there are contacts until today; it is one of the Druze spiritual centers. With Syria there are virtually no contacts. Here and there, there are contacts by way of Lebanon or via the Shouting Hill on the Golan, but regular contacts, no. Syria is still an enemy of Israel.

[Question] Do the different interests within the community create frictions?

[Answer] There are differences of opinion, but there's no coercion. On the Golan Heights there's a political difference of opinion regarding the peace process. The people there are troubled. Will Israel return the Golan as it did Sinai? In my opinion, most of the population there—and

this is my opinion—would prefer to stay in Israel. But because of the uncertainty and the fear that they may in any case be returned to Syria, they speak differently in public.

[Question] What do you think would have happened had the Druze not supported Israel 43 years ago?

[Answer] I don't think it's worth trying to answer such questions. You can ask this question of every historical step. History goes on, life goes on; in every period there are fundamental decisions to be made, and sometimes it's for the better, sometimes for the worse. Our parents who made this decision were wise. With hindsight, I think they made the right decision.

[Question] Even though there's discrimination?

[Answer] I'm talking about the basic decision. Afterwards, the country developed; but the Druze community, which was a rural community closed within itself in villages, didn't develop at the same rate as the country as a whole. Was this a result of international discrimination? Historians will have to study the subject before we know for sure. The inequality that developed derived in part from the naivete of the Druze community and in part from the lack of concern of the government.

Today, as I said, there's a new leadership in the Druze community, a new spirit. People better understand the Israeli reality and the democratic system, in which you can't sit on the fence. The Druze were always nice, made do with little, made do with what was given them, and didn't press with all the democratic tools at their disposal. The state was constantly busy with all kinds of tasks, and the Druze were always on the sidelines. Today there's anger and frustration, but in terms of the big picture, we in the Druze community don't regret our historic decision to tie our future with that of the Jewish people and the State of Israel.

Subcommittee Formed To Investigate Shin Bet

91AE0486C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Jun 91
p 1B

[Article by Gid'on Levi]

[text] A year ago, Yonas Mahsian was on his way to buy vegetables in the al-Zu'ida open market in Gaza. Suddenly security forces, IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) and Shin Bet (General Security Service), burst out looking for a fugitive, and took Mahsian's Peugeot from him, even though he was just passing by. They promised to return it to him after a few days. A year and two months passed, it is reported, and only now have the Shin Bet admitted that they actually took the car, a minor matter, and suggested a monetary compensation. Things like this do happen. Anyone who read the "Betzelem report" on Shin Bet interrogations, will not get excited over something like this. Of course, it is not even worth thinking of conclusions, or of taking anyone to court.

On the day after tomorrow, Tuesday, the Knesset committee for State Comptrollership will meet and introduce an important change. It will set up a subcommittee for inspection of the Shin Bet interrogation unit. If there is no last minute change, still another instrument of supervision, modest as it is, of the activities of the Shin Bet, especially of its interrogation rooms, will come into being on that day. This instrument is indispensable. The Landau report gave the State seal of approval to this need, when it stated unequivocally: We recommend that the State Comptrollership also inspect the interrogation unit of the service." (It is of course possible to wonder why only on the interrogation unit, and not, for instance, on the operational unit).

Until now, the Shin Bet's interrogation unit worked without any real outside control. There is the law, and there are procedures, and there are the famous "understandings" about the grey areas. There is the in-house inspector of the Shin Bet (following the bus no. 300 affair), and there is the State Comptroller, who, up to this time, has been writing classified reports on the Shin Bet, centering on the administrative side—inflated expense accounts and substandard vehicles. It is alright to assume that the secret services committee of the Committee for Foreign Relations and Defense, in its present composition of a Lieutenant General, Major General and Brigadier in reserves, and with a veteran of the Mossad as chairman, has not been too interested in deliberations on topics of human rights. For Yosi Sarid, a member of all the other subcommittees, there is no place in it, by the way.

Four years after the publication of the problematic Landau report, one of its recommendations is being carried out now. After the memorandum of the "Public Committee Against Torture in Israel" was sent to the chairman of the Committee for State Comptrollership, Professor David Liba'i, who has a certain sensitivity to the subject of human rights, Liba'i decided to work immediately to set up a new subcommittee. He received the blessing of the State Comptroller, and what was more surprising—the blessing of the Prime Minister's office and of the head of the Shin Bet—for setting up the committee. Until he received the appeal from the Committee Against Torture, he admits, he was not aware of the Landau recommendation.

Has the State Comptroller acted on the recommendation directed first and foremost to her, and begun the inspection of the interrogation unit? An official answer cannot be given. Everything is classified. But we may assume that if Liba'i sets up a subcommittee, it is a clear sign that Ben Porat is already working hard on a classified report on the investigative unit of the Shin Bet, which will serve as a basis for the new committee's deliberations.

Now the practical questions, which are the most important, remain. Who will sit in the committee, and what will the committee do? Who will sit on it? The Likud would like to suffice with those who have been looking

until now at the reports of the Shin Bet—an almost secret forum of two: Eliahu ben Elishar and David Liba'i, heads of the two relevant committees. Liba'i would like at least four members on the committee, two from the Ma'arakh—himself and Mota Gur—and two from the Likud—Ben Elishar and Re'uven Rivlin. It is no secret that the composition of a committee is sometimes more important than its powers. It may be asked now, why not add an opposition representative from a party other than the Ma'arakh? Dadi Tzucker and Hayim Oron, real human rights activists, are candidates, but Liba'i says that it would be difficult to do successfully; there are also Tehiya members who are interested, and this is already too much.

And what will the committee do? In the next few days, a date has already been set for an appearance before it of the head of the Shin Bet, who everybody says is interested in an apparatus like this. Soon Liba'i will ask to look at the confidential part of the Landau report, and the "Betzelem" report will also reach the table. How has all this affected protection of human rights? It is hard to know. A committee like this may do important work in its sphere, but is also likely to find itself saying that the unclean is clean and the clean is unclean. The combination of Miryam ben Porat and David Liba'i seems to promise success, even though Ben Porat, when a Supreme Court justice, already ruled once (in the High Court of Justice appeal against the bus no. 300 amnesties): "It can not be denied that it is very difficult for those carrying out a special security function to always stay within the law." A sign that does not necessarily bode well. Liba'i is filled with optimism about the possibilities of the new mechanism's working. He says that experience has proven that the reward for this action is likely to be great. He admits, though, that general rules for the activities of the committee have not yet been set at all.

Will the lame Muhammad Tzivhi Ibrahim Ahmad Git, from the Shati camp, be able to turn to the committee with a complaint about the torturous blows he suffered during his interrogation (as detailed in the "Tselem" report) In the past, Liba'i says, he tried to examine complaints like this when they reached him. Four months ago, for example, he sent a signed declaration about torture to the Defense Minister's office for examination. To this day, he has still not received an answer. Now, he hopes that when he is head of the new committee, perhaps an appeal from him will have more effect.

But it may be pretty easy to smear all of you, I told Liba'i. That is right, he answered, but not to smear the State Comptroller!

Shin Bet Chief's Administration Said Probed

TA1606114191 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Jun 91
p 1

[Report by Amir Oren]

[Excerpt] A clandestine investigation into questions of proper administration and integrity, conducted last

month, focused on the Shin Bet chief, whose name is prohibited from being published. The investigation was conducted on the instruction of Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, the Shin Bet chief's direct superior, in the wake of anonymous complaints by senior Shin Bet persons. To investigate the affair, Shamir appointed Reserve Major General Refa'el Vardi, who summoned the Shin Bet chief for a lengthy interrogation.

According to knowledgeable sources, the Shin Ben chief's explanations satisfied Vardi on the issues specified in the complaints. Vardi reported his positive opinion to the prime minister.

Last week, Avi Pazner, Shamir's spokesman, was asked to reply to several questions pertaining to the investigation of the Shin Ben chief:

- Why had the prime minister ignored similar rumors on the eve of the Shin Bet chief's appointment, but decided to launch an investigation this time?
- Why and on what authority did the prime minister appoint Vardi, instead of handing the investigation over to the Israel Police?
- Was the prime minister satisfied with the investigation's findings and conclusions? Is the Shin Bet chief's tenure, which began in April 1988, of a predetermined duration?
- Has Shamir reported the fact and results of the investigation to the inner cabinet and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee?

Pazner said that he had been instructed by the prime minister to refrain from public reference to any of the questions. [passage omitted]

Kibbutz Absorption of Ethiopians Profiled

91AE0457B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jun 91
p 3

[Article by Nurit Kahana: "We Will Invite Rabbi Peretz to the Dining Room at Beit Oren"]

[Text] "If a rabbi checks the food daily, it is all right. We do not get along with the religious extremists. All of the Ethiopians are religious," said yesterday Zion Negosa, a counselor and translator among the Ethiopian immigrants who arrived at the guest house in Beit Oren, adding "they have it good here."

Negosa is inundated with such a large number of appeals from the members of the community who cannot manage without him, that he could not see Minister Yithaq Peretz on television two days ago.

The new Ethiopian immigrants, who gathered on the morning after the broadcast on the lawns of the kibbutz guest house, had not heard what was going on. Fathers

and mothers stood near the ping-pong table that had been set up in the courtyard, but as yet has not been used, waiting for the next stage of their absorption. Just yesterday the stage of vaccinations and records was completed, and some of the problems of locating relatives throughout Israel were solved. The children played near them with a ball and gathered stones in small plastic bags.

"We did not see television yesterday," said Movka Beri, 25, who arrived from Ethiopia in Operation Solomon. "I want to go to Jerusalem," he replied when asked if he was religious.

A wave of telephone calls flooded the kibbutz upon hearing Minister Peretz's statements on television. The members expressed shock at what he said.

Since this Sunday morning, the receptionists at the guest house counter have been replaced by people from the absorption division of the Jewish Agency, social workers, and translators. The process of absorbing the immigrants from Ethiopia in Beit Oren began three months ago, on the initiative of the kibbutz, which offered to transform the guest house into an immigrant absorption center. First, a contract was signed with Amidar; subsequently, the contract was handed over to the Jewish Agency. Since the beginning of the week, 224 Ethiopian immigrants have arrived at the kibbutz and more will arrive soon. Thus, the number of immigrants will exceed the number of members of Beit Oren, which stands at 250 people.

The absorption center at this guest house is one of 33 centers that have opened since Operation Solomon. Three kibbutzim—Beit Oren, Ayelet Hashachar, and Kfar Hahoresh—are participating in the process of absorbing the Ethiopians, taking care of more than 4 percent of all of the immigrants: 600 people.

Among the certificates of esteem to the Beit Oren guest house from the Ministry of Tourism is also an advertisement by the Haifa religious council noting the starting and ending hours of the Sabbath. "This is a guest house with the kashruth approval of the Chief Rabbi of Haifa, Sha'ar Yishuv HaCohen. Two kashruth supervisors supervise the kitchen," says Eran Rotem, the kibbutz social secretary. "Here, and, to the extent of my knowledge, in other absorption centers, as well, the immigrants have not yet asked to use the synagogue available to them, added Rotem."

Annie Kasagi, social worker: "In general, the immigrants here observe tradition, each according to his own path and views."

"We will invite Rabbi Peretz to a meal here," says the woman in charge of the kibbutz dining room, Nili Pollak. Jewish Agency guidelines delineate the types of food and the manner of serving, beyond the ultimate demand of kashruth: chicken without skin, no salads, only whole vegetables, and meals without fish. Among the pots of cutlets and rice cooking in the guest house kitchen says

Ataf Harman from the nearby Druze village of 'Osfiyya: "I have been working here for ten years. We observe kashruth, and the kashruth supervisor checks the food. Minister Peretz' attack is terrible. He spoke against the bad education in the kibbutz. We, too, were educated here, and it is exactly the contrary."

Another neighbor from Kibbutz Beit Oren, also from 'Osfiyya, is Salah Abu-Riad, who guards the immigrants for a security company. "I have been accompanying them since the day that they arrived in Israel. I saw many of them who observe the Sabbath, and others that do not care. I guard them so that they will not get hurt, throw themselves from heights, and encounter dangers of modern life. The kibbutz is a good place for them."

"Everything that Minister Peretz said was as if it was said about me", says Erez Benjo (19), a kibbutz counselor approaching his military service. "I am the one who mediates between them and the kibbutz culture, takes them to nearby sites, and, soon, to trips throughout the country. Two days ago, we held a meeting between the kibbutz children and the Ethiopian children—a "meeting of balls"—on the dining room lawn. We brought 60 sponge balls, and the children played. Will the yeshivas also absorb them like this?"

"Rabbi Peretz' statements against the kibbutzim were directed against the coalition, within the framework of his struggle to constitute a substitute for the deteriorating Shas faction. I estimate that he spoke on behalf of Rabbi Shakh," reacted Dudik Rotenberg, the secretary of Kibbutz Beit Oren. "The United Kibbutz Movement must file a libel suit against him."

Rotenberg expressed the fear that, from a technical perspective, Peretz' statements and intentions would be likely to bring about the removal of the newly arrived Ethiopian immigrants. "If this causes a governmental crisis, the result is likely to be the removal of the immigrants from here. The Jewish Agency decided to bring them here, and it can remove them tomorrow."

According to Rotenberg, the absorption center is separate from the kibbutz. "If, at the end of the year, some of the immigrants request to become members, they will be received gladly," he noted. Only ten percent of the kibbutz members work directly with the immigrants, but many came to welcome them upon their arrival, and the children play together after their studies.

"They live within the kibbutz," says Rotenberg. In a month a children's house for the immigrants will be operated next to the kibbutz children's house. "We are not dealing with absorption of the Ethiopians in the kibbutz, but with a contract with the Jewish Agency for one year, during the course of which we want to be incorporated and involved."

According to Eran Rotem, Beit Oren's social secretary, there is a great advantage to the housing of the immigrants in the kibbutz, rather than the city. "The alternative for them is hotels in the city, in which they will be closed in and will not be able to go out."

The main objective of the kibbutz members during this year is to establish personal relations between the veteran members and the immigrants. "We have 100 children, and they have 150—of all ages," says Rotem.

"I am positive that no member of the Oriental community who was educated in the kibbutz is sitting in jail," he emphasized in response to Peretz' claim that, due to the education in the kibbutzim, many members of the Oriental communities are in prison.

"There is no better example than the manner in which the members of Beit Oren received the immigrants. They accompanied them from the first day and volunteered to assist them. They looked happy," says Benny Dotan, the deputy manager of the absorption division of the Jewish Agency. Soon a temporary Kupat Holim clinic will open in the kibbutz, with a staff, equipment, and a small pharmacy, until the urgent medical problems are solved. According to Dotan, six intensive study classes are now being established for the adults. There will be lessons in Hebrew, Jewish tradition, citizenship, history and geography, customs, etc. Until the opening of the classes, there will be preliminary lectures in the areas of Jewish heritage and the land of Israel. Youth awaiting their military service engage the Ethiopian children in yard games and tour the area with them.

In Beit Oren, they have started to build an automatic laundry for the immigrants, a youth lounge, and an adult lounge. According to Dotan, the Branch for Jewish Tradition of the Absorption Division of the Jewish Agency is active in teaching the immigrants and holds seminars and trips to the holy places. "Nobody intends to cause people to stray from their path," he says. "The kibbutzim are more worthy and fit to absorb the immigrants from Ethiopia than any other sector."

Ethiopian Immigrant Leader Discusses Absorption
91AE0487A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Jun 91
p B2

[Article by Tzafrir Rinat: "Parties on the Fence"]

[Text] Since the Shlomo Campaign, the Ethiopian immigrant leadership has been oscillating between a feeling of elation and gratitude to the state and the need to deploy for the impending social and political struggles. As community leaders discovered from the televised appearance of Minister Peretz and Muki Tzur, the discussions concerning their future are still taking place without their participation.

Adasu Masala, chairman of the Umbrella Organization of Ethiopian Immigrants, said that the social and political philosophy that the immigrants have brought with

them from their country is very simple: "God makes the decisions and people have to accept them. If you were born poor, for example, it is because that is what God meant for you."

People like Masala, 30, who came to Israel 10 years ago, have long since grasped that they would have to struggle if they and other Ethiopian immigrants are to become integrated in the Israeli society. "The last drop for me and the thing that shook me out of my passivity, was the conversion," said Masala. "I decided that I was not willing to let them have my body."

Masala and other young men fought against conversion and against their compulsory registration in religious schools. In the course of their endeavors they established seven organizations, which one year ago merged into the Umbrella Organization of Ethiopian Immigrants. Currently, the organization's goal is to bring over the remaining Ethiopian Jews and ensure their absorption in Israel. The organization members are convinced that one decisive condition for attaining their goals is to remain politically neutral.

"Belonging to a political organization carries both advantages and disadvantages," Masala explained. "When you are close to the party in charge of a certain institution, that is good, but when you come up against another institution, dominated by another party, you have a problem." Shlomo Mula, another activist in the umbrella organization, added: "You go into politics when you stand to gain something. We adopted a neutral position in order to secure the support of parties throughout the political spectrum, and it has worked. I think that in most parties there is no dispute about the Ethiopian immigration."

On the other hand, the parties have not rushed to co-opt members of the Ethiopian community either, as they did with the Soviet immigrants. They are content to secure a foothold in the Ethiopian community and to send their bread upon the waters. Moledet sent a few activists to help distribute clothing, but they did not identify themselves as coming on behalf of the party. Ely Shapira of Moledet, who is in charge of immigration for his party, cannot name one Ethiopian activist in the party.

The Alignment and RATZ [Citizens Rights List] maintain regular contacts with community members, but all their endeavors are aimed at resolving daily problems. "I think that no political use has yet been made of the Shlomo Campaign," said Knesset Member [MK] Avraham Katz-Oz of Labor Party, in charge of relations with new immigrants. "I think that before the end of the year there will be no question of political actions among the Ethiopian immigrants who came with the Shlomo Campaign." Alignment hopes for real cooperation with the Ethiopians in the future, and Katz-Oz spoke about ensuring positions in the party apparatus for Ethiopian activists.

So the parties are sitting on the fence. For its part, the immigrants' Umbrella Organization is not conveying

any political messages to the parties and is not putting forth key figures worth courting. "They do not know of any strong personality to pursue," said Shlomo Mula. He himself names Masala as the prominent figure in the organization. Masala is aware of his popularity, but he continues to follow the line of a young leadership without personal political ambitions: "I could pull a lot of people after me in a certain political direction," he said, "but I do not want to do that."

Deputy Science Minister Ge'ula Kohen, who chairs the commission monitoring the initial absorption of Shlomo Campaign immigrants, thinks that anyone who talks about mobilizing political votes among Shlomo Campaign immigrants, does not know what he is talking about. "It is ridiculous to talk about mobilizing votes among a community whose makeup consists of 60 percent children; not one seat will come out of that." She joins Katz-Oz in his view that the Ethiopian immigrant community has so far managed to stay out of the political game.

Nevertheless, the Umbrella Organization maintains close ties to officials among the absorption authorities, who are usually not politically anonymous. Adasu Masala: "The absorption and education offices are still interested in educating and steering the new immigrants. I know about Minister Peretz' attack on steering Ethiopian immigrants to kibbutzim. The absorption minister tried to explain to me that we are getting lost and how important it is that we should preserve our roots. He is interested in spiritual absorption, rather than social absorption." Other offices at the Absorption Ministry, Masala pointed out, especially from the deputy director general down, are cooperating with the Umbrella Organization.

Not the entire young leadership of the Ethiopian community agrees about the absorption minister's policy. Rabbi Yosef Hadana fully agrees with the minister's position concerning the kibbutzim: "I think it is a mistake to send them there. If it had been a matter of more veteran immigrants, I would not have minded. These, however, are people who came with the intention of preserving their traditional way of life, so the kibbutzim are not the right place for them." Hadana said about Masala's and Mula's request to allow the Ethiopian immigrants to decide their own lifestyle by themselves: "They cannot decide freely, because they are naive and have no idea what it is all about. They do not know the difference between religious and secular."

Masala said that the Education Ministry is still holding on to old mentalities. As an example he cited a circular by the education ministry, in which he explained how important it was for the Ethiopian immigrants to go for religious education in order to preserve their roots. "He had already decided what was good for us. I do not think that anything has changed in his policy."

The Jewish Agency also tended to support that policy; lately, however, the Youth Immigration Department

decided to involve Ethiopian activists in decisions concerning education. This week they will take them on a joint tour of educational institutions.

"In my opinion, Adisu should not go to war about the education issue," Ge'ula Kohen said. "The religious schools are still preparing for immigration absorption, but we allow every person the right to refuse and to opt for another kind of education. The new immigrants can enlist the help of older immigrants in order to decide. The [kayasim] must also be consulted, we need to know what they think. After all, the education system needs to know where the students will choose to go, so that they can prepare to absorb them."

Shlomo Mula doubts the capability of the [kayasim] to decide the future of the community youth: "We have a problem with them. They cannot steer the young generation in the modern society. The young leadership can do that; it wants to see the community youth become integrated in universities, not in yeshivas."

Ge'ula Kohen's commission is expected to ascertain that the decisions that will be taken about how to handle the Shlomo Campaign immigrants will be carried out in practice. She said: "Monitoring commissions at this time will preempt investigation commissions later." The bitter pill that she has to swallow in order to continue having a say in the immigrants absorption apparatus is the implementation of the government policy that bars the steering of new immigrants to the territories; according to her, that policy is being strictly observed. "I cannot direct them to the territories because of my job. The settlements will have to do that by themselves. I think that the government's policy is wrong, because the settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip are a natural absorption environment from a social and pioneering viewpoint, and as it is in a few years time these new immigrants will no longer be defined as new immigrants and will be able to decide by themselves where they want to settle."

Adisu Masala is not enthusiastic about the idea of Ethiopian immigrants settling in the territories because of security problems and narrow employment opportunities. It turns out that even Ge'ula Kohen has understanding for Masala's arguments concerning the Ethiopians. "I would not want to wage the struggle for settling Judaea and Samaria at the expense of the Ethiopians."

Although the Umbrella Organization is trying to separate between Ethiopian immigrants and politics, its members, too, agree that the community's political leanings will be largely determined by how they are treated. Shlomo Mula is of the opinion that the general trend is to the right. "Most of the actions involved in our immigration were carried out under rightwing governments. In addition, there is the matter of the link to the Land of Israel. In those two areas the new immigrants will find it easy to identify with rightwing parties."

"The ultra-orthodox parties are not interested in us, and with the extreme left parties we have difficulties identifying. Moledet does not come into question for us, either. We are in favor of keeping the Land of Israel, but not of throwing people out. In the Labor Party I like the central current, the one represented by Yitzhaq Rabin." After some more thought Mula added: "Perhaps we should take from each party what suits us, a mixture of political and social ideas from several parties, and establish a party of our own."

Adisu Masala does not want to hear about an Ethiopian party, and as far as he is concerned, party membership is the private business of each immigrant.

"The government that brought the immigrants here," he said, "may also be the one that will fail in absorbing them. Bush, too, was involved in bringing us here. So are we to vote for Bush? I think that whoever helps the Ethiopian immigrants settle down will have their support. Other issues are not relevant from their viewpoint. A new immigrant from Ethiopia, who has not lived long here, cannot very well voice an opinion about the territories, for example, because he is not very familiar with the historical background."

For the time being the politicians cannot very well tell in what direction the political wind is blowing in the community. "I met with Masala and Mula dozens of times," said Ge'ula Kohen, "but I have no idea what their political views are." Mula's political views seem logical to Kohen, who views the Ethiopian community as "a community with a pure Zionist sentiment and a Messianic flair about it. It sounds logical to me that they should support the right wing. The rightwing parties speak their language, they use symbols and values with which they can identify."

Although until now the Ethiopian community has not been subject to party courting, Shlomo Mula is convinced that such pursuit can be expected in the future. "So far the community has not been used for political purposes. No schools, clubs, or settlements have been built on a political foundation, but in the future there will be political activism; after all, we make up almost two seats already."

"I do not doubt that the new immigrants will be targeted by the parties," Ge'ula Kohen said, "but that is legitimate, as long as the issues of immigration and absorption are not exploited." Ge'ula Kohen also has a promise for the future: "I would not approach the new immigrants at election time, so it would not be said that I am taking advantage of my contacts with them."

Adisu Masala is convinced that even political exploitation would not change the Ethiopian immigrants' feelings: "Anyone who wants to profit from the immigration, is welcome to do so. As far as we are concerned, this is a release from slavery into freedom."

Ultraorthodox Vying for Influence Over Ethiopians

91AE0486E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Jun 91 p 9

[Article by Arye Hashbayah]

[text] At first sight, the ultrareligious, and especially Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, wish the best for the Ethiopian Jews, but actually they have been systematically insulting them since "Operation Moses" and "Operation Solomon," and even before that.

The Ethiopian Jews are religious Jews. The two terms which guide them are "Orit" (five books of Moses), and "Heymanut" (principles of the religion). The people who educated them according to these principles were the "Keses," the Ethiopian religious priests.

The Minister of Religion, Professor Avner Hai Sha'ki, and the Minister of Absorption, Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, have not helped even one of the Keses to receive an appointment as a Rabbi. Instead, they appointed as Rabbi, Yosef Hadana, the son of Kes Hadana, and he serves as the Chief Rabbinate's travelling Rabbi. Hadana, the religious establishment's man, appointed by Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, is the only Rabbi of the community recognized by the establishment, and even though his standing in the establishment is weak, it is higher than that of his father, the Kes. This is one of the tragedies of the Ethiopian community. The religious establishment has caused the disruption of the institution of the Kes, the greatest educational factor, by ignoring it. Rabbi Peretz, who has been accused by the [Ethiopian

youth—Adiso Masala, Rahamim Moshe and others—of not being ready to speak with them, also has not spoken with the Keses. Therefore, it is hypocrisy on his side to set himself up as someone who worries about the education of the members of this community.

It is not only the ultrareligious establishment that is hypocritical about the immigrants from Ethiopia. A report from the State Comptroller (report no.38, 1988) revealed that seven settlements refused to absorb Ethiopian Jews. Four of these settlements were settlements that had religious municipal council heads. Therefore, any attempt to claim that the Ethiopian Jews are getting help from the religious community is a great hypocrisy. The heads of the Union of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel had to fight for the rights of their brothers to settle in the communities that had refused to absorb them. Although they preferred religious communities, they could not reach agreements with all the religious settlements, because these opposed the absorption of Jews from Ethiopia.

The Jewish Agency provides religious education for the Ethiopian Jews. Shraya Kab, a religious man, is head of the institution "Hofim" of the Aliyat Hanoar (Youth Immigration), and he sees to giving religious education to children who arrive at his institutions. So does Dr. Hayim Peri, a religious man, head of the Yemin Orde

Institution, an exceptionally good boarding school for Ethiopian children. These two educators declare that religious education has great weight in the life of this community, and therefore they must be educated in the light of Torah and Mitzvot. "This guards their peace of mind and their tradition," one of them said to me. In the Agency, they believe that we must be sure to give Jewish education to children and parents, so as not to break the backbone of this community. Therefore, all this talk about the Jewish Agency sending the children to apostasy is foolishness, and vanity, and a great hypocrisy.

All of the immigrants, and the immigrants from Ethiopia in particular, have problems. The religious/ultrareligious establishment, which is so worried about their future, does not give them even a bear hug. It insulted them more than once, until the young people of the community were forced to demonstrate against it in the middle of the 1980's. The immigrants who came in "Operation Solomon" and "Operation Moses" are people who have lived through many tragedies, and it is important to pay attention to their needs, to listen to them, and not to dictate to them what to do and where to go. They must decide for themselves. The egg has to slowly get onto its feet and begin to walk - as the Ethiopian proverb goes.

In order to get an idea of the difficulties for Ethiopian Jews in Israel, we must read what Intamar Salam, a social worker in the Jewish Agency and an old-new immigrant herself, says: "The Ethiopian family that immigrates to Israel loses much. Not only separation and death, but also loss of the traditional families roles. The passage from a quiet, balanced religious framework to a high-pressure, competitive environment, which is secular in character, is difficult. The young people who came to Israel and left part of their families behind them, or lost them on the way, have guilt feelings because they have made it here and have it good, at the same time their parents and others did not make it. The impossibility of overcoming the feeling of mourning is also an obstacle. The immigrants expect and believe that the Israelis understand their cultural codes, their culture and their customs, and are very disappointed when they learn that it is not so. It is very important, therefore, that the Israelis learn to recognize and be attuned to these codes, by paying attention to the smallest details."

The ones who have done all this are precisely the members of the secular establishment, members of the Jewish Agency and the Joint, and not the members of the religious/ultrareligious establishment which has rejected them.

Ethiopian Aspirations in IDF Discussed

91AE0529A Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 3 Jul 91
pp 26-29

[Article by Dorit Ravini'an and Dubi Alboym: "So When Will We Have An Ethiopian CoS"]

[Text] More than ten years have passed since the large immigration of Ethiopian Jews in "Operation Moses,"

and many of them are still not seen in key positions in the country. The reference is not only to high-level positions, which require many years of a slow climb upwards, but also to junior positions, which every Israeli of their age holds. (?)

Even the widely given excuse concerning the cultural gap that they must still bridge is no longer valid for young immigrants, who came in the early 80's. On this background, when three officers out of the seven serving in the IDF who are Ethiopian immigrants say that "they bear the responsibility for the entire community on their shoulders," it is possible to believe them immediately. These officers, who have traveled a much harder path than any other member of the officers's course from the cultural and social aspects, serve today unofficially as the main spokesmen of the young members of the community, and, at the same time, represent the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] to the youths who are about to be drafted.

Beyond the mentality problem itself of being absorbed in a new country, the assertion is that the members of the Ethiopian community lack the behavioral codes that underlay Israeli society. If the average Israeli thinks that pushing for positions and high aspirations are excellent qualities, this is not self-evident among a large portion of Ethiopian immigrants. The naivete, and, occasionally, the lack of self-confidence, have hindered them not a little. The three officers, from those "who have done it," speak about the long path that they have traveled in the army, the difficulties, the aspirations and the things that must still be corrected.

To this day, 2nd Lt. Gid'on Samu, or, originally, Vanus (the Boss), yearns for his childhood in the village of Marwah in the Gondar Province of Ethiopia, for the cows that he milked in the field and for the daily life divided naturally by the light of day and the darkness of night. Now, Gid'on must accustom himself to the ticking of the alarm clock and the nervewracking military movements, which divide the day into minutes and seconds. His dark face is sculpted nobly and impressively, and it overshadows the bashful tempo of his speech. His Hebrew is relatively free of an accent. When he was 13 years old, he immigrated with his father in a group on foot, and at no little danger. Up to twelfth grade, he studied in an ulpan and in the Hodayot youth village, and he lives today in Kiryat Motzkin. His four brothers and his mother arrived in the country only two years ago.

[BAMAHAHE] What did you think about the army before the induction?

[Gid'on] First of all, that it is the reason for the existence of the state; were it not for the IDF, we would not be here. The army service was perceived as a compulsory wheel, that comes to you. It was self-evident. Who would do it, if not I?

[BAMAHAHE] What path have you traveled up to now?

[Gid'on] Basic training, the **Magen Tziyyun** course (a special preparatory course), Training Base 4—squad leaders's course, course in Training Base 8, operations officers's course. Now I am a physical training officer in MAHVA (Center for Education and Learning) and I am very satisfied.

[BAMAHANE] Would you like to be an infantry officer?

[Gid'on] Very much. But meanwhile, that is what the army wants me to do.

[BAMAHANE] The IDF now has seven officers from Ethiopia, of whom three are in the reserves. What does being an officer mean to you?

[Gid'on] The service itself is a challenge, and being an officer is a greater challenge, because not everyone can meet the demands of the course as I did. When I went to the course, I knew that there were other Ethiopians who had succeeded. That gave me the feeling that I could, too.

[BAMAHANE] Would you like to continue in the army?

[Gid'on] On the one hand, I want to go out to civilian life to study architecture or computers. On the other hand, I know that as an Ethiopian immigrant officer, I must advance those younger than I and must represent the service and show them the possibilities before them.

[BAMAHANE] Do you have a strong desire to succeed?

[Gid'on] Very, very strong.

[BAMAHANE] You talk about representation. Is it a great responsibility to be a nonstop example?

[Gid'on] Even if I would not want to, I represent the community. It is a joy, because all the attention is directed towards me without any effort. But the responsibility is great, because it is necessary to act and be aware of the dual interest: the personal one and that of the community.

First lieutenant **Shimon Yasu**, who is with us, accepts this as a matter of course. "I am obligated to represent my community," he says. The third officer, 2nd Lt. **Asmara Alma**, explains: "It takes a strong personality. All eyes are on you—'An Ethiopian and an officer?'—this can put pressure on you. On the other hand, it gives one a lot of strength to succeed. On difficult days, you look at what is positive about the whole thing. I am supported, I am pushed upwards. There were days when I was alone in the country, without any family, and only the knowledge that I must succeed for all of them kept me going."

The three of them heard about "Operation Solomon" over the radio, like the rest of us. Asmara's brother and sister arrived in the Holy Land on the first wing of airplanes: "It was astounding. You could see on their faces how hard it was and how good it is for them now. It was very moving."

[Box p 27]

Magen Tziyyun Course, the Corridor

The number of officers who immigrated from Ethiopia has doubled and tripled in the past two years. Four new 2nd lieutenants, three veterans, two who have completed Training Base 1 [Officers's School] and are about to do makeup work, and five more officers-in-training.

The army intends to absorb more members of the community, and they are being integrated in elite units. The main frameworks are the infantry and the professional branch of the Air Force and Ordnance. If the Ethiopian soldier was once identified with the red beret, today it is different. The image of the officer who thinks with his feet has changed. Since '89, they are in all the services—maintenance officer, military government officer, ordnance officer, education officer.

The GADNA has accompanied them from the time they were [?] and throughout the service. "It's not easy to make it possible for an Ethiopian soldier to enter Training Camp 1," says Captain 'Oded, an officer who is responsible for Ethiopians in the Gadna [Youth Corps]. "So that they can determine their potential, which is not always reflected in the records, they go through diagnostic tests and not in the mobilization office. The problem of the quotas of the units makes it difficult, as well as the problem of the remainder of the service. In order for every one of these officers to have the opportunity to reach the course, it was necessary to involve high levels in the army. This is pull in the positive sense, that would prove that they are not set apart and are as good as the rest, and sometimes even better. Up to the course, every kind of pressure is exerted. From that point, they become equal in every respect, and must prove themselves."

Magen Tziyyun is one month of preparation prior to induction. The stress is on studies on army topics. Captain 'Oded: "The intention is to bring them to the same level as the native-born, who has heard stories about the army being his whole life." So that they will arrive at Training Base 1 with the same mentality. That creates a good feeling and it helps. An encouraging trend comes out of **Magen Tziyyun**. If some time ago they dropped out of Training Base 1 because of a cultural gap—for being 'Ethiopian'—today they drop out for 'Israeli' reasons, like everyone else. Not because of any cultural or linguistic deficit.

"Every such officer is somebody, like a flower in the Sahara desert. At the concluding ceremony of the course, in front of 500 officers in training, you see one Ethiopian, and that is great. **Magen Tziyyun** was the cause of the difficulties the army was having in judging the members of this community. Sometimes, they did not read them right, and I, from experience, understand the customs and can explain. Not all of them know how to measure and appreciate their potential. They are a great bunch."

Asmara has no nickname, neither Asi nor Sami. When he immigrated from the city of Gondar in 1984 he was 17 years old. Today he is 24. He is the first one from the community who put on the grey uniform of the air force. The color flatters his appearance, and the title flatters his ego.

[BAMAHANE] Are you satisfied that they note the origins, or does it anger you that they do not forget for a moment where you come from?

[Asmara] No. That shows the positive side. It shows, that if someone thinks that the Ethiopian cannot fit into this service or into the army in general...look, I am an example. I am a source of the pride of the community.

[BAMAHANE] What did the IDF mean to you when you were in Ethiopia?

[Asmara] The Israeli Army was described there as a maker of miracles and wonders, as doing the unbelievable. The big dream was first of all to get to Israel. The great privilege was to join the army, and the pinnacle—to be an officer. My achievements are those of the entire community.

[BAMAHANE] Is it a kind of mission?
sonal interest, [which is] that I want to advance in the army. In civilian life, being an officer looks like something difficult to attain. I promised myself that I would at least try. Today, I am an example. The more officers there are in all the services, the more encouragement and motivation there is. That is something which characterizes the community, the desire to be the best in every aspect.

[BAMAHANE] How do they relate to you when you come home?

[Asmara] They are very proud of me. The young ones who are being inducted now see me as an opening, an incentive. I talk to them and make them shed all their hesitations, I push them to believe more in themselves, to think big.

The few difficulties that he experienced during his absorption he attributes to his age and the fact that he arrived alone. His family followed him two years later. To this day, independent and opinionated, he lives in a separate apartment from his parents in Ashdod. He plays soccer a lot, sees movies, loves to be with the guys. He is well-versed in Hebrew, the uncompromising sincerity and the decisiveness in his speech are evidence of a successful absorption.

[BAMAHANE] What path did you follow?

[Asmara] General basic training, the Air Force, the non-commissioned maintenance officer course, the officers's course, the equipment wing.

[BAMAHANE] Not many members of the community reached the Air Force, most of them are in infantry. How do you explain this?

[Asmara] In the past, the soldiers chose the kind of service according to rumors in the community. This was because there were few, and most of them reached the paratroops and Golani—"That is what there is, so that is what we will do well." Today, there are enough veterans to make it clear that there are other services and branches. The **Magen Tziyyun** course contributes today to broadening the knowledge about the army and its channels.

[BAMAHANE] Will you continue with a military career?

[Asmara] Yes, definitely. Together with university studies. I studied electronics and computers in high school, and I want to advance in that.

[BAMAHANE] Is there a willingness to be mobilized among the youth?

[Asmara] I know of a very high level of willingness. They are not only interested in compulsory service. They want to be officers. They ask me often about [career] tracks. The interest in serving goes with the desire to contribute, to become part of the real Israeli society. This is pride, this is the desire to prove that we are as good as anyone born in Israel.

[BAMAHANE] So why are there only seven Ethiopian officers today?

[Asmara] Perhaps up to now there was not enough living evidence that it is possible, that they can pass the course. Second, they have a problem with speaking with and approaching the commander. To dare to make a request, to believe that you, too, can. I believe that they will try slowly and will succeed. It is characteristic of the community, this patience. They are not running anywhere, whoever needs to get to Training Base 1 will get there in the end, I believe.

[BAMAHANE] Is this a problem of lack of self-confidence?

[Asmara] No. This is a problem of lack of initiative. They are not aggressive. I would like them to try harder, to dare, because I am sure that they have the ability.

First lieutenant **Shimon Yasu** came to Israel when he was 11 years old. From Tigre Province to Be'er Sheva. The climate is similar, but Shimon would like to go back in order to look around, and then return. He would have been happy to participate in "Operation Shlomo." When the last of the community strode up the airplane's ramp, he was in Ketzi'ot, a maintenance officer in the **Iron Steps** formation. He and a few of his comrades, the first officers from the Ethiopian immigrants, are called "the

officers's Mafia." All of them stay with their parents on the weekends on the same street in the capital of the Negev.

[BAMAHANE] What did you know about being an officer before the course?

[Shimon] I was inducted into the officers's track. I knew all the time that I wanted to be a commander.

With the Ethiopian pride, Osama breaks in with European politeness as Shimon finishes speaking. "The desire to be an officer is the desire to give the maximum. I felt that I could contribute more than an ordinary soldier, to exploit my potential.

[BAMAHANE] How do you view the integration of the officers of Ethiopian origin?

[Osama] It is my impression, my own and and that of others, that they are integrating nicely. What I would be glad to see, is more officers in more branches, in all kinds of places. A broad distribution. Both in the army and in Israeli society.

[BAMAHANE] Where are the Ethiopian soldiers concentrated today?

[Osama] For the moment, more in what is related to physical training. There is also infantry, but there is no navy and no armor.

[BAMAHANE] Why?

[Osama] In the community, they like to follow a path that has already been paved. They are afraid of starting something new. Someone returns from the paratroops and says that it was good for him there, so all the others also go to the paratroops.

When Shimon, slim and strong, returns home on the weekends—"First of all, it is devoted to soccer, like every Be'er Shevaite. In the evening, there is Kiddush with the family. On Sabbath, you have to rest, to regain strength for the next week."

[BAMAHANE] What is still difficult for the Ethiopian soldier?

[Shimon] Before **Magen Tziyyun**, there was a problem with Hebrew. Before 'Operation Shlomo,' there was concern for the families that had not arrived in Israel. Now, there are no problems.

[BAMAHANE] Are you embarrassed [by the fact] that you are different in appearance, that you stand out?

[Shimon] No, from that aspect it is completely all right.

In front of the three, at the concluding ceremony of the officers's course, Ben-Gurion would have been moved to say even more than what he said on 5 September 1955, at the end of the officer's course in Jerusalem: "In the IDF, Jewish youth from all the corners of the world meet—from developed countries and from poor countries.

Within the IDF, the communal barriers are destroyed, and every commander must work diligently with love and concern to raise up his subordinates from the backward lands and impart to them values of equality and freedom, so that they will return to the members of their communities as counselors and educators..."

[BAMAHANE] When will there be an Ethiopian CoS?

[Shimon] Not before the Yemenite CoS. He will arrive before us; we are the greenest ones here.

[BAMAHANE] What would you say to soldiers from the community who want to become officers?

[Osama] Do not be afraid to want and do not be afraid to try. Go as high as you can. It is necessary and worthwhile to serve more than three years, it will help you and all of us.

[Gid'on] You need a lot of desire, that is the key to success. You need to be in touch with the commander, to be aware. It is important that you take the initiative. The road today is easy when there are officers from the community who have succeeded and there is **Magen Tziyyun**.

Osama does not calm down, given the opportunity he has been given to express himself, and he again emphasizes his message: "It is necessary to speak. You have to understand, the problem is not solved if you keep it inside. You do not have to cope alone. It is not chutzpa to ask for a talk, to dare and try to be an officer.

[Box, p 29]

After the Celebration

"After the days of celebration are over, when all the speakers have finished being photographed and have gone home, and begin the ordinary daily routine, the difficult days of absorption begin," says Uri Gordon, the head of the Immigration Department in the [Jewish] Agency. He knows what he is talking about. He went through this dynamic seven years ago, in Operation Moshe. And there was no lacking difficulties then. The Ethiopians came with an ancient African heritage to a western land. They came into a different, modern, way of life, that lays claim to competing with the most advanced places in the world. And despite this pretension, it was hard for the Israelis to accept the color of their skin. Even the Judaism that they met here was different from what they knew. It was necessary to narrow tremendous gaps, to modernize them rapidly, and the State of Israel spared no means: "We are investing in the Ethiopian immigration, for every person, much more than in the Russian immigration. More years in absorption centers, more ulpan, more privileges, more vocational education. In addition to that, the Ethiopians are eligible for public housing, that is, it is the state that is taking care of supplying to them, as a gift, an apartment, as part of the

absorption process. The Russians, if we are to make a comparison, must buy an apartment like any other citizen," notes Gordon.

This effort eases the problematic nature of this immigration only a little. The new language and the technological gap make finding a job almost impossible. But no less destructive was the destruction of the infrastructure. One of them, for example, was the patriarchal family infrastructure. "In Ethiopia it was an honor to be an adult," says Rabbi Waldman. "The young ones served them. They would kiss the knees of an older man before speaking to him. They would not break into his words and they would treat him with great respect. In our western culture, it is an honor to be young. In addition, the youth advanced very quickly. They picked up the language better, mixed in with Israelis and left the adults behind. They also took from the elderly and the Keysim, the spiritual leadership of the community, their political leadership, when they went out to struggle with the establishment."

And the different skin color also did not make it easy for them. The State of Israel rubbed its eyes a lot until it got used to it, if at all. Mayors, schools, and neighborhoods who did not want to accept them can be remembered. And the number of mixed couples is still small. [It] still does not signal harmony. [by Dani'el Sa'ar]

Data on Palestinian Detainees Released

TA1607114991 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jul 91 p A4

[Report by Tzvi Zerahya]

[Excerpt] Some 9,128 residents of the territories are currently being held in military prisons; 580 are serving administrative detention terms. This was reported yesterday by Brigadier General Shalom Ben-Moshe, the chief military police officer, at the Knesset's Public Audit Committee. The committee discussed the irregularities in the detention facilities noted by the state comptroller.

Gen. Ben-Moshe also said that 4,891 of the detainees have been tried and are serving their sentences, 2,966 are being held until the end of the legal proceedings against them, and 691 are ordinary prisoners. He pointed out that the data indicate a substantial decrease in the number of detainees, whereas there has been an increase in the number of prisoners who have been tried and sentenced. A sharp decrease of over 50 percent compared with the peak periods of the intifadah was noted in the number of administrative detentions. [passage omitted]

Arab Political Violence in Lod Profiled

TA0508151191 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Aug 91
p 5

[Article by Ben Caspit]

[Text] On 14 September 1990, a story appeared in "MA'ARIV" titled "Khomayniism—Ten Minutes From

Tel Aviv." The story dealt with the nationalist-Islamic reawakening of some of Lod's Arabs. A senior security official in the area was then quoted as saying: "When they become stronger, petrol bombs will fly here."

Not a year has passed, and the petrol bombs are already flying. Last week, one of them exploded on the outer wall of an apartment building in the city's Eshkol neighborhood, opposite the market. The petrol bomb caught fire but miraculously did not spread into the apartment where an 80-year-old Jewish woman was sitting at the time. Two weeks earlier, a petrol bomb was thrown at another building in the same neighborhood.

Lod, by the way, is here. This does not refer to Nablus nor Gaza. This is a mixed city without a violent history. Lod is a stone's throw away from Road Number 1, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway, half a kilometer away from Ben Gurion airport and a quarter of an hour away from Tel Aviv.

The petrol bombs are already flying. No one has any doubts about that. The question is who is tossing them. To date, neither the police nor the various security services, have any suspects or detainees. Despite that, they are convinced that they are dealing with members of the Islamic movement—AL-NIDA' AL-'ARABI—which recently awoke in the city. AL NIDA' members vehemently deny this.

The following is a partial list of recent nationalist intifadah acts in Lod:

A cargo train passing by the Arab railroad neighborhood in the north of the city was attacked in the middle of the night, apparently with live ammunition. The conductor and his assistant heard a loud bang on the armored window and the sound of a shot being fired. A hard metal object which was thrown at the locomotive was found in the area, but the conductor maintains that a shot was also fired.

A synagogue near the police station was almost completely destroyed by two unknown youths who broke into it in the middle of the day, relieved themselves in the women's section and destroyed the building's entire contents.

Shortly beforehand, similar acts of vandalism were carried out on an old-aged home in the center of the city. Aside from the damage wrought on the place, the walls were spray painted with slogans, swastikas etc.

Another synagogue near the Arab neighborhood of Neve Yaraq absorbed a sophisticated fire-bomb which caused much damage. The bomb was composed of match tops, flammable glue and assorted other items used to set fires.

And now petrol bombs. Until now, there have miraculously been no casualties. "But if things continue this way, there will be casualties too. It is a matter of time," one of the security officers in the area said. [This is the]

same officer who less than a year ago prophesied the [coming] of the petrol bombs.

There are 48,000 residents in Lod. Eleven thousand of them are Arabs. The Jews live in the center of town and in the new neighborhoods. The Arabs are spread out in the outer neighborhoods which surround the city: the Railroad neighborhood, Pardes Snir, Samekh-Het, Neve Yaraq, Ramat Eshkol (a mixed neighborhood). Basically, there are good neighborly relations in the mixed neighborhoods. The distressed neighborhoods, such as the Railroad one, are a different story. You think twice before going into them. A guard from a security company who was attacked there by unknown assailants more than a year ago still does not understand how he came out alive.

Who throws the petrol bombs? In the meantime, no one knows. In each case, the members of the Islamic movement deny responsibility. They are angered by the attempt to incite the public against them and to attribute such acts to them. Yusuf Sharaya, the leader of the movement, has trouble concealing his anger: "The media and the police are inciting an entire public against our movement. You, only you, are responsible for what is happening. The Islamic movement has until now observed the law, continues to do so, advocates peaceful coexistence and works to achieve it. Our aim is to raise the standard of living among Moslem Arabs, and we do not stray from this. Whoever accuses us of all sorts of acts, does so at his own risk. If, unfortunately, someone is hurt as a result of this incitement, it is the fault of you inciters. Since when can a newspaper or a policeman place blame on someone before things are proven? This hurts me very much. There were prayers in the great mosque today. Can you imagine what would happen if we would incite the public against all the slanderers? But, in the meantime, we maintain control and restrain ourselves."

Security officials do not get excited about the denials. The Lod police commander summoned Yusuf Sharaya to his office last week and warned him. The police officer informed Sharaya that the situation must be stopped. Sharaya agreed and said that he and his movement have nothing to do with the petrol bombs, the shots, the stones or the graffiti on the walls.

The Islamic movement in Lod is struggling to maintain its position among the local Arab population. Not all of the local Arabs belong to the movement. Those in the know claim that most of the Arabs are in fact loyal Israeli citizens, peace-loving, who deep in their hearts hate this religious reawakening which they claim brings only trouble. The real fight, the difficult one, is actually being conducted among the Arabs themselves, and its peak culminated in the removal from the town of the Imam of the great mosque, about a year ago.

Lod Arabs arrived there from Yafo, Shaykh Munis, and from the Negev. Another important part arrived in a kind of exodus from Arab towns beyond the Green Line.

This was not by an illegal move, but by a government act. These evacuees were, in effect, collaborators who spied on behalf of Israel and families that assisted the IDF until they were uncovered by the local population. To this day, families like that still occasionally trickle into Lod. They are usually the most loyal Israeli citizens.

The Islamic movement faces vehement opposition from them. In one of the confrontations, during the course of the deposing of the Imam by the Islamic movement, the other side brought in reinforcements from Gaza. Two van loads full of young men arrived from Gaza to help their "Israeli" cousins against the Islamic movement people. Strange world.

What next? There are two possible scenarios: the first and more optimistic one—the police will catch the local terrorists who will be severely punished. The nationalist dirges will end and everything will fall into place peacefully. The less optimistic scenario: the next petrol bomb will penetrate a residence and kill peaceful citizens. The Jews will go out on the streets and go for every moving thing, the Arabs will react and who knows how it will end. A Lod Arab, moderate and intelligent, said on this matter: "Lod is in my opinion, sitting on a time bomb. I am afraid of the future and of the outcome. I am not worried about the Jews, but about us the Arabs. I am very worried about how the Jews will react if and when something happens."

Media Connections in Der'i Affair Discussed

91AE0523D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jul 91
p 9

[Article by Natan Ro'i]

[Text] Interior Minister Arye Der'i, who has been crucified from the jacuzzi, and who is described by Ben-Dror Yamini (DAVAR HASHAVUA', issue no. 24) as an unfortunate soul whom "the Red Army assembly is preparing to lynch," is my motivation in writing the following remarks.

Minister Der'i has a lobby of supporters in the Israeli media. His power as interior minister and his ability to supply headlines bubbling with raw journalistic material has made him into the darling of members of both the Haredi and the secular media (during his honeymoon period in the Israeli press, journalists—confusing me about him—said of him: He is a man whose ways are all ways of peace, he is one of us, he is a religious Peace Now). His power in the media was and is considerable. Therefore, his depiction as a martyr, a victim, and an underdog is nonsense.

Minister Der'i has greater power than a journalist. The print media wages a harsh fight against the institutional, dependent media—Israeli television and the Voice of Israel—which, in very many cases, present the "voice of the master." The printed media presents a courageous

position compared to radio or television, which present themselves as "governmental," and are actually far from that.

How many reports were there about Arye Der'i on Israeli television in connection with the investigation being conducted of him? Very few, and most of them were done by correspondent Elisha' Spiegelman, who suffered not a little from the pressures exerted on him by the administration.

In a truly democratic state, in which there is no monopolistic broadcasting authority, Der'i would have been exposed publicly on a much broader scale than that revealed on Israeli television and over the Voice of Israel. Professor Asher Aryan has already written about this ("Politics and Government in Israel," published by Zmura Bitan, 1990): "The monopoly of radio and television runs completely counter to the competition that prevails in the domain of the printed word. Even though there are a number of radio stations in Israel, including Army Radio, all news editions that are broadcasted have a common source. Also, there is only one television channel, although there is talk of establishing a second channel. Radio and television are subordinate to the Broadcasting Authority, which is a governmental body established in 1965."

Minister Der'i is suspected of violations that bear the character of a personal and public disgrace. If he lived in the United States, he would have resigned immediately upon the publication of the charges against him. However, Arye Der'i, the learned man of SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim], did not leave his public position. He fought to prove his innocence, and he has returned to the public system like a giant. On the advice of his lawyer, he has preferred to remain quiet regarding the investigations by the police, as acting otherwise would be inappropriate for a public person of his stature. Remarks were made in this regard by Miryam Ben-Porat, Hayim Kohen, Professor Yitzhaq Zamir, and many others. Instead of cooperating with the police as required by his status as a public person, he has preferred to remain quiet.

All of these people ask why Der'i has moved in the opposite direction of what is required of a public person in a democratic system? To answer this question, one must try to understand the reality in which Der'i lives, his electorate, his court, which is the court of Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef, and his mood. Minister Arye Der'i, a member of the Moroccan Jewish community, grew up in the shadow of Rabbi Schach from Bney-Braq, the leader of the Lithuanian current of Bney-Braq, who is a die-hard opponent of Zionism and religious Zionism. Der'i attained to his position within the community after he served as the clerk and secretary of the Council of Torah Sages of the Sephardi community. These two currents, the religious-Haredi Ashkenazi and Sephardi currents, do not recognize the state of Israel. They recognize only a state based on Jewish law, which is far from the state of Israel. If Der'i were to uphold the law and cooperate with

the police, he would be considered a strange bird and would perhaps even be ostracized from his community. From this perspective, Der'i is a distinguished representative of the Haredi attitude.

Ben-Dror Yamini's attitude regarding the media's treatment of the Der'i affairs is a carbon copy of Der'i's attitude. This attitude is also not surprising. It views the media, instead of Der'i's actions, as malodorous. However, this is the attitude of a conservative, Haredi Jew: The bad is always outside, never inside in the soul. One must be wary of what is happening on the outside and to preserve the beauty that is within. Very few rabbis have thought that beauty must also be sought internally and that the bad must be eliminated from within oneself. I would suggest that Rabbi Der'i, perhaps also Ben-Dror Yamini, review the writings of the rabbi from Kutzk. By the way, I heard about the rabbi from Kutzk for the first time in the socialist United Kibbutz Movement, in the land of religious apostasy.

Journalists 'Ostracized' by Egyptian Counterparts

91AE0446C Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Jul 91
p B13

[Article by Yig'al Lev: "An Open Letter to Egyptian Journalists"]

[Text] Of all the countries that Israel has diplomatic relations with, only Egyptian journalists have ostracized their Israeli journalist colleagues.

In a conversation held at my house with the General Secretary of the World Press League, which brings together the Communist, Arab, and African press, I raised with him the issue of the ostracism of journalists by their colleagues. I stressed that the journalistic profession is antithetical to any concept of ostracism. The whole purpose of the press is to make connections, the attempt to bring about understanding between countries and people. Ostracism may perhaps be appropriate to politicians, but not to media people.

In that same conversation he tried to come to grips with the reasons for the break between the two bodies and promised to look for a way to arrange a meeting between representatives of the League of Egyptian journalists and representatives of the League of Israeli journalists.

This pose of ostracism is insulting because Israeli journalists are at pains not to assail their neighbor. In the Israeli media I have found almost no vindictive attacks on Egypt and certainly no attempts to vilify the leaders. A brief glance at Egyptian newspapers shows just the opposite picture.

In the weekly ALMASUR Muhamad Al Sa'adni writes: "There is no use in nor hope for an attempt to live in peace with Israel..." He follows up by saying: "Let us talk seriously. There is no Arab government that does not wish Israel to disappear, but wishing is one thing and the ability to make it happen is another." As to solving the

problem, he avers: "There is only one way left to us and that is our own strength and the use of the weapons of the murderer in order to put things back in place. That is the language Israel understands."

The Egyptian press is strewn with anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish expressions, and their tone has intensified of late. In the newspaper B'AKHBAR, the priest 'Aziz Halil publishes an article on Zionism and asserts: "The goal of Zionism is the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine and setting Jerusalem as its capital so that the Jews can rule over the entire world from it and take control of the religions."

And in the newspaper AKHBAR AL YUM an article was published about "the Jewish coup at the Cannes festival," and reporter Ahmad Salah talks of "the Jewish control of the world film industry," which, according to him, was the reason why the three first prizes were awarded to Jews.

In a cartoon in the paper GAMHURRIYA, an Israeli soldier is depicted with the emphasis on his Jewish nose.

In an open letter to the chairman of the National League of Egyptian Journalists, published at the end of last month in the Egyptian paper SABAH AL HAYR, the editors of the paper called for allowing visits by Egyptian journalists to Israel. The League of Egyptian Journalists was called upon to take a clear professional stand on the issue of visits by Egyptian journalists to Israel: "The reader has every right to know what is going on in Israel and the territories. We must put a stop to the Don Quixote campaign against journalists who leave to survey the scene in Israel. The Egyptian Council of Journalists has to come to a final decision on this."

Israeli journalists travel frequently to Egypt. They have developed good ties with their counterparts there. The problem is that Egyptian journalists have been turned into tools of incitement against us instead of being the arrowhead for establishing relations with us. The press is

a window through which neighbors get to know one another. Our window is open, but Egyptian journalists have lowered an iron curtain over their window. The first step will be to raise that curtain.

Gaza Poll on Political, Economic Situation

TA1607150691 Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English
15 Jul 91 p 16

[Excerpt] The bimonthly East Jerusalem based magazine AL-USBU' AL-JADID conducted an opinion poll in the Gaza Strip. The poll was conducted by Dr. Riyad al-'Ailah and will be published in the July 15 issue of AL-USBU' AL-JADID. The results confirmed facts concerning the political, economic and social realities of the current stage:

- 85 percent expressed their belief that the economic situation in the Gaza Strip is negative and deteriorating.
- 81 percent said the educational situation is weak or even very weak.
- 88 percent emphasized that the educational curricula are entirely inappropriate and stand in need of drastic amendment.
- 72 percent believed that the political situation is bad.
- 61 percent demanded that international legitimacy be applied with one criterion.
- 68 percent advocated the establishment of a completely independent Palestinian state.
- 54 percent believed in the possibility of coexistence with Israel through two neighboring states.
- 94 percent did not believe in the American solution because of the lack of credibility of the United States' pro-Israel policy.

The survey depended on field interview conducted with 495 persons chosen at random from various locations in the Gaza Strip covering camp, village and town residents as well as all age brackets. [passage omitted]

West Bank, Gaza Residents Receive Tax Break*TA0707091091 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
7 Jul 91 p A1*

[Report by Eytan Rabin]

[Excerpts] The defense establishment has for the first time confirmed significant income tax reductions for residents of the territories. The reductions will mainly affect the income tax paid to the Civil Administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Today or tomorrow, a decision will be endorsed stipulating that any wage earner in the territories with a salary of 600 shekels a month or 7,000 shekels per year will be exempt from paying income tax.

The plan has already been okayed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens. The defense establishment is preparing a series of additional income tax rebates and changes in the tax regulations. A meeting is scheduled today with Civil Administration officials from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including the deputy coordinator of government activities in the territories, Brigadier General Freddy Zakh, to sum up the final details.

Among other things, it has been decided to reduce the number of tax brackets from 11 to five, the same number as within the Green Line. It has also been decided that the highest tax bracket in the territories, 52 percent, will be lowered to 48 percent—the highest bracket in Israel.

Security sources said yesterday that this constitutes an essential change in the system, with the guiding principle of simplifying regulations and achieving greater efficiency and cost savings. The main purpose is to make life easier for the weaker strata in the territories, who find it difficult to pay taxes. [passage omitted]

Sources in the defense establishment explained that the rebates come within the framework of reducing violence and restoring normalization, especially in the larger cities. [passage omitted]

In addition to the new tax regulations, alleviatory measures will go into effect concerning economic projects in the territories and permission for entrepreneurs to receive money from Saudi Arabian money men to invest in the territories without PLO mediation. [passage omitted]

Unemployment Compensation Claims Up 8 Percent*TA0307094391 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 3 Jul 91 p 8*

[Report by Evelyn Gordon]

[Excerpts] Demobilized soldiers are being hurt the worst by the growing unemployment crisis, the National Insurance Institute (NII) reported yesterday.

The institute said that it paid some 57,000 claims for unemployment compensation in the second quarter of the year, an increase of 8 percent from the same period last year, and a rise of 3 percent from the January-March period. [passage omitted]

The NII's report follows a recent Central Bureau of Statistics report that unemployment rose to 10 percent in the first quarter of the year, from 9.8 percent in the last quarter of 1990.

NII director General Mordekhay Tzipori stressed that not only are more people collecting unemployment, but they are doing so for longer periods of time. He noted that in fiscal 1990 (which ended on March 31, 1991), the average person collected unemployment for 120 days—up 20 percent from only 100 days the previous year—and said that the average was expected to be even higher for the April-June period. [passage omitted]

Trade Union Chief Invited To Meet Gorbachev*TA1707144191 Jerusalem QOL YISRA'EL in Hebrew
1400 GMT 17 Jul 91*

[Text] Histadrut Secretary Yisra'el Qeysar today received an official invitation to meet with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of September in Moscow. NA'AMAT [a Histadrut-affiliated women's organization] Secretary Masha Lubelski, who met with the trade unions' president in the USSR, brought the invitation to Qeysar.

Reasons for El Al Airlines Success*91AE0433A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 May 91
p C3*

[Article by Dan Arkin: "The Profits of Flying Home"]

[Text] Either God loves El Al or the national carrier is lucky. Very lucky. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain how the national carrier has succeeded in holding on and, even more than that, in turning out profitable financial statements in recent years.

Tourists did not come during the intifadah, but immigrants came from the USSR. All the aviation companies stayed at home during the Gulf war, only El Al stayed in the field and hit the jackpot; travelers were struck with the fear of terrorism, and the carrier came and brought security; 15,000 Jews must be brought from Ethiopia in two days, El Al does half of the job. Communism collapses and Eastern Europe opens up, airplanes are sent to Moscow, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague. And there is a raisin [in the cake]: the one and only Ethiopian stewardess in El Al finds her brother.

The company presented yesterday its financial statements for 1990, which showed a profit of \$14.1 million, during a period when the Gulf crisis affected every airline in the world, and a great number of them showed losses.

There is some disappointment in El Al, a feeling that the greens and the blues of the army dwarfed its share in "Operation Solomon," garnered all the glory, and forgot to emphasize that "the civilian air force" brought approximately half of Ethiopian Jewry to Israel in an operation that achieved several odd records in world aviation.

It would be interesting to know what they are saying over in the Boeing Corporation when they read that in the 747 airplane, the jumbo, that they built for 450 persons, nearly 1,200 persons were transported, even if most of them were thin and small and a lot of kids sat on their knees, backs, and stomachs. The managers of El Al could have been put on trial for several violations of aviation laws and international regulations that they committed in "Operation Shlomo." But not to worry, the corporate symbols and letters were removed officially and the airplanes were mobilized into the air force reserves, and given a wing number to the 747, 757, and 767.

The national carrier reflects in effect the image of the people. In times of quiet, the battle is done with the management over every comma and period in the labor agreement. They do not forfeit even a half-hour of overtime. They also anger the passengers.

But give them a mission—they storm the planes like the devil to take double and triple passenger loads. They work hard on night flights of immigrants. They bore almost the entire burden of civil aviation to and from Israel during the Gulf war, including that sealed-room airplane that stood on the runway with hundreds of passengers on board during a Scud missile alert.

Let us get back to the financial statements. The beautifully bound and distinguished-looking financial statements have many pages, with tables and graphs and columns of numbers. But the financial statements tell a story even without economists. A story with a history: El Al was once a very disruptive corporation—the number of strikes compared well with the number of flights. Industrial unrest was its trademark.

Until about eight years ago, the government shut down the corporation for several months, declared the legal situation of temporary receivership—and the temporary status has continued to this very day.

Final approval for every action is received in the Jerusalem District Court, eight workers's committees became one ground-air employee representative. Nearly 7,000 employees shrank to 3,443. There is an assertive director-general, Rafi Harlev, a brigadier general (res.) and formerly the number two man in the air force; instead of the board of directors there is a receiver, Attorney Amram Blum. He represents all the directors. Not exactly the conventional arrangement in government corporations—but it is efficient and working.

The graphs show that there were losses in the first five years after the major surgery in the early 1980's, while from 1987 until yesterday there have been profits. In

1989, the profits reached \$24.2 million, and the managers were sure that in 1990 they would earn more—then came Saddam Husayn and killed Rafi Harlev's increase in profits.

Prices of fuel soared. El Al paid \$28 million for airplane fuel alone from August to December. The number of passengers declined by more than half in January-February, because who comes to a country at war. The increase in air fares and El Al's monopoly during the war (excluding Tower Air) did not compensate for all the war losses.

Rafi Harlev has data on the financial situation of 16 airlines: only three of them made profits in that period, and they were Swissair (\$3.1 million); Austrian Air Lines (\$11 million) and United Airlines (\$94 million). Among the important losers were Delta, Air France, KLM, Lufthansa, SAS and Alitalia.

So El Al was definitely a good company in a branch that was noted for low and vulnerable profitability—wars, weather, terrorism, fuel prices, labor relations, politics, and political upheavals. All of this has a quick impact on the movement of persons.

In order to survive and make a profit, it is necessary to plan well, to prepare in fat years for the lean years. El Al responded immediately by reducing the number of employees in Israel and abroad, decreasing overtime, sending employees out on accumulated leave; connecting and combining routes—a trick that passengers dislike very much, economical use of the fleet of airplanes, revising fares—or, in less polite language, raising ticket prices, intelligent use of subsidiaries (TESHET and its subsidiaries), that deal in aviation services and tourism and representation of foreign companies in Israel and are bringing the parent firm a good few millions this year. In this manner, the managers say, we were able to present a profit this week to the owners, the Government of Israel. Small, but still a profit.

To say that today everything is all right in El Al would be an exaggeration. Competing firms and travel agents are not always enthusiastic about El Al's aggressive and inconsiderate methods. Passengers complain about the quality of the service, that El Al is an efficient, secure, and safe company, but that it is not always nice to the passenger, who is paying a lot of money in order to fly blue and white.

But it is the airline of the State and the Jewish people, and nothing will help. In an El Al airplane an Israeli feels at home. Maybe there is not the peak of service and food and pampering of foreign airlines, but it is our flying home.

What is Rafi Harlev dreaming of now? Of the day when a blue and white Boeing 747 Model 400—a leviathan of the skies, the pride of the Boeing plants for the early 2000's, 500 passengers—first lands in Israel. That will happen some time in 1993 or 1994, and then El Al will be truly world-class.

Experimental Oil Shale Power Plant Successful

TA1106104691 Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST*
in English 11 Jun 91 p 10

[ITIM report]

[Text] An experimental shale oil-fired power plant in the Negev has been operating successfully, boosting plans to build a 1,000-megawatt plant, Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yuval Ne'eman said yesterday.

As a result of the experimental program's success, there are plans to build eight to ten 120-megawatt units which would be connected to generate a combined 1,000 megawatts, Ne'eman said at a Bet Sokolov press conference. The plants would burn only shale oil, instead of coal.

The experimental power plant, completed in 1989 in the Negev's Mishor Rotem, produced 12 megawatts an hour, proving that large quantities of oil shale could be used for generating energy, general manager of Pama (Energy Resources Development) Avraham Kaiser said. Pama developed the plant and, after its experimental run, started selling electricity and steam produced there.

The Negev has one of the world's largest deposits of oil shale. Israel oil shale is the poorest in energy producing potential, having 700 kilo-calories per kilogram. The experimental plant proved it was nonetheless practical to use domestic oil shale for generating electricity, he said.

Israel has 12 billion tons of oil shale, which can generate as much power as 1.25 billion tons of coal, Ne'eman said.

Lod-Ramle Development Project for Immigrants

91AE0460B Tel Aviv *HAYARDEN* in Hebrew 12 Jun 91
pp 6-7

[Article by Moshe Shavit: "The LORAM Company Is Dealing With Two Main Goals: The First, to Aid in the Absorption of the New Immigrants By Construction Throughout the Central Region. The Second—to Aid in the Reconstruction of Lod and Ramle and Other Settlements in the Area. Only Arik Sharon Can Double the Population of the Golan"]

[Text] Mr. Aharon Grinstein, chairman of the Likud in B'nai Brak and a member of the administration of the large religious city, a veteran and accepted public figure, was recently appointed chairman of the Company for the Development of Lod-Ramle (LORAM). Aharon Grinstein has many achievements in many fields, but we will note only that more than ten years ago he accepted the appeal of the chairman of the movement at the time, Yoram Aridor, and reactivated "Ahdut Yisra'el," in order to serve the religiously observant members of the Likud. Aharon Grinstein is one of the founders of the bureau for the self-employed, and has managed the municipal branch of the Herut movement. Aharon Grinstein has opinions on subjects beyond B'nai Brak, and he believes that Minister Ari'el Sharon, with his welcome

initiative and own vision, will double the population of the Golan Heights, which is an inseparable part of the State of Israel.

This is already evident in the Golan in the accelerated construction that is now taking place there. The contracts for the construction of 30,000 housing units on the Golan Heights are proof that the population of the Golan will soon be doubled.

He is much encouraged these days by the statements of Menahem Begin, who on leaving the hospital for his new apartment in Neveh Afeka reiterated to the Israel Government that the Golan Heights are an inseparable part of the State of Israel according to a law passed by the Knesset.

Regarding his new position as chairman of the board of LORAM, Aharon Grinstein told us: LORAM, the company for the development of Lod-Ramle and the nearby towns, such as Beit Dagan and Gan Yavneh, and which belongs to the Ministry of Housing, deals with two main goals: the first is to aid in the absorption of the new immigrants by way of construction throughout the central region. The second is to aid the settlements of Lod and Ramle and other settlements in the central region in the evacuation of unstable buildings that constitute a safety hazard and an environmental nuisance. Our interlocutor stressed the contribution of Minister of Construction and Housing Ari'el Sharon to the progress of the construction branch and the finding of solutions for the tens of thousands of immigrants who came to Israel in the past year and those who are expected in the coming months. He also noted the impressive functioning of the director-general of the company, Avi Geva, who worked for years to move the company forward and turned it into a leading factor in the construction branch in Israel that is highly regarded.

LORAM: A Housing Company

In making his comments, Mr. Grinstein stressed that regarding all of the things required for absorbing the immigrants, LORAM received the status of a housing company for the purpose of building thousands of housing units for new immigrants and also for young couples and families under urban renewal—everything at relatively low and generally controlled prices. As for the subject of evacuations, the chairman of the board explained that the company specializes in this subject and is today considered to be the best company in Israel.

We accepted recently the task of evacuating hundreds of Arab families in Lod who had over the years squatted on national land and who lived in deplorable conditions. By proposing alternative housing of an acceptable quality to those residents, LORAM attains two objectives: the evacuation of those residents to improved buildings and the evacuation of the land, which becomes available for the use of the city of Lod.

Aharon Grinstein says that the company also handles the subject of providing housing. LORAM's housing branch,

headed by the assistant director-general, Hayyim Bashari, acts to find appropriate housing solutions for distressed families, young couples, and new immigrants in the Lod-Ramle region.

The company is building houses of all kinds: single story houses and also multi-storied buildings, it is preparing land for the "Build Your Own Home" program, and more. One of the innovations in construction for the Arab residents, which is now only experimental, is the construction of "envelope apartments"—that is, the erection of a uniform external skeleton at the construction site, to maintain the architectural facade, and giving the dwellers the possibility of adapting the apartments to their own needs and requirements.

The LORAM company has taken upon itself dealing with thousands of apartments in the entire region, and promoting the company's goals, which today requires a lot of effort, dedication and loyalty on the part of all the employees.

The Company's Previous Achievements

The LORAM company has many achievements, which can actually be seen in the cities of Lod, Ramle, Rishon Lezion, Rosh Ha'ayin, Gan Yavneh, Beit Dagan, and Be'er Ya'akov.

LORAM developed residential neighborhoods on urban lands and state lands, and urban development in general, as well as lots for independent and inexpensive construction. Development was carried out with concern for the welfare of the individual. For example, the new neighborhood of Young Lod, which is a continuation and extension of the "Build Your Own Home" neighborhood and Neve Alon, in all of its stages, and the two neighborhoods together have 600 housing units.

In light of the great experience that the company has acquired in developing similar "Build Your Own Home" neighborhoods in many settlements in the central region, the LORAM company has invested a lot of thought in the Young Lod neighborhood, which is reflected in the subjects of planning and neighborhood development.

The planning of neighborhood development at an especially high level was made possible by the readiness of the Israel Lands Administration to sell the land at 50 percent of its real value and by the aid of the Ministry of Construction and Housing with the costs of the development and in granting preferential loans to the purchasers of land for construction in this neighborhood.

We who are involved in the development of Lod must note its past. Lod is an ancient city—approximately 3,500 years old. The Sages of the Talmud speak of it as being a walled city already at the time of Joshua Bin Nun. Writers and sages lived there at the time of the Second Temple. And after the destruction of the Temple, when Israel was exiled from Jerusalem, it became an important spiritual and economic center for the Jews of Eretz Israel.

The Roman rulers of that period were replaced years later by Byzantines, and afterwards with Arabs, Crusaders, Turks, and British. And the city changed its appearance, changing its Jewish image for pagan, Christian, and Moslem images, and then back again—but it has always remained standing. How did Lod survive for thousands of years? Moreover, why did most of its rulers glorify it, even making it into a provincial capital? The secret of the city's strength is reflected clearly throughout the map of Eretz Israel, the new as well as the old. It sits upon a central crossroads. Here meet the ancient longitudinal axis, which in ancient times linked Egypt in the south with Syria in the north, and the latitudinal axis, which already in Biblical times ran from the seacoast to the interior.

The End of the Process: One Large City

Aharon Grinstein believes that at the end of the process, the two cities—Lod and Ramle—will make up one large city, a modern Jewish city, most of the inhabitants of which will be immigrants from various lands.

Aharon Grinstein stresses that the efforts of the LORAM company are invested in strengthening Lod's attraction, on two levels: we act to create worthwhile conditions that will attract entrepreneurs to develop diversified and advanced industry in Lod, and we are interested in attracting a young, educated and economically-secure population, which will raise the level of the entire region.

Today, against the background of the mass immigration from the Soviet Union, we have an additional challenge, and I hope that we will also be able to cope with this very successfully.

The developed industry and the new residents together will be able to bear the burden of the development of the city in the future, as well, and will free the municipalities from their great dependence on external budgets—to the benefit of these cities and the welfare of their residents.

As was mentioned, the company also has branches in the surrounding cities, and while speaking with Avi Geva, the director-general, he directs us to Gan Yavneh, where LORAM has also carried out and is carrying out broad operations in the sphere of development. Many may have the impression that Gan Yavneh is a "godforsaken" place, far-away, and lacking community services. It is wrong to think that.

Gan Yavneh of today is an exciting combination of tranquil rural atmosphere far from the bustle of the city, with advanced community services, such as a superb school system that includes schools and kindergartens that are equipped with the finest learning aids. In recent years, Gan Yavneh has become a center of building that is in demand among the economically-secure population that seeks an improvement in its quality of life, which has a swimming pool, a local cultural hall, a public library, flowering parks, and play areas.

The building plans in Gan Yavneh, as in Beit Dagan, constitute another building block in the development thrust of these towns.

Outside experts are also of the opinion that the LORAM company is managed with great efficiency and with close supervision over the work of the contractors.

Lod's attraction, as with that of its neighbor Ramle, lies mainly in its central location. The ancient roads have not disappeared from the map. On the contrary: they have been paved and have become modern highways, which go from Lod to Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Be'er Sheva. Lod's train station is the crossroads of the tracks in Israel today. But what is perhaps the most important thing: Lod is located only 3 km from the central link of the State of Israel with the entire world—the Ben Gurion Airport.

These advantages are very clear to Israeli industrialists and businessmen, so that when the two industrial parks were constructed by the LORAM company, they were occupied by well-known companies from Tel Aviv. LORAM is conducting negotiations with all interested entrepreneurs, and is selecting those that suit its goals. One of the principles that guide this selection is avoidance of air pollution.

LORAM is not interested in bringing in heavy industry projects, that would impair the quality of life of the

region's residents, as "quality of life" is the key concept in the second central goal that it has set for itself.

So far, LORAM has aided many hundreds of families in Ramle to enlarge their apartments, something that has eased the residents's problems of crowding. LORAM has invested ceaselessly in the improvement of the appearance of the city and in dealing with local problems such as approach roads in poor repair and defective lighting.

Half a Million Apartments Within Five Years

At the end of the conversation, Aharon Grinstein stressed again that Minister Sharon is today at the center of the most difficult action. He will also change the Galilee. Carmi'el, a settlement that has tripled in size and will reach 60,000 residents. Upper Nazareth will be doubled in size. The population in Tzfat and in Ma'alot will increase a lot. All this in addition to 1,000 homes that are planned for the outposts. The quality of life will be different. The problem of Wadi 'Ara will be solved—and the region is now in the process of preparing the land for construction.

The entire region of ridges that overlooks the seacoast will be covered with buildings that will be occupied by Jews from the Soviet Union.

There is today a lot of construction in the Jerusalem region, as well as in the entire Negev region. We are talking about half a million apartments within five years.

MA'ARIV's Gilbo'a Profiles IDF Chief Baraq

*91AE0467B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Jun 91
pp B1, B11*

[Article by Amos Gilbo'a]

[Text] "Tell me, do you not think that you have made a mistake in the total number of guns?" Chief of Staff Ehud Baraq asked quietly. They all—all the officers who had gathered in the war room of one of the IDF's [Israeli Defense Forces] commands—heard the question. Silence reigned. On the screen was a slide that detailed the arrangement of the command's forces. Dozens of figures and data. "You are right, commander," mumbled the officer responsible, and a stir passed through the hall. They presented another slide, and another, including one about the activity in one of the subunits of the command. A sea of facts and figures.

After several hours, the chief of staff arrived at that subunit, which presented a similar slide. Before they went on to the next one, the chief of staff stopped them: "Are these the data? I am not sure that I saw the same data in the command." They hurriedly checked and compared—the data actually were not identical.

He goes into details—he understands details. He pays attentions to fine points. It is hard to put any thing over on him. This is common knowledge among officers all over the command and beyond it. But, he already said these things in "Heykhal HaTarbut" (the Jerusalem convention center), a week after he took over the job, before all the officers of the IDF from the rank of lieutenant colonel and above: "honing the system, excellence, rests on three foundations: accurate intelligence, constant learning from experience, and knowledge and understanding of details." It is possible that too many officers thought that this was just another lecture that could go in one ear and out the other. But this was a plan of action that the chief of staff intended to carry out. The "commotion" accompanying the actions does interfere, but Ehud Baraq believes that with the passage of time, in no more than two years, these actions will be seen in another, true light—and it will be clear that he was right.

The chief of staff's visit to that command was planned, formal, and also exceptional. All of his other visits to IDF units have been without advance warning. "Surprise visits." To know exactly what is happening, without wasting the time of those being inspected with preparations, whitewashing, polishing and presentations.

On Wednesday, 29 May, the chief of staff was among those who greeted the American Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, at Lud airport. From there he returned to his office and changed from dress uniform into work clothes. From his office they telephoned to somewhere and asked, "When is a good time tonight for the chief of staff to come to the armored brigades's maneuvers? The answer was, "toward nine o'clock." "We will be there at midnight," Baraq decided. And then, wearing a bullet-proof vest, he arrived at the exercise area, got into the

tank of one of the unit commanders, and together with him and the tank team took part in the exercise until dawn.

Back to the office, a short nap, a shave, and on to the discussions. And they are endless. But 35 days ago, at the end of a series of long discussions, a working paper was completed outlining the main directions of a plan for economy and stepped-up efficiency in the IDF. These are the directives for the multiyear plan meant to work an actual revolution in the IDF toward the year 2000. What they are doing now, what they are preparing to do next year, and what the direction is in the longer run; with clear time tables for far-reaching staff work; with painful cuts in live flesh and a strike at the useless sacred cows, and at the redundant bodies. And the staff work has begun to move at a rapid pace.

And the IDF feels, and how, that the pace is speeding up and that

someone is in charge; that there are decisions and that orders are enforced. That you need to work and save and become more efficient, and without smart excuses. The company, battalion, and brigade have become the flag bearers of the ground forces. The headquarters stream man power, vehicles, supplies and oil to them. Initiative is returning to staff commanders. Consistency—in directions, in carrying out missions, in carrying out orders—has turned into the name of the game.

But, and this is a big "but"—the IDF does not live on the moon. The IDF is a people's army and the chief of staff is the commander the public raises its eyes to. And this public is also the media and the politicians. And here—what can you do?—they do not talk just about the main thing, restricted to a great extent, but more about what is revealed, whether true or imaginary, and there is gnashing of teeth, and the media are full of stories about the chief of staff. Every day has its story and its interpretations. Major General Doron Rubin, and the IDF radio station, and Dani Nave, and the Women's Corps, and the Education Corps, and the officers moved around like "marionettes" from assignment to assignment, and the exposure of the special units in the territories.

"I was happy to hear about his appointment," said Brigadier (reserves) and Knesset Member Binyamin ben Eli'ezer (Fu'ad). "He is going to undertake a big shakeup in the army. His direction is excellent. But he is wasting ammunition on marginal things. He is simply attracting fire to himself needlessly. The decision-making process appears from outside to be precipitate, partisan. And it all gets out to the media. The generally accepted picture is that he does not consult with others."

Baraq admits that there is something in this. He has been heard to say, "I also make mistakes, and I intend to learn lessons from mistakes, just as I ask others to learn lessons. And fast."

He has not yet been chief of staff for a hundred days, and it is impossible to argue with the facts: with him there are no appointments based on favoritism, influence, or intrigues.

Then what happened with Dani Nave? The chief of staff, who has been impugned in the past as one who keeps too extensive a network of connections with politicians and media is learning to recognize the reality decorated with trivia from the world of imagination. Ehud Baraq, they said, met Nave in the hall and suggested the role of IDF spokesman to him. In another place it said that the suggestion was made over the telephone.

The factual version: a week before the fuss broke out, IDF Spokesman Nahman Shai told Baraq that Minister Roni Milo had "closed" his appointment as general director of the second television channel, and that it would be necessary to find a substitute for him. Together they went over the qualifications necessary for an IDF spokesman, and made a list of possible candidates. Nave's name came up among others. Several days passed. Several people were consulted, but the responsibility is not diffused. It is his alone. Baraq invited Nave to his office, asked his opinion on the nature of the spokesman's role, and then offered it to him. Nave, according to the media, almost fell off his chair. The chief of staff did not notice anything like this and the chair—at the last examination—was in perfect condition. Nave just asked for a chance to take counsel. After two days, at around dusk, he came and announced that he was ready to accept the job.

Neither Baraq nor Nave foresaw the political opposition that would arise. Colleagues in the army were insulted, and said that they had worked their behinds off for years, to reach the rank of Brigadier. It was not right that he did not go first to the minister of defense, and tell him his intentions concerning Dani Nave. Neither did he consult with his second in command, Major General Amnon Shahak, nor with Uri Shagai, head of Intelligence. A mistake.

Baraq actually examines his actions carefully, including his decision-making process. There are no "decisions from the hill," landing from above; there is staff work to the length and breadth; recommendations from the professional ranks are almost always accepted; the discussions are fiery but purposeful and practical. To the point. So things seem to Baraq and to many officers.

But this is not the whole picture. For other officers there is a feeling that he decides from the first what has to be done and why it has to be done, and just expects them to listen to the "how it has to be done." He has tremendous experience and quick understanding. What seems in his eyes efficient and practical is translated in the eyes of not a few officers into impatience and haughtiness. Sometimes the appearance is more important than the substance. Baraq thinks that this is not so, but he too, as he will certainly acknowledge, has to learn.

And if the officers feel that way, then the politicians all the more. Many have the highest expectations for him and wish him well, but there are some who lie in wait for his every slip. Baraq knows that there is no situation without stumbling blocks, and not everyone is holy. And in any case, what is holy for politician A is unclean for politician B.

The media reported that he instructed the "Behavioral Sciences Division" in the manpower branch to carry out a survey among the officers, to find out how they relate to him and to his actions, and that it found that they blamed him for pursuing cheap popularity.

Nahman Shai said that the chief of staff did not know anything about this survey. The chief of staff does not busy himself with, and does not instruct others to carry out, surveys like this. This was a routine survey that the "Behavioral Sciences Division" has carried out as part of its job for years.

The chief of staff's voice cracks. His damaged vocal cords betray him again. But there is no time for an operation. Because the time is short and it must not be allowed to slip away. All the IDF staffs have stepped up their rate of work. There is no choice. If they do not manage to complete the multi-year plan by the beginning of July, they will lose an entire year and lose money and everything will dissolve. "Lower the gears," they tell him, "they will not stand up to the pace." "No," he says, "we must not give up. We must be consistent, for the Middle East will not give us a long period of rest."

Baraq maintains that he has explained himself to the army at several opportunities, and wonders if it is possible to overcome the antagonism and conservatism among part of the officer corps. He has already assembled all the ranks from lieutenant colonel and above; he has met twice with all the division commanders, and had conversations with battalion commanders, and with all the commanders responsible for current security; soon he will meet with the entire senior officer corps.

This seems all right on paper, and should also work in practice. But the public only hears about what does not work. And only about minor things. It seems like this is all they do in the army.

Baraq thinks that the results are important and not the headlines. Every day there are new headlines. This passes. What remains is the inner truth within the IDF, and that is what is important; for instance, norms of behavior when facing an enemy. An example: the incident in Neve Or, in the Bet Sh'an valley, when an IDF force ceased the assault on a terrorist. He dismissed four officers, among them the brigade's second in command. A tumult arose. But he is convinced that he was right. It is forbidden to compromise on sticking to objectives against an enemy, and on not undermining efforts to establish contact with him. If we compromise here, at the tip of the IDF's javelin, the essence and nature of the IDF as a fighting army will be lost, says Baraq again and again.

It makes the impression that one incident is constantly following another. There is not a quiet day. Doron Rubin, for example. A true officer. What happened? Baraq, from the beginning, almost as soon as he took command, announced that there would be a defined duration for each rank—the term for a major general—three years. Within two weeks he invited all the Major Generals to see him, one by one. Doron came too. He said to him: "Doron, I have nothing to offer you. I cannot promise you something definite for at least a year. If you have an idea, come to me. There is no rush. Take a few months." He left. The next day, boom - a headline in the newspaper. It was not Doron who leaked it. He is honest and decent. But the press publicity had already created a new situation.

The chief of staff wants to demonstrate that he is consistent, that there is no double standard. Thus he answers the question of why he forbade the media coverage of the farewell parachute jump that Rubin's parachutist comrades arranged for him. "I ruled," said the chief of staff, "that there would be no more correspondent coverage of farewell ceremonies for officers, the same way I ruled that the ceremonies will be modest and without unnecessary extravagance. I held to this when the major general of the Northern Command and the corps officers finished their assignments, and also in Doron's case. Why should it be so for Yosi Peled and not for Doron Rubin?"

But the question is asked anyway: Was Doron not an exceptional case? Does the chief of staff have no sensitivity for human feelings? What would have happened if he had made a gesture and come personally to shake Rubin's hand after the parachute jump? There is no simple answer.

When the chief of staff hears that the IDF radio station is reporting from the field, he smiles. You might say that this is a bitter smile, but Ehud Baraq is not the bitter type. He is too rational, and bitterness is not a component of rationality. IDF radio is reporting from the field. It is forbidden to give in here. "And I am not giving in on this," says the chief of staff. "It has become a symbol in the army. Nothing in the army will be immune to changes and eliminations. How can I look into the eyes of the flight commanders, tank battalion commanders and others, whose living flesh I am cutting now, who have no lobby and no media and no politicians, but who do have field security over them?"

The politicians are especially sensitive about the chief of staff. He is seen as more political than Dan Shomron. He is a threat to them. The actions he takes from antipolitical considerations are presented precisely as based on political intentions. They will all pay lip service to the argument that it is forbidden for the army to be political, but they will all stir in the chief of staff's pot, as if it was a party branch. The chief of staff already knows that he must live with this, and also that he has to pay attention. Not to create opportunities for political attack.

Last Saturday, at a party that veterans of the general staff cruiser gave in his honor, somebody rose and told about his crew, whose navigational travels all over the world filled the whole map with black lines—"foot paths." And the commander of the crew was a young captain, Ehud by name, who is going to go great distances.

For years the chief of staff, when he arrives home, has been accustomed to put exercise shoes on his feet, to change into an exercise suit, and with a pistol at his hip, to take a walk with a friend. It is nighttime. A good hour to stretch your muscles and think clearly. The night is quiet and the everyday noises do not interfere with the focus of attention.

In front of his house one day at the end of a walk, he ran into a friend, formerly a senior Shin Bet (General Security Service) officer, today in an industrial position, who told him: "You will learn from General Director Kor, who escaped from the media. Even if you are a genius and filled with lightning (play on the name "Baraq", which means "lightning"), the media will always find some fault with you. Go on with your holy work, because you are on the right track."

He entered his house. Again the telephone rang. After a quarter hour of conversation he sank onto the bed. Four hours of sleep and the chief of staff will return to work. He will keep going. Baraq is a man who goes great distances—the name of the true test. In the short range there are more headlines and noise than reflection of the true character of things.

Antiaircraft Forces Commander Appointed

TA0707073091 Jerusalem QOL YISRA'EL in Hebrew
0700 GMT 7 Jul 91

[Text] Colonel Yitzhaq Biran has been appointed commander of Antiaircraft Forces. He will be promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Our army affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe reports that Biran, 42, has served in the Antiaircraft Forces since age 18. He is about to graduate from the National Security College and to complete a master's degree in political science. His predecessor, Brigadier General Uri Ram, has resigned his commission.

Integrated Antiaircraft Training Begins

91AE0529B Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 3 Jul 91
p 9

[Article by Uri Kashti: "First Integrated Exercise Between Hawk, Patriot and Aircraft" (farewell interview with Brig. Gen. Uri Ram); place and date not given; quotation marks, boldface words as published]

[Text] A large-scale foundation exercise of the 'Patriot' units ended several weeks ago. This was the first orderly and organized exercise since the days of the Gulf war. The exercise concluded only one of the stages of the lengthy foundation process.

"The system, integrated with other AA systems, succeeded in the exercise in attaining achievements in pursuing planes and helicopters that were better than those we have had before. The capabilities that were evidenced in the exercise indicate that the absorption of the 'Patriot' will result in a leap in the whole air defense field. Not only in the area that is better known to the public—the activity against ground-to-ground missiles, but also in the capability against planes and helicopters."

The 'Patriot' and the 'Hawk' are complementary systems, asserts Brig. Gen. Uri Ram, the commander of the AA forces. The 'Patriot,' he says, can cope successfully with missions that are more or less parallel to those of the 'Hawk' batteries. But the system also has unique missions, which the 'Hawk' cannot carry out, such as downing targets at a greater range [and] at a greater altitude and an ability to provide an answer to certain types of ground-to-ground missiles. Possibilities of integration of the two systems—the 'Patriot' and the 'Hawk'—are now being examined by the AA forces in order to achieve the greatest operational efficiency.

"The 'Hawk' system will remain with us for many more years," says the commander of the AA forces, "and it will continue to serve as an operational system in every way. It is a highly mobile system, with advanced identification systems and a capability against low-flying targets."

The 'Stinger,' a shoulder-fired missile for defense against planes, also participated in the exercise. The 'Stinger' is, in fact, a development of the 'Red Eye,' a shoulder-fired missile of the 60's, which was in use also in the Israeli Air Force. In the Lebanon war, on 10 June 1982, 1st. Lieutenant Rami Turner succeeded in downing a 'MIG 23' plane with a 'Red Eye.' This was the world's first downing.

The 'Stinger' is intended for defense against low-flying planes and helicopters. The missile can operate within a wide range of speeds and is capable of coping with diversionary and jamming equipment. The guidance and identification systems of the 'Stinger' allow it to differentiate between real targets and diversion flares.

The 'Stinger' is one of the most advanced missiles of its kind in the world. The company that manufactures it has succeeded in miniaturizing the sensor system, so that the missile can carry out infrared detection and tracking of planes. These capabilities give the 'Stinger' a greater chance of tracking and hitting the target," [quotation marks as published] says Brig. Gen. Uri Ram. "The 'Stinger' can be used in a number of ways: shoulder-fired, but also in a launcher system that is mounted on an APC or on another [type of] light vehicle."

The 'Stinger' great potential leads to a broad range of techniques and modes of operation, which will be used in the AA forces. The 'Stinger' units were integrated within the framework of the 'Vulcan' battalions. These are the leading battalions in AA combat together with the ground forces. The aim is to bring about maximum integration of the two systems—the 'Vulcan' and the

'Stinger'—so that, in the end, an integrated system of artillery and missiles will be obtained that will be able to meet the largest number of threats on the battlefield of the future.

"The 'Stinger' primary and central role is integration in the AA battalion and the provision of defense to the ground forces against planes and attack helicopters. The entry of the 'Stinger' into the AA forces had made possible new spheres of activity and the use of new modes of combat. The new techniques result in the maximum exploitation of the missile's sector-wide capability, that is—the ability to "lock onto" and hit the target, even if it is several kilometers away, before it has begun to attack. The outstanding advantage is that the entire system weighs only 15 kg. The 'Stinger' is, perhaps, the most sophisticated system of its kind in the world. Very few countries are today equipped with the advanced version of the 'Stinger.' By the way, the equipping of the Air Force is being carried out at the same time as the equipping of the American Army," adds Brig. Gen. Ram.

Brig. Gen Uri Ram is now completing 25 years of service in the Air Force, all of them with the AA forces. He began as a fighter in a 'Hawk' battery and went through the entire command route, from battery officer, through battalion commander, and ending as commander of the AA school. In addition, he served in a number of staff positions in training and operations. In the 70's, he was responsible for the absorption of two new weapon systems. He will be replaced by Col. Tchaki Biran, who served as commander of the AA school.

IAF Chief on Arrow Missile, ATF Fighter

91AE0535A Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR
in Hebrew Jun 91 p 5

[Interview with IAF Chief 'Eitan ben 'Eliahu by BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR; place and date not given: "More Defense With Fewer Resources"]

[Text] "If we plan wisely and implement properly, the Air Force will become more efficient and will maintain and even improve its quality in the course of carrying out the multiyear program that is being consolidated in the General Staff. The precondition for that to happen is not to affect the principal strength components of the Air Force," says Air Force Chief of Staff Brigadier General 'Eitan ben 'Eli'ahu in an interview with BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR.

"The multiyear program is being consolidated against the background of the new situation created in the Middle East after the Gulf war and against the background of the challenges facing the State of Israel in the area of immigration absorption," explains Brig. Gen. 'Eitan ben 'Eli'ahu. "It seems that the challenges Israel will face in the coming years will make a defense budget increase difficult. Therefore, we have to redeploy the financial resources that will be at our disposal over the

next five years. It seems that, at least in the next two years, we shall have to make a serious effort to tighten the belt."

The defense budget over the last few years has remained fixed in nominal numbers and from a real point of view, has been significantly cut. The defense assistance that the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] receives from the United States, totaling 1.8 billion dollars a year, has also been cut in real terms due to the inflation in the United States. Furthermore, the advanced aerial combat systems are more sophisticated and expensive.

"The Air Force faces a number of challenges today," says Brig. Gen. ben 'Eli'ahu. "First of all, we have to do everything we can to tighten our belts and become more efficient without reducing the procurement and development budget. After the efficiency is achieved, we can move to the next stage and cut routine security and short-term expenditures on the assumption that military tension will not increase over the next three years. Nevertheless, since it is difficult to forecast the military situation in the Middle East, we have to understand that the further we get from the events of the Gulf, the more likely the prospects for a deterioration of the security situation. The cuts made now must thus be implemented in such a way as not to affect the ability of the Air Force to return to a level of activity that would provide a response to a possible threat of war in the future.

While routine expenditures for the short and immediate term will be cut, we will continue to build up the Air Force at the same rate. The trick is to maneuver between the requirements of routine security and building up the Air Force without seriously affecting either one of them."

According to Brig. Gen. 'Eitan ben 'Eli'ahu, a reduction in the defense budget in favor of the immigration challenge will result, in the final analysis, in a significant increase in the budget: "If we are successful in getting control of immigration absorption and they have employment, the gross national product will increase. If the percentage that the defense system gets from the national budget remains fixed, the defense budget will automatically increase. Hence the reduction over the short term has to help improve Israel's economic situation as well as strengthen its military."

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] What routine activity will be cut?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] First of all we are looking for every possible corner that can be cut without affecting defense itself. We are surprised over and over again to find more and more areas in which we can become more efficient. The cut in each individual area is not big, but since the number of areas is large, the total cut is significant. Second, we are removing old systems from service to make room for new ones. That allows us to get the same defense output with less tools and less manpower. Nevertheless, it is always important to identify the red line that cannot be crossed.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Will the level of defense that the State of Israel has gotten used to from the Air Force in the past be affected in the wake of the cuts?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] Over the coming years that level will remain the same and may even go up if we are smart enough to become more efficient. The level of defense will decrease significantly only if in the future we are forced to carry out dramatic decisions such as a cut in the order of battle of airplanes. It is hard for me to imagine that such a situation would actually occur, except if the need for strength and scope of defense is reduced over the coming years for political reasons.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] The Arab states are also aware of the IDF and Air Force budget cut. As a result of that, will Israel's deterrent ability be affected?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] As long as we do not take significant hits in the order of battle in the strategic and deterrent elements, even our deterrent ability will not be affected. Quite the contrary. The smart enemy will be able to understand that he is faced with an army that has not been reduced in its essential elements and operates those elements with greater efficiency. That knowledge should actually increase our deterrent ability.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] What will be the fate of the "Arrow" project?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] The "Arrow" project is already on its way. We are now at the development stage and have to prove that we will be able to overcome the technological challenge. According to the data, it seems we shall succeed in doing so. The "Arrow" system will constitute another brick in building up the strength of the State of Israel. If we have in our hands a defense system that will neutralize the threat of missiles aimed at the rear, the Air Force will be freed up more for attack missions.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Will the "Arrow" project constitute too heavy an economic burden on the defense establishment?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] The participation of the United States in the initial stages of the project was almost complete. We hope that the Americans will continue to finance the project in the future as well. We have to remember that the Americans are very interested in developing the "Arrow." At first they were interested in a global continental defense system within the framework of the SDI project. The importance of global defense has lessened because of the military weakening of the Eastern bloc. But in the wake of the Gulf war, the need for tactical defense from medium- and short-range missiles has increased. If in the future the Americans should want to move their forces to a certain area in order to assist in the solution to a local conflict, as it happened in the Gulf war, they now have to find a fitting response to the problem of the missiles.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Will projects like "Sledgehammer 2000" and the upgrading of the "Puffins" be affected?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] Anything having to do with the refurbishing of planes like the "Phantom" or helicopters like the "Puffins" is very much up in the air. Still, we will not touch the main level of the force, i.e., new fighter planes and helicopters. Meanwhile, the plans that we had in the past are still in force but are constantly in danger. We are constantly striving to find the right formula to maintain quality as well.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Is the Air Force interested in the F-15 and the ATF?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] The F-15E is not for sale. The Americans are prepared to sell F-15 model F's, which are the lesser version of the E, and which are intended for export. The investment would be large and the return that you get from them is not sufficiently high. As to the ATF plane, it is still too early to talk about it in the present plan, which is aimed at the next five years. The ATF will begin coming into production at the end of the decade. Nevertheless, when we do a five-year plan, we take into account the next ten years, as well. I have no doubt that the ATF will be included in the next multiyear plan.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Do you intend to purchase new training and transport planes and helicopters?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] Apparently new planes and helicopters will be added to the order of battle. In this area a number of alternatives are being considered, starting with improved "Cobra" helicopters through additional "Apache" helicopters and ending with a helicopter like the LH. When building an order of battle of helicopters it is important to create a mix of choppers that complement one another. There are also plans to refresh the training and transport planes, but as long as the planes at our disposal can carry out their missions, the main and perhaps exclusive considerations will be economic. Refurbishing the planes, replacing them, the nature of the activities—all that will be decided in terms of this consideration.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] What is expected for the antiaircraft systems over the next five years?

[ben 'Eli'ahu] Three "Patriot" batteries are included within the framework of the multiyear plan. Over the next ten years, the "Patriot" batteries will gradually replace the existing "Hawk" system. Those three batteries will defend Israel against surface-to-surface missiles in the near future, but if there should be a sudden deterioration in the area, we could immediately equip ourselves with additional batteries and be assisted in doing so by the experience we acquired at the time of the Gulf war.

Aircraft Firm Releases New Data on Nimrod Missile

*TA1106152391 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
11 Jun 91 p A3*

[Report by Re'uven Pedatzur]

[Text] As the Paris Air Show opens this week, the Israel Aircraft Industries has published new details about the laser-guided Nimrod missile it developed. The missile is designed to be used against tanks and targets that are very important to the enemy, such as power plants.

The data published indicate that the Nimrod has a 26-km range, which allows it to be launched at enemy tanks behind their lines before they reach the front line. The Nimrod provides pinpoint accuracy, day or night, against mobile targets as well. Its deployment and operation are simple and convenient:

- The launcher reaches the launching site, and the system is aimed in the general direction of the target. There is no need to zero or balance the system before firing.

- A special designator transmits data about the target to the launcher, and those are fed into the missile itself.

The missile checks itself, notifies the operator that it is ready for launch, and gives the time required to reach the designated target.

- The soldier operating the locator gives the order to fire and illuminates the target with a laser spot during the last 15 to 30 seconds of the Nimrod's flight.

- The Nimrod cruises at the desired altitude, under the cloud base, and commences screening the target area several kilometers before reaching it.

- Once the target is located, the missile registers it. Then the Nimrod follows the target, and homes in on it with its navigation system.

- The missile stabilizes in flight and finally homes in on the target.

The Nimrod has five major components: search, control and guidance, a war head, a rocket engine, and a servo (a system of steering propulsion).

Improvements to Merkava Mark-3 Tank Detailed

*91P40378A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 12 Jun 91
p 12*

[Text] The Merkava Mark-3 tank, the most modern Israeli tank, has entered into operational activities in a substantial way. As it has been a customary practice since the beginning of the Merkava project, this tank included, many improvements and adjustments have been made on the tank according to the demands of the customer: the soldier in the field. In connection with the Merkava 3, it must be noted that up to the present, there

have been few requests. This is because everything that has been learned from all previous tanks has been applied to this one.

The majority of requests from the soldiers touch upon issues of human engineering. According to the head of the Tank Development Authority (TDA), Reserve General Nahman, problems are caused as a result of uncomfortable placement of equipment and devices within the tank. This may mean an uncomfortable chair, handles located too far from the operator, placement of equipment which disturbs a soldier trying to jump into the tank, or other such things.

A number of improvements made to the Merkava 3 involve, among other things, the comfort of the crew. In addition to 60 liters of drinking water, which are found in all generations of the Merkava, the crew can now enjoy air conditioning as well.

Numerous improvements have also been made in the armor. Beyond the famous modular armor and the engineering planning which exploit the accessories of the tank, especially the engine, to protect the crew. The electronically controlled turret was put into the tank in order to eliminate the presence of lubricants inside the tank, and thus to further reduce the danger of burns. The Merkava Mark-1 and Mark-2 also had hydraulic turrets with special systems to enhance protection against fire at the time of attacks on the tank. The potential exists for there to be no burn victims, a rare, and perhaps exclusive thing among those injured in armor battles.

According to the head of the Tank Program Directorate (TPD), Major General Yehudah Edmon, the best means to learn about what is in need of improvement is the soldier who operates the tank. In this vein, he has conducted inspections of armored units, and has had conversations with the personnel.

Everyone connected with the development of the Merkava, beginning with the heads of the departments of the TDA, to the head of the TPD, to the assistant to the minister of defense, Reserve General Yisra'el Tal, recognizes that the connection between himself, the Merkava project and the unit inspectors must always be maintained.

In all evaluations the remarks of the common soldiers are taken into account on every matter related to the operation of the tank. "When Taliq inspects an armored unit," says Major General Edmon, "he sits with the binder, with the division commander, and with all the high officials, but never forgoes a two-hour conversation with the commanders, sergeants, and the soldiers."

After they decide which improvements to make, and how to make them, they task the heads of the tank project, the TDA, the chief armaments officer command, and whoever serves as the engineering arm of the TPD.

Remaining Military Publications Reviewed

91AE0446B Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
22 May 91 p 7

[Article by 'Amit Gorvitch: "What Are Left Are BAMAHAHE, MA'ARAKHOT, and BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR"]

[Text] BAMAHAHE will expand its objectives. It will soon be decided by what criterion units will be given expression, in what format and with what distribution. The approach to the topics will be professional, with a considered, overall IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] view, says the BAMAHAHE editor. The corps will enjoy a much larger distribution and exposure. It is estimated that in the near term BAMAHAHE will become the target of criticism by those entities whose paper was canceled.

Last week staff work was concluded on the issue of IDF publications. With the aim of saving manpower, resources, and expenses, the publication of nearly 30 IDF journals will be suspended. Only three journals will continue to be published:

A. The newspaper BAMAHAHE, which will be the mouthpiece for the whole range of branches and corps either through its columns or through appropriate supplements.

B. The journal MA'ARAKHOT, which will serve to express the thinking of the military and defense sectors and as a platform for IDF officers.

C. The journal BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR, which will continue to be published, but with a reduction in expenditures and resources. Other branches and entities (infantry, navy, intelligence, etc.) will find appropriate expression via BAMAHAHE and its supplements.

It was also decided that all commercial advertising in IDF journals will come to an end.

The significance of the chief of staff's decision regarding the cut of about 30 military journals is now being assessed. Those publications will be given expression in the pages of BAMAHAHE. It will soon be decided which of those journals will find expression in separate supplements and which within the newspaper, at what frequency and with what distribution, and what the format, structure and content will be for the various forms of expression.

Since some of the journals that were shut down dealt, among other things, with professional areas and were intended for internal use within the corps, they will find alternate solutions for transferring professional information in a format of regular, internal military correspondence.

BAMAHAHE prints 70,000 copies. It reaches all the regular army people and civilian IDF workers in their homes. More than 10,000 additional copies are sent to

soldiers in their units. Furthermore, BAMAHA NE is sold freely to a limited extent. According to market surveys, the newspaper serves a broader community of readers, and the estimates are of tens of thousands of readers beyond the official distribution. This statistic will be taken into consideration in positioning the paper to fill the functions of those newspapers that were closed.

"The responsibility placed on the newspaper and the weight of BAMAHA NE as a military media tool will increase," says the editor of BAMAHA NE: "The problem will be, on the one hand, publication of an interesting and factual newspaper according to the professional criteria that we have assumed thus far and, on the other hand, the desire and need to fulfill the expectations and interests of the corps whose viewpoint is different, and sometimes professional, and flows from internal considerations."

I am aware of the fact that BAMAHA NE will be scrutinized, says the editor in chief, and I expect that groups and entities that were hurt by the decision will try to

prove that BAMAHA NE cannot be a proper substitute for their paper that was closed.

"I imagine that we will soon become the object of stinging criticism by these groups. This requires a professional approach on our part, responsibility and also sensitivity and reflection, to the extent possible, regarding those groups that to a certain extent we will serve from now on. Those entities will enjoy the wide distribution of the paper and the fact that they will get stronger and perhaps more significant exposure for themselves.

An additional factor in the internal organization is tied to the cancellation of commercial advertising. Following this, BAMAHA NE is working on a design that will continue to give the reader the feeling he is reading just another weekly journal. Currently they are working on the organization and creating the contacts with the various corps to consolidate the optimal solution to the new reality.

Children Polled on Thoughts on Gulf War

TA02071142791 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 2 Jul 91 p 10

[Article by Zvi Zinger]

[Text] According to a new survey, 19 percent of children in grades 1 to 6 were very frightened during the Gulf war. Forty-one percent were "a little scared" and 40 percent were not at all afraid.

The research, which looked into the thoughts and feelings of Jewish children during the war, was commissioned by the Ministry of Education and Culture and was conducted by the Institute for Social and Practical Research. It involved a random sample of 546 children—50 percent girls and 50 percent boys. The children were interviewed about a month after the war.

The following are the results of the poll: 53 percent of the children did not think they had "no one to talk to" during the war. About a third of the children felt this "a few times"; 14 percent felt it "many times."

Fifty-two percent of those asked enjoyed their vacation from school, forced upon them by the war. Thirty-seven percent did not enjoy their vacation and 11 percent actually disliked it. On the other hand, 61 percent of the children were bored.

About a quarter of the children got into more fights with siblings and parents. About a third of the children estimated that they actually got into less fights.

Despite the fact that Area A [Tel Aviv and its surroundings] suffered more than any other area from missile attacks, the study did not find that children in this area were any more frightened than others or that they demonstrated a different attitude toward school.

Secular-Religious Conflicts Influence Immigrants

91AE0486B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jun 91
p 1B

[Article by Uri Avneri]

[text] "One day, my child came home crying. Someone at school had called him a Zhid. At that moment, I decided to emigrate to Israel. Not for myself, for I lacked nothing in the Soviet Union. But for the child. So that this would not happen to him again. Now, we are here. Yesterday, my child came home crying. Someone at school had called him a Goy. What now? America?"

The speaker, a Jew from Moscow, had married a Christian woman. A distinguished scientist. A man any country would be blessed to have.

The child crying with both his eyes—his Jewish eye and his Russian eye—is a member of a new category, which can be called "Goyehudim" (Gentile-Jews). People who are partially Jewish, who want to be connected to the Jewish people and/or to the Israeli nation.

The problem cannot be ignored any longer. It presents us with a challenge every step of the way. Tremendous numbers of Goyehudim are arriving with the waves of immigration from the Soviet Union, and apparently also from Ethiopia. Some of them are helped by forged passports. Now a reliable survey has told us that 52 percent of the Jews in the Soviet Union are married to non-Jewish spouses. It is reasonable to assume that this is also the case in rest of the world.

You meet them everywhere. In Moscow and Berlin, in Budapest and Prague, in New York and Paris. Some are proud of the part of them that is Jewish and wear conspicuous Jewish stars. Some speak of immigrating to Israel (very often "for the children"). Some see their "mixed" origin as merely a biographical detail. (A very high Soviet official revealed to me by chance this week, as a piquant detail, that his mother was Jewish.) Some of them joke about it. (Dr. Gargur Gizi, head of the neo-Communist party in East Germany, told me that he is exactly 38.5 percent Jewish, because his mother's mother and his father's grandmother were Jewish.)

Among the Jews of the Soviet Union, the situation is especially colorful. For 73 years, they lived in a multinational state, where everyone intermarried, and religion was unimportant. This week, I met a man in Moscow, who told me he has Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Gypsy blood. And he is not exceptional.

How do you relate to this phenomenon? There is the religious approach. A Jew is someone who was born to a Jewish mother (a racial-biological fact), or who has converted according to Halakha. According to this formula, an arbitrary portion of the Goyehudim are kosher, and the others are not. It depends on a chance fact: whether the correct grandmother was Jewish (in the land where I was born, at one time, the identity of one's grandmother was a matter of life and death).

This approach causes millions of individuals to be rejected by the mass of the Jewish people. Without making, God forbid, a comparison, this religious approach is likely to cause us to lose six million potential Jews. The price of betraying national values and giving in to the religious.

There is a Jewish-secular approach, which says that there is no importance in religious and/or racial origin. A Jew is someone who wants to be a Jew, someone who sees himself as a Jew (and it can be added: someone whose surroundings see him as a Jew).

There is a national-Israeli approach, which says that an Israeli is someone who wants to live in Israel, who is ready to share her fate, to serve in her army, pay her taxes, and share in her successes and failures.

We have to deal with this problem, because on it depend the future of the Jewish people and the future of the State of Israel. Millions of individuals honestly and wholeheartedly wish to join our people, because their "mixed" background pushes them in this direction. If we receive

them with open arms, their children will be the scientists, generals, authors and engineers of Israel in the next generation. And those who remain in the diaspora will bring a renewal of the Jewish communities around the world.

This is not something new in Jewish history. In various periods when Jews flourished, the Jewish people absorbed hordes of non-Jews—defeated Carthaginians, whole tribes in southern Arabia, whole tribes in nearby Ethiopia (the ancestors of the Falashas), the Kuzaris and other entire kingdoms. It has been said more than once, that from a purely racial point of view, the Palestinians of today are closer to the ancient Israelites than most Jews are.

Whoever longs for the flowering of the State of Israel as a secular, modern and progressive state, must greet the Goyehudim coming to us, and welcome them as brothers. Anyone who worries about the future of the Jewish people must open to them the diaspora communities everywhere. This is a gift from heaven, a kind of compensation for the terrible holocaust. The question is, who among the Goyehudim wants to identify with the Jewish side in him. I do not believe that there is an absolute answer to this. The matter depends on every person who struggles with his fate. Maybe the balance will be negative, and for every new Jew who comes in this way, the Jewish people will "lose" two. Maybe the balance will be positive, and for every Jew "lost," the Jewish people will gain two. This is a kind of national current account, and the balance depends on our drawing power, and on the negative push of anti-Semitism, on the family situation, the dominance of the father or mother, and many other complicated factors.

Much depends on us—if we know how to give up preconceived ideas and outworn superstitions; if we are sophisticated enough to behave like a modern nation in the modern world; if we understand that we are being offered a human treasure which can not be valued with gold.

Ultraorthodox Internal Conflict Examined

91AE0487B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ (Sabbath Supplement)
in Hebrew 21 Jun 91 pp 6-7

[Article by Arye Kaspi: "The Best Kept Secret in the Country"]

[Text] Since the death of Rabbi Kahana there has been no religious politician for whom the Israeli left wing has conducted such a faithful, stubborn, and single-minded public relations campaign as Rabbi Peretz.

If the rabbi of Ra'ananna had said what Peretz said, it would have rated at best a few lines in the local town newspaper. But since the rabbi of Ra'ananna has been the subject of a miracle and has become a big minister in Israel, all his admirers on the left and center got together and decided to make the figure of this little-big man penetrate the consciousness of all Israel. And if TEKEM

[Kibbutz Movement] Secretary Muki Tzur, who started the festivities, had invested 10 percent of what he puts into the study of philosophy into learning about public relations, he would have spared himself and us all the current headaches. Once again we saw how one ultraorthodox idiot can outsmart all the sages of the left wing.

In the course of the police investigation into the business of SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardis], Arye Der'i recruited Boris Qrasny from the public relations pool close to Shim'on Peres, a nonreligious man who lives in between the ultraorthodox and Labor Party. He was the one who conducted the public relations for Degel HaTora in the elections and is currently handling the Na'amat [Alignment-affiliated Women's Labor Federation] account. I suspect that he is the one who made up the latest affair so that we should have to deal with something that did not exist 40 years ago, instead of giving our attention to what is happening today right under one's nose. And if Qrasny did not invent this gimmick, more shame to him, he should have thought of it long ago.

Because the real problem that has been hidden from the public eye for many years is precisely the failure of religious education in general and of ultraorthodox education in particular. One year ago I tried to persuade the Prisons Authority to share with me the data they had on the number of prisoners educated in each school system. At the time I got a polite refusal. This week I tried again. Someone in the Prisons Service told me that such information does exist, it is only a matter of pulling it out. Shuli Me'iri, the service spokeswoman, claims that the Prison Service does not have such information. "And even if it did, it would be a waste of computer time to pull it out."

The failures of religious education are among the best kept secrets in the State of Israel.

The achievements of religious public schools are appraised by the Education Ministry. The results are usually not made public. But everyone agrees that the achievements of students in religious public schools are lower than in other public schools, although the number of class hours in religious public schools is about 20 percent higher than in public schools. The popular explanation is that the students in the former schools come from weaker social strata, so their potential is lower to begin with. The problem is that the religious schools are far less open to change and to programs designed to handle initial handicaps.

But a far more difficult phenomenon are the boarding schools that the orthodox established especially for the Sephardi communities. Some people claim that a considerable percentage of prison graduates are also graduates of those boarding schools. And here is where a war is being waged unbeknownst to most of the public.

In recent years Welfare Ministry instructions ruled that economic conditions are not sufficient grounds to send a child to a boarding school. A child is sent to a boarding school, with the approval of the relevant committee, only

if the family situation makes it necessary to remove the child to a boarding school, in which case the parents are requested to contribute to the child's upkeep expenses.

But the rules of the game do not apply to the orthodox. They offer free boarding schools to parents who have material difficulties. Cases were uncovered in the past in which ultraorthodox child hunters received a fee from orthodox boarding schools for every child they managed to recruit.

In the encounter between the poor and the education system there are two basic approaches. There are parents firmly determined to secure a better world for their children and to give them a better chance in the social competition. Those people are making every effort to ensure the best possible education for their children. They struggle for the right to send their children to be educated in kibbutzim or to the best public boarding schools. At times one witnesses strange cases. Once I accompanied a Moroccan father and his son through the selection process of Neve Hadassa in the Sharon. While we were waiting outside, the father said, I am not sending my son to this school. I asked, why not? He said: There are no Ashkenazim here. Most of the children are from Morocco.

The second approach is that of parents who give up a priori. They send their children to ultraorthodox schools in order to become religious, because "Religious people are straight." I met more than a few criminals who send their children to such boarding schools. People who live with guilt view religious education as an act of atonement. Children of criminals are solid customers of boarding school education, because the parents spend years in jail. For many of them family life is accompanied by violence and in such cases social workers encourage sending them off to boarding schools.

Peretz' supporters come from the poorest stratum of the Sephardi Jewry in the country. They are vulnerable to all kinds of ills, including ultraorthodox missionaries, home-made crime, Ashkenazi arbitrariness, and the wretched "authentic" leadership that makes a living at their expense.

Last Friday night I prayed at a synagogue of people from Tripoli. I have a few acquaintances at that synagogue. Someone praised me for being there. Others helped me follow the prayer book. That synagogue for Tripoli natives was opened five years ago within the framework of SHAS revival. It is housed in a seedy makeshift building next to a luxurious Moroccan synagogue, but the place is full and all the worshipers are young. Most of them are poor.

There are many born-again Jews at the Tripoli synagogue. The worshipers look very different from people's image of SHAS. Aside from the genius who went to the Lithuanian Yeshiva, everyone wears a knitted skullcap and sandals. Some of them even drive off to party after the service.

The Ashkenazi HABAD [orthodox sect] follower sent by the rabbi gave a sermon. Every Friday he gives a sermon to the Tripolitans. Since the Torah portion for the week was the Qorah story, he spoke about him and his community and demonstrated that even Moses, the greatest in his generation, had his leadership disputed by some. The HABAD man was undoubtedly referring to his rabbi [the Lubavitcher Rabbi], but the worshipers were thinking of other rabbis. They do not care about the enmity between Rabbi Shah and the Lubavitcher. Most of them do not even know it exists, and those who do are willing to forgive the rabbis their weaknesses.

Asher, who works as a school janitor, told me that all the Eastern Jews, except for the Yemenites, follow Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

But what if Rabbi Peretz decides to form a party?

We will vote whatever Rabbi Yosef says. If he says 'alignment,' we will vote alignment.

Not everyone thinks like him. Even among very observant Jews some separate between Ovadia Yosef's religious authority and his political authority. In the last Histadrut election the Tripolitans, who voted SHAS in the Knesset election, mobilized to help a secular friend. Who was MAPAM, as it turned out.

Ten years ago I took a two-year sabbatical from my private life and went to manage the Bet Dagan Rehabilitation, Culture, and Sports Center. I was in a different country. Bet Dagan is one of the biggest crime centers in Israel and one of the most religious places in Israel—19 active synagogues for a population of about 2,500 inhabitants. A Sephardi Bene Beraq.

There were very few secular people there. Among the few there was the head of the local council and I. Among all the many challenges that I remember from that period not one had anything to do with religion. Most of the work focused on trying to improve education services. No one feared that this secular man would lead his children astray. Some members of the team that worked with me were also nonobservant. The only mistrustful person was the principal of the religious public school, who like me, was an outsider, a MAFDAL [National Religious Party] activist who is currently director of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The image we have of the Sephardi orthodox world is based on Ashkenazi images. Anyone who is familiar with Sephardi religiosity knows that it is a different world, but ever since SHAS propaganda began to feed the media, the differences in the public perception became blurred.

Most SHAS supporters are not ultraorthodox. Altogether there are very few ultraorthodox among the Sephardis. SHAS is an expression of the poorest and most humiliated stratum in Israeli society, and it consists of a mixture of social rebellion and religion.

SHAS's biggest gains in the last elections were in the poorest neighborhoods: 11.6 percent of the residents of

neighborhoods classified by the Central Office for Statistics on the lowest rung voted for SHAS. In particularly poor places, like District D-North in Be'er Sheva, SHAS won 20 percent of the votes and more. In many of those neighborhoods, SHAS's growth was accompanied by a parallel increase for Agudat Yisra'el. The activists of the Lubavitch Rabbi managed to get those whom SHAS missed. In Bat-Yam, the power of the Aguda increased tenfold between one election and the next, and not because of some ultraorthodox invasion.

The public opinion polls conducted before the latest elections are one example of how western techniques fail among this category of the population. All the polls published in HA'ARETZ before the election treated the religious parties as one bloc and ignored the special nature of the ultraorthodox parties. The results of the polls published in the evening papers bore no relation to the results of the elections. They gave SHAS 3-4 Knesset seats and Agudat Yisra'el two. Degel Hatora was mostly relegated to the minimum quota. The overall number of ultraorthodox seats was estimated at five or six. In reality, the ultraorthodox won twice as many: 13 Knesset seats.

The Ashkenazi ultraorthodox consciously and firmly distance themselves from anything that smells of secularism. The same cannot be said even of all the SHAS leaders, let alone its eastern voters and those who vote for Agudat Yisra'el.

The lowest stratum of the Sephardi population is torn between the two cultures and lives with an intense feeling of failure. SHAS's average voter suffers from deep inferiority complexes. He feels a profound need to be on good terms with value systems that he does not understand. That is why he does not tell the whole truth to the pollster, or to most reporters.

There is also a huge gap between men and women in their attitude to those two value systems. The women were raised to take the lowest place in society. They are the main and almost only customers of the education programs that the Ashkenazi establishment hands out from above. They are natural targets for training programs for mothers, as well as general education and cultural activities. Participation in such programs cannot pull the women out of their miserable situation, with which they have made their peace, but it exposes them to contact with the success of the secular culture. The percentage of men in such programs is nil. They want "concrete things," they want to escape from their income bracket and the low status into which they were born. In most cases they do not have the skills to break out, so they pull back. A minority turns to crime, while the majority turns to religion. And some do both.

This week, behind the transparent screen of the battle between secular and ultraorthodox and the religious war, the two sides conducted an ethnic war. This disguise allowed both sides to say things that one may not even think in the ethnic conflict.

For years I have been watching people who were a complete failure in the world of modern values, who were not able to feed their families, who could not handle the mortgage, the bank statements, and the sour face of the school principal who invited them for the umpteenth time to discuss the subject of why their child was nervous.

The synagogue is an island of peace for them. The Shabat prayers are a social event at which you meet your kind of people, who do not threaten your self-confidence. The preacher explains to all interested that everyone is equal before God, and God, for his part, sits quietly and does not deny it.

But even with God it is difficult to get along. The God of SHAS and Agudat Yisra'el is willing to immediately gather you to His bosom. The price is eternal guilt feelings. You are never as good a Jew as God wishes it. You can never fulfill all His Commandments. This gap between the sense of failure fostered by the western race to achieve and the sense of sin imparted by the religious world is the Eden of the preachers, the demagogues, the charlatans, and the envoys of the rabbi from New York and the local Peretz. On Wednesday, Rabbi Ben-David will lecture us at the Tripoli Synagogue on "Life After Death and the Transmigration of Souls." Asher, the janitor, said it should be worth my while to come.

Jewish, Arab Graffiti Examined

91AE0469A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 21 Jun 91 pp 22-24

[Article by Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg: "In the Forest of Symbols"]

[Text] Since the eruption intifadah in December 1987, most of the administered territories have been rendered no-go areas for many Israelis. Those intrepid enough to visit today might feel that they have entered a chaotic, even sinister, landscape of incomprehensible glyphs and figures. Graffiti now covers almost every inanimate surface (and some animate ones as well) in the disputed territories. Walls, telephone poles, mountains, monuments and ruins are fair canvases as well as, upon occasion, trees, cacti and bodies. The interested observer can gain some sense out of the seeming disorder through this first field guide to the graffiti of the intifadah.

Pioneers in the collection and analysis of graffiti are mainly situated in the U.S., where inordinate attention has long been paid to scribbles of every sort, whether in latrines or subways. Scholars have sometimes spent years decoding the gang graffiti that appears on the walls of metropolises such as New York City and Los Angeles, congested areas where social tensions run high. While criminals and madmen run wild in such cities, millions of tax dollars are doled out each year to anti-graffiti squads.

Until recently there has been scant attention paid to graffiti in the Middle East, yet the range of specimens to

be found here is one of the richest and most diverse of any area in the world. Particularly since the advent of the intifadah, a number of species of graffiti have come into being and flourished in Israel and the territories with the help of the Shabab, the "young guys" at the vanguard of the intifadah.

The graffiti can be broken down into two main classes—perennials and annuals. Within these two classes are a myriad of species which include both visual images, consisting of six major subgroups, and written codes, which number in the thousands.

Perennial graffiti is that which does not change much over time. In this category belong the territorial markets and significant symbols of the major players in the graffiti game—Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas, and the Communists. Many of the icons employed by these groups have a long history in Arab, Palestinian and—particularly in the case of Hamas—Islamic culture.

Most perennials consist of a number of key symbols which include the clenched fist, the V-sign, the rifle, the Palestinian flag, the map of "All Palestine," and the Dome of the Rock. The clenched fist and the V-sign are both internationally recognizable symbols, but in the course of the intifadah, they have attained a specifically Palestinian intent. The fist is often used by the Shabab to denote the power of the underground military units that they refer to as the "striking hands" or "striking fists" of the uprising. The fist symbolizes resolute, forceful, even violent action and is often depicted holding a gun, banner or knife.

The V-sign of the Palestinians is closer in spirit to the Churchillian victory symbol of World War II than to the "peace sign" of the American Sixties. Both on and off the walls, it is an ubiquitous manifestation. The V-sign is most often used by the nationalist factions, Islamic groups tending to favor the one-way sign, a fist and heaven-flung finger often accompanied by the credo of the Muslim.

The flag is recognized as a powerful symbol by the Palestinians and Israelis alike. The Shabab go to absurd lengths to hang the flag from high-tension lines and the precarious summits of minarets and church domes. Villages that are only infrequently visited by the army will sport hundreds of flags, painted and woven, hanging or daubed, on every conceivable structure. Almost all Palestinian groups, secular and religious, use the flag or its colors frequently and prominently in their graffiti. A common lament is that without the formal symbols of identity—a passport, an ID card, an anthem, a flag—they feel like nonentities.

The flag is an image that transcends the split between the religious and the nationalist parties, as does the rifle. The rifle is the tool by which the sovereignty, epitomized by the flag, will be achieved and the shame of defeat erased.

Indeed, the centrality of the rifle is emphasized by the sheer number of times it appears in the graffiti as a slogan—"Why Fear? Why Fear? The stone becomes a Kalashnikov"—or as a stencil as in one of Fatah's shields.

The gun is such an important symbol that Yasir Arafat is one of the few world figures to insist on addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations with a pistol on his hip. It is worth noting that Arafat himself figures prominently in the pantheon of Palestinian icons. His name appears in many daubings, either as part of a greeting or pledge of loyalty, or as a talisman written on a doorway or wall. His grinning presence is everywhere, floating high above the street and out of the reach of soldiers. He is pictured caressing children, holding bouquets of roses, or locked in embrace with the martyr-saint Abu-Jihad.

The dramatic rebirth of the Jewish state after 2,000 years of exile was the culmination of centuries of longing for many Jews. The Palestinians call it "The Catastrophe." Thus it is not surprising that representations of land figure prominently in Palestinian graffiti. Many Palestinian factions make wide use of the map, often incorporating it into their names.

The Dome of the Rock is a relatively new addition to the corpus of key symbols. It is used almost exclusively by Hamas to underline its claim that the struggle in the region is a battle of religions, and not politics or territories.

Annual graffiti is that which flowers briefly. It is often put up in response to timebound events that the shabab feel need to be addressed. Annual graffiti is more likely than its perennial counterparts to consist of written messages rather than symbols. A prime example of an annual was posted by "The Army of Muhammad" at the entrance to the Islamic cemetery near al-Aqsa Mosque at the beginning of the Gulf war: "Dirty American," it read, "Go back to your swamp. Hamas is the foundation."

The most common efflorescence of late not only refer to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ("Yes to the Iraqi aggression"), but also to the Baker peace initiative ("The Baker plan will not save Shamir's project") and Soviet immigration to Israel ("Jewish immigration is a capital offense committed against the rights of our people").

Although the overwhelming majority of annuals are directed inward—a fact which makes them particularly fascinating—there are small subspecies that are meant for outside readers. These often sprout due to stimulation from foreign organisms such as UN fact-finding missions, congressional delegations, or European peace groups. Such messages are atypical and inevitably written in English. "Stop the killings now," "We will struggle for our national independence" and, surprisingly, "No place like home" are but a few examples.

Graffiti inevitably springs up overnight, particularly between warm periods. In all climatic zones, fluctuations

of temperature increase according to the proximity of the IDF. Zones such as Hebron, where the temperature is almost always hot, generally cannot sustain large numbers of species; whereas in smaller villages, where the climate is considerably cooler, many varieties are able to blossom and thrive without significant intervention. The hotter the climate, it should be noted, the more power and prestige is awarded to a successful disseminator.

The lifespan of all graffiti, regardless of species, is brief. Walls, even whole villages, that are blanketed in growths one day can be bare the next. This is chiefly due to the heavy predatory pressures of the Judaeo-Samaritan and Gazan ecosystems. Internal predation is a factor, especially between such widely differing breeds as the Palestinian Communist Party and Hamas. The slogan Hamas hiya al-asas or "Hamas is the foundation," one of the most common of perennial messages, is often edited by the Communists to read hamas hiya al-wuswas or "Hamas is the Whispering Devil." Barbs meant to deter potential editors are sometimes placed within messages in the form of maxims such as "Internal fighting is poison" and warnings as in "Woe to those who erase nationalist graffiti" or its variant "Woe to those who erase nationalist graffiti without being ordered to do so."

The areas are rife with black panthers, red eagles, green eagles, black nightingales, ninjas and mountain monsters. When the soldiers cannot capture their quarry, they often turn to their traces. Their appetite for graffiti can be voracious. Were it not for the extreme fecundity of the shabab, there is little doubt that many species of graffiti would now be extinct.

Perhaps due to overconsumption of Palestinian graffiti—the cultivation of which is illegal—IDF soldiers have increasingly become layers. Soldier graffiti is rarely as complex as that of the shabab. It is made up largely of territorial markers such as the Magen David and the menorah, or the names of various brigades such as "Golani," "Giv'at i," or "Mishmar Hagvul." Interesting anomalies include "peace" and "love" or "Arafat is dead."

Notably, very few of these IDF varieties are uprooted by Palestinians. IDF and Palestinian species, however, cohabit precariously. Typically, a graffitist will paint a Palestinian flag which is then whitewashed by the soldiers and replaced with the Star of David. The Shabab then come and X out the star, replacing it with "No!" which is in turn crossed out and replaced with a slogan such as "Arabs out!"

A final competitor in the graffiti game is the settler. Settler graffiti shares some characteristics with that of the IDF, especially the heavy reliance on territorial markers. It differs in that it is more overtly bellicose, perhaps due to the fierce competition between the settlers and Palestinians over nesting sites. Common are references to the late Rabbi Meir Kahane and the ubiquitous slogan, Mavet l'aravim or "Death to the Arabs."

This anger is mirrored in the messages put up by the shabab. Particular venom is reserved for the settlers—and the Border Police. Both groups are commonly referred to as murderers, animals or madmen. "Let's make the Day of the Land a spur for struggling with rocks and Molotovs. We will face the herds of settlers" is a typical message. The Arabic word here translated as "herd" is usually employed only if one is speaking of animals.

Graffiti hunting is not always pleasant or even safe. We do not recommend anyone to set out on his or her own without a competent guide. Even the most cursory visit to the relatively safe streets of East Jerusalem will reveal that the short catalog offered here does not begin to attest to the wealth of species to be found. Countless more have yet to be studied. Moreover, the ever-changing topography of the areas in question will no doubt ensure future evolutions and permutations. Still, this guide should enable the novice to make some sense out of the heretofore mysterious writing on the wall.

Secular-Haredi Gap Seen Widening

91AE0457A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Jun 91
p 2b

[Article by Yerakh Tal: "Controlled Ultra-Orthodox Violence"]

[Text] After a relatively lengthy intermission in the Sabbath demonstrations of the ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem, cries of "Shabbas, Shabbas" were once again heard two weeks ago on the Sabbath on the Ramot road in Jerusalem. Not satisfied with clamoring some of the ultra-Orthodox also threw rocks at passing cars.

It is possible that the ultra-Orthodox are being encouraged by the "Sabbath wars" sanctified by Deputy Minister Rabbi Menachem Porush. There is currently also a bill for a reduction in public transportation on the Sabbath, which the Likud undertook before Agudat Yisrael to pass in the Knesset. Although it seems that other urgent problems at hand, such as the political problem, the absorption of immigration, and the economic situation, shove any other issue aside, the ultra-Orthodox-secular confrontation is likely to return to the agenda.

In a new study about to be published by the Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel, Professor Menahem Friedman from Bar Ilan University claims, on the other hand, that "the component of violence within the framework of ultra-Orthodox society is currently limited and, to a great extent, controlled." "The oppositional religious radicalism which constitutes the foundation for the development of ultra-Orthodox society," said Friedman, "ostensibly could have developed as violent underground activity." In the first years after the establishment of the state it seemed that, indeed, a violent underground movement that would attempt to continue the legacy of Lehi [Fighters for the Freedom of Israel], would develop in the margins of the ultra-Orthodox

camp. The development of the yeshivas as the sole institutes of socialization in ultra-Orthodox society, which absorbed the ultra-Orthodox youth in monastery type frameworks, however, facilitated their full supervision and incorporation into "the society of scholars."

The second opposition, of radicalism in the style of Neturai Karta, adds Friedman, appeared to have a greater chance, since it was not underground and the component of violence in it was limited from the outset, and also because it had a component of altruism, heroism, and personal sacrifice. Neturai Karta indeed were the momentary heroes of the youth organizing in the yeshivas. The development of "the society of scholars," the cessation of the torrent, and the crystallization of the status of the "greats" (the Torah sages) as possessors of charisma who are not to be challenged, however, strengthened the ultra-Orthodox sect [Eda HaHaredit] at the expense of Neturai Karta, to the point that the latter was rendered a small group lacking any real power in ultra-Orthodox society.

Friedman's study deals with sociohistorical questions related to the development of ultra-Orthodox society after the holocaust, its unique social structure, and the processes that led to a crisis in the religious-political leadership (the Council of Torah Sages), to the division of the historical party framework (Agudat Yisrael), and to the rise of ultra-Orthodox parties on an ethnic traditional basis.

The first stage in the establishment of ultra-Orthodox society was laid back during the War of Independence, notes Friedman. During the difficult battles for Jerusalem, on the eve of the declaration of independence, the rabbis of the Eda HaHaredit issued an order to the Torah scholars, the yeshiva students, not to report for military service. With the intervention of the activists of the ultra-Orthodox parties, the consent of David Ben-Gurion and Hagana general headquarters was obtained not to draft the yeshiva students, approximately 400 in number, the decisive majority of whom were from Jerusalem. The demand for their release was explained by the argument that after the holocaust and the destruction of traditional Jewish society in Eastern Europe, it was incumbent upon the State of Israel to see to the continued existence of the tradition of Torah study. The ultra-Orthodox leaders also claimed that in every Western country it is customary to release those studying for the clergy from military service. The release of the yeshiva students from the War of Independence set a precedent valid until this day. Ben-Gurion granted the release of the yeshiva students from the War of Independence, among other reasons, because, at that time, they were few in number; in light of the leavetaking of religion by the youth, he assumed that they would, over time, decrease in number. An additional reason [was] that the Zionist leadership was filled with guilt over its attitude toward traditional Judaism in the Diaspora at the time of the holocaust. Ben-Gurion's conduct on this issue reflects these feelings and desire to come to terms with the religious-traditional world.

The second component that facilitated the recovery of ultra-Orthodox society, according to Friedman, is related to the organization of the ultra-Orthodox educational system. On August 1, 1949, the Compulsory Education Act was legislated. In this framework four branches were recognized—general, labor, "Hamizrahi," and the independent branch of Agudat Yisrael. The surprising thing is that the development of the ultra-Orthodox educational system had a primary impact on the status of the ultra-Orthodox women and, through them on the development of ultra-Orthodox society as a "society of scholars." By the mid-1950's, the graduates of the Beit Yaakov seminars had already started to become an inciting element influencing all realms of life in ultra-Orthodox society. Ostensibly, this development should have also influenced the men, encouraging them to obtain a general education, but its impact was in the opposite direction—the yeshivas adopted the principle of antipurposefulness, as Friedman defines it, of complete dedication to the study of Torah, and extreme opposition to general education and professional training.

In the ultra-Orthodox public, the perception intensified that it had won in a frontal confrontation with secular Zionism. It was not the politicians who brought about the "victory" (laws releasing religious men and women from military service), but the masses that went out to the streets. A feeling of confidence and strength penetrated the religious public, replacing the feeling of fear and low spirits. Ultra-Orthodox society was now able to "close" the ranks and to exercise full control over the relations between the sexes and over marriage.

The ultra-Orthodox struggle against the secular took on an extremely violent and dangerous character during the early 1950's. Organization of ultra-Orthodox youth in armed undergrounds was discovered, such as the "Jelmi underground" and the "Kana'im underground," exposed by the security services. For the first time, the arson of cars whose owners drove on the Sabbath in Jerusalem and actions against butchers who sold nonkosher meat were attributed to the ultra-Orthodox. The security services exposed this underground when one of its members was about to place a fright bomb in the Knesset during deliberations on the Hours of Labor and Rest Law (14 May 1951), which was considered by religious circles as a permit for the desecration of the Sabbath. The second underground was exposed during the deliberations on the State Education Act, that sought to cancel the branch method. Two youth were apprehended with a bomb in their hands while attempting to harm a structure belonging to the Ministry of Education. The ultra-Orthodox leadership, particularly the rabbinical leadership, was alarmed by the phenomenon, inasmuch as it was viewed as [deriving from] "Zionist" roots to a greater extent than from the traditional Jewish experience. Just as they held the phenomenon of Neturai Karta's radicalism in esteem, they rejected the radicalism of the underground.

The more the level of education in Israeli society increased, the roads before the ultra-Orthodox youth seeking to fit in with his nonultra-Orthodox peers became blocked, claims Friedman. The more he matures and becomes ready for independent life, the educational and social gap between him and his peers becomes greater, making leaving the yeshiva even more difficult, thus increasing his economic, emotional, and social dependence on the ultra-Orthodox social framework. Since the 1950's, the economic state of the yeshivas in Israel is undoubtedly better than in the past, thanks to generous governmental support, as well as donations from abroad. It is not only that the number of yeshivas has increased, but they have also been successful in establishing many new structures and in raising the level of nutrition and services to their students. Certainly this fact, according to Friedman, has had an impact on the yeshivas' appeal to the ultra-Orthodox youth.

Nonetheless, the guarantee of housing and basic conditions for young ultra-Orthodox couples is the weak link in the socioeconomic arrangement of ultra-Orthodox society. In Friedman's opinion, this point embodies a potential crisis capable of challenging the entire ultra-Orthodox social structure; signs of the crisis are already appearing at this time, according to Friedman. Western Jews, particularly American Jews, are currently faced with an increasing number of "emissaries" from Israel, coming to collect funds for the basic needs of their offspring about to be married. On the bulletin boards in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, it is possible to find more and more personal requests recently for assistance in purchasing an apartment for yeshiva students. This is, according to Friedman, a new phenomenon indicative of the increasing difficulties of continuing to maintain the unique structure of the ultra-Orthodox "society of scholars." Until now, this structure was the secret of the strength of ultra-Orthodox society; today, it has become apparent that this is the foundation of its weakening.

Friedman views the interest of ultra-Orthodox youth in the yeshivas and kolels as various manifestations of youthful rebellion, the essence of which is the delegitimization of their parents' religious lifestyle, that was influenced in one way or another by the "false lures" of modern secular culture. Friedman claims in his study that the parental generation appears to the sons as lacking religious enthusiasm and pride for its identity. On the other hand, the ultra-Orthodox youth raised in Israel (and in the West) are totally different from their parents. They seek completeness, they are idealistic and view the yeshivas and those heading them as their framework of reference. These youth are forming as an elite group learning to admire the idealistic, anti-purposeful character of the yeshiva. Consequently, they scorn the parental generation seeking to see the "purpose" of its sons and daughters in the wake of the difficult experience of the past.

"The society of scholars" in ultra-Orthodox society is the basis that facilitated the formation and strengthening of the Council of Torah Sages in the 1950's, but it is also the

element that, in the 1980's, led to crisis and the deterioration of the Council's power. The perpetual growth in the size of "the society of scholars" and in the standard of living intensifies the internal competition over limited resources among institutions and the particularist groups that compose ultra-Orthodox society. The "greats," as the heads of institutions and the leaders of the particularist groups, are becoming directly involved in the internal competition and tension. Instead of being a distant and neutral element, acting toward the alleviation of internal tension, the Council of Torah Sages is rendered a center of conflict and a framework in which decisions are made through internal struggle.

Despite the severe differences of opinion and rivalries among the various components of ultra-Orthodox society, Friedman maintains that this society is still, in the minds of its members, a single society with a shared historical consciousness. In his opinion, one must not draw hasty conclusions from the internal dissension and rivalry that the society is ostensibly about to disintegrate in the near future.

Friedman devotes a special chapter in his study to Shas. There is no doubt, he notes, that the success of Shas in the social domain is presently extremely impressive, but great doubts exist as to whether its power will be sufficient to bring about a revolution in the character of traditional Oriental Judaism, turning it and its sons into Oriental ultra-Orthodox. "Not only are the resources required for that purpose greater than the existing sources, but the Ashkenazi 'society of scholars' is also exhausting its capability to maintain such a large number of scholars in 'economic moratorium,'" explains Friedman.

In general, it can be said that the ultra-Orthodox grouping in defined geographical areas such as Bnei Brak and Jerusalem has the potential to decrease the points of friction and ultimately contributes to a decrease in tension between ultra-Orthodox and others in Israeli society. The changes in the entertainment culture in the large cities could not have taken place in the absence of the process of "ghettoization" that removed most of the ultra-Orthodox population from the city centers to unique residential areas. Moreover, the ultra-Orthodox grouping facilitates the full expression of their cultural uniqueness. It grants the individual a feeling of security, despite [the fact] that he is foreign within the framework of the Israeli population.

Within the framework of the ghetto, ultra-Orthodox society seeks to express not only its cultural uniqueness, but its dialectic relationship to Zionism and to the State of Israel, says Friedman. This is expressed both in the symbolic realm, such as not flying the national flag on homes and institutions on Israel Independence Day, not standing at attention during the siren honoring fallen IDF soldiers, not saying 'Halel' on Israel Independence Day, and in the economic and legal domains, such as the demand not to require state courts.

Its grouping within the ghetto, however, bears a high price from the perspective of ultra-Orthodox society, as well. This framework facilitates tight social control over the lifestyle of the individual. The housing shortage in the main ultra-Orthodox centers and the soaring prices of apartments there, due to the high demand and the low supply, has "pushed" the young ultra-Orthodox to the periphery. In development towns and small cities ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods are appearing, but these, too, have a similar pattern of isolation in small quasi-ghettos.

Territorial Dispute With Messianic Jews Discussed

91AE0465B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Jun 91 p 23

[Article by 'Amir Rosenblitt: "The Struggle for the Right to 'Ovot"]

[Text] At the entrance to 'Ir Ovot, somewhere in the heart of the 'Arava, those arriving are greeted by an Israeli flag and a blue and white sign on which is written: "Welcome, Jesus the Messiah." We ride several minutes within the empty settlement without encountering a living soul. We pass the antiquities site of Meitzad Hatziba, and then we meet the elderly Peter Buchsbaum who directs us to Simha Perlmutter's caravan in stammering Hebrew mixed with English. The door of the caravan is locked. Buchsbaum suggests that we look for Simha in the dining room. Two dogs greet us with loud barking, and then Simha appears, dressed in black slacks, a short sleeved white shirt emphasizing a muscular body on which was a prayer shawl with ritual fringes. His face sported a graying beard and he wore a large skullcap on his head. Rabbi Simha Perlmutter, who established the place in the late 1960's, receives us with great suspicion, wondering why the media is suddenly showing renewed interest in him.

For the past six years, Perlmutter and his family have been embroiled in a legal struggle with the Israel Land Administration and the Middle 'Arava Local Council, which are seeking to evacuate him from the location, which had been abandoned by its settlers. Perlmutter, a Messianic Jew who came from the United States with his family and a group of eccentrics, established 'Ir Ovot in 1968. Over the years, the settlement deteriorated and the authorities began to clip his wings, in order to receive the agricultural areas in his possession. In the wake of his economic decline, several years ago Perlmutter agreed to the proposal of Shimshon Gavrieli, a resident of central Israel, who offered him partnership in growing water-melons, melons, and vegetables. In recent years, the entrepreneur has invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in the place; for the most part, however, he accumulated losses. Recently, Yohanan Rotem from Moshav 'Ein Yahav, near 'Ir Ovot, joined the project, and then the partners began to show a profit for their labor.

Recently, Ministers Rafa'el Eitan and Rehava'am Ze'evi attempted to mediate between the parties, and the latter

even offered to reach an agreement whereby Perlmutter and his partners would be able to till the areas for five additional years. Several weeks ago, the affair reached a climax, in the wake of Ze'evi's appeal by telephone during a legal hearing on the matter in the Be'er Sheva Magistrate's Court. The minister's intervention aroused agitation in the local council, and the head of the council, Ilan Oren, sent him a sharp letter in which he accused him of hindering the legal proceedings and defending elements with an interest in the matter (such as Shimshon Gavrieli, owner of the "Ariana" nightclub in Jaffa). Gandi [Ze'evi] retaliated, responding to Oren: "Your determination, whereby I am hindering legal proceedings, is false and wicked. You behave with citizens according to strange laws of the jungle that are unacceptable. After all this, you seek to teach me what the executive branch is, what proper rules of administration are...your comments about poor reasoning, etc., are worthless verbiage...."

Perlmutter: "Believe me, when I came to Israel with my family in 1966 I could have settled in the center of Israel and reached a state of rest and security. If so, what am I doing here in the middle of the desert? What is holding me, despite all of the difficulties and the struggles being waged against me? I believe that I am part of the plan of the Blessed Lord, who decided that I would settle in the heart of the barren 'Arava, and I cannot escape this fate."

The story of 'Ir Ovot begins in late 1966. In Israel, [nobody] knew how to relate to Perlmutter and the ten [people] who came with him from the United States. There were those who thought that they were not Jews; others said that they belong to the "Jews for Jesus" movement. The fact that Perlmutter was married to two women: one, a proper Jew—Yehudit, and the second, a Christian who converted—Rachel, only reinforced the suspicions. Simha's declarations regarding their desire to hasten the coming of the Messiah via settlement of the 'Arava, also did nothing to draw fans.

Perlmutter, 56, was born in Boston to an Orthodox Jewish family, studied in a yeshiva, later completing his studies at the university in political science and law. He later moved with his family to Miami, where he founded a congregation and a synagogue, becoming its spiritual leader. In his sermons, he claimed that the world was in the last stages of the process of redemption and that all believers must repent of their misdeeds and move to the land of Israel, in order to assist in the hastening of the time of the coming of the Messiah.

When his group arrived at the airport in Lod, the authorities wanted to return the "missionary" group to the United States, but ultimately enabled them to enter Israel as tourists. The institutions refused to discuss the possibility of granting them the status of new immigrants; thus, the group was moved about for a few months from a hotel to a Hebrew intensive language course in Netanya. When he saw that all of his attempts to obtain immigrant assistance were futile, Perlmutter decided to "go to the 'Arava and settle there". He

purchased a jeep, leased two trucks, and went down south with all of the baggage, to a strip of land that was totally barren then. The members of the group knew nothing about the place, except for a few verses from the Bible.

When they were about to go to sleep, a military patrol arrived at the location, and the commander asked to know what they were doing there. "We are Jews, and we have come to settle the land, and we shall not move from here", answered Simha. The members of the patrol wished them good night, and reported the strange meeting to their superiors. The next morning, the helicopter of CO Southern Command at the time, Shaika Gavish, landed near them. Gavish was accompanied by 'Ezer Weizman. The two sought to find out what people were looking for in the 'Arava, near the Jordanian border. Simha Perlmutter mobilized all of his power of persuasion, and in English mixed with verses from the Bible, told them the story. At the end of the conversation Gavish said to them: "You are good Jews, although a bit crazy, but if you withstand the 'Arava, I am crazy enough to help you".

The group was housed in buildings in an abandoned military camp from the period of the British and then the struggle for daily existence began. The main problem of the settlers of 'Ir Ovot (named for one of the stations of the journey of the people of Israel in the desert) was the lack of recognition by the settlement authorities. Without identity documents or immigrant documents and facing uncompromising hostility by the settlement authorities, huge obstacles were put before them. On more than one occasion, Simha and his friends were arrested and put into jail because they had no identifying documents (they gave up their American passports) or because of construction without a permit.

The period of the relative prosperity and flourishing of 'Ir Ovot was in 1982, when 22 families and over 100 people resided there. 'Ir Ovot was a kind of Orthodox religious commune, with most of its members related to one another. Perlmutter's family branch, for example, included four generations. Together with him there lived his parents Rose and Harry (Rose, 84 years old, lives there to this day), he and his two wives, their nine children and their grandchildren. The people living there married primarily among themselves or with volunteers from abroad who encountered the place as temporary guests. Several of the residents were addicted to hard drugs; others abandoned destroyed families or settled there in order to find themselves.

According to Perlmutter, the difficulties created by the various institutions, including the Jewish Agency and the Agricultural Union, caused the desertion of the settlers of 'Ir Ovot. "When the first children were born there was great joy, but when we realized that there was no place to send them and all of the elements were creating difficulties for us, people started to take stock of themselves." In 1986, his wife Yehudit decided to leave Simha and the place, together with their children. Over the course of

time, the settlement emptied of its residents, and 'Ir Ovot became a ghost town. Today only eight people live there: Simha, his convert wife Rachel, his two sons, 15 and 17, his mother, an elderly immigrant couple from Australia, and the janitor, a solitary Holocaust survivor, Peter Buchsbaum, who has lived there since the beginning.

"We wanted to establish a kibbutz or a large collective town, something along the lines of Degania. But naivety is apparently a negative characteristic, because it ultimately renders you stupid. You cannot be a sheep in a society of wolves", says Perlmutter.

The Israel Land Administration offered him compensation and apartments in various places in Israel, under the condition that he evacuate the lands of the settlement. But Perlmutter does not intend to give up. He is determined to hold on to the place: "I came here on my own initiative and invested my money and my strength in the development of the place. With my own hands I built the infrastructure in the place. The state demands of me, and justly, to "volunteer" my sons to the Israeli Defense Forces and, indeed, all of them served in the army and one of them was a combat officer in the Armoured Corps. The two younger children will also serve in the army. Why are they attacking me and trying to usurp my land away from me, when I am still at the height of my strength and capable of tilling the land. This is like giving a person a gun with a silencer and telling him: "end your life quietly." I am not interested in compensation. Three years ago, I buried my father here and all I want is to be buried next to him. If they would let me, I would absorb hundreds more families, including new immigrants."

Toward the exit from 'Ir Ovot, we encounter another blue and white sign on which it was written: "The Torah compels us to be modest. Village of Jesus, Messiah of suffering and redemption." Upon parting from us, Simha says: "My dream was shattered into fragments. I do not know if I still have hope. Everything that you see here is a failure. The failure of Simha Perlmutter."

The head of the Middle 'Arava Local Council, Ilan Oren, says: "I do not have anything against Simha Perlmutter. I fulfill a public position here and execute the policy of the settlements of the region, which decided to maintain the distribution of resources according to criteria determined by the state. We object that those close to ministers will receive preference in the distribution of water and land. The dangerous precedent in the establishment of the private farm 'Ein Hatziba forces us to be vigilant that this will not reoccur in 'Ir Ovot, as well. In 'Ein Hatziba they spoke of a settlement of 25 families, they gave them 1,000 dunams and a million cubes of water, while only three members were absorbed there (in the interim one has left), who are retaining the means of 25 families.

"In 'Ir Ovot, a similar thing was about to occur. This is a settlement of a single person who established a religious kibbutz with the assistance of Gavish and the

Jewish Agency. 'Ir Ovot ran up millions in debts, and five years ago it was appointed a receiver. Due to the desertion by the residents, the Ministry of Interior revoked its recognition of the settlement and a legal process began for the return of debts to creditors."

Oren does not deny the rights that Perlmutter deserves: "He invested in the place and there is no doubt that he must be compensated. I am even willing to employ him myself for the rest of his life." According to Oren: "the thing that lit a red light for him" is the fact that, five years ago, Perlmutter created a partnership with questionable elements from the black market. The State Attorney's office claims that there are transgressions of the Settlement Act and exploitation of State land for purposes of profit via negative elements.

"In any case, there is not enough land for all of the residents. The allocation of water is like in a bathtub: if one draws, the other will not have. Our struggle is one of existence against partisan settlement that does not match policy. Perlmutter failed because of his religious views. The fact is that everyone at 'Ir Ovot, including his family, fled from him".

Management of Immigrant Radio Examined

91AE0465A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Jun 91
p 2B

[Article by 'Irit Rosenblum: "Two Headed Radio"]

[Text] On the eve of the end of Amnon Nadav's first term as director of the Voice of Israel, he issued a statement to the press, revealing that in contrast to a majority of over 90 percent that listened to the radio broadcasts during the war, a large sector does not listen to the radio at all. This public certainly is not aware of the labor conflicts and power struggles between the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv bureaus.

The last conflict, in which the employees of the Jerusalem bureau held a meeting on the eve of [the holiday of] Shavuot that led to a two day broadcast strike by the management, broke out due to the decision to establish the Immigration Absorption Station (IAS) in Tel Aviv, and not to utilize the 40 (80, according to the management's count) employees of the Russian Department in Jerusalem. This was joined by the decision to cut in half the broadcasts to countries outside of Israel, a decision objected to by MK Avraham Poraz (Shinui), who is about to bring it before the Knesset.

In Jerusalem, it is claimed that the distancing of the immigrant station from Jerusalem and from the trouble making Jerusalem union, while employing immigrant journalists not in the accepted manner via the director of the radio, was done for clear reasons. The Likud is aware of the electoral power of the new immigrants, and it is impossible to know what advantages it can produce from them, says the Jerusalem union. (In the interim, most of the members of the journalists' union in the Jerusalem bureau have quit.)

The director general of the Broadcast Authority, Aryeh Mekel, rejects the charges. According to him, first class journalists from the Russian immigration, as well as Ethiopians, were hired. He attempts to lessen the sting of the complaints of the Russian department, saying that the department in Jerusalem is responsible for all of the broadcasts to the Soviet Union, and "this is really holy work. They always claimed that they did not have personnel and only over the past year I have added to the department in Jerusalem 12 employees with temporary status. All are new immigrants and they broadcast to the Soviet Union." The department also provides news reports to the immigrant station.

Tension exists between the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv bureaus, dating back to past years. For years, employees of the Tel Aviv bureau performed marginal jobs and received remnants of overtime—a vital component of the wages of Broadcast Authority employees. When the center of gravity leaned toward Tel Aviv, and more overtime was received in Tel Aviv, agitation set in in Jerusalem.

The Tel Aviv bureau also lived in perpetual frustration. "Naturally, the entire center of journalistic activity, apart from the political establishment—the centers of economic, social, and criminal decisions—are in Tel Aviv, as are entertainment, art, culture, literature, and music," says a Tel Aviv correspondent. Jerusalem is dominant in the news realm. The news room is [in] Jerusalem, and, traditionally, the news reports are broadcast from Jerusalem. The reasons are historical and political. "There cannot be a two headed animal. The center must be in Jerusalem," says a senior [source] at the news [department]. Partners to this approach are the director general of the Authority, Aryeh Mekel, and the director of the radio, Amnon Nadav. Due to this regulation, the broadcasts that must take place from Tel Aviv are also transferred to Jerusalem, and [then] back to Tel Aviv. Thus, the Tel Aviv bureau became one of services, receiving its orders from Jerusalem.

In past years, the Tel Aviv bureau has suffered from a lack of 'star' correspondents. The prominent figures were in Jerusalem—Yaron London, Gabi Gazit, Yitzhaq Ro'eh. In the 1980's, wandering began from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. Among the arrivals were Gazit, Razi Barkai, Shalom Kital, [and] Shlomo Raz. The character of the radio broadcasts has also changed over the years. The concept changed from formal style news reports to talk show style programs, some of which were news and others of which were personal programs, that did not require proximity to the news room. Examples are "Kol Tzivei Hareshet" or "Osim Inyan" by Gazit and Kital, a program that indicated the commencement of equality between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The political correspondents have always come from Jerusalem—the late Rafi Unger, Aryeh Mekel, Shalom Kital or Shimon Shifer and Aryeh Golan. Military correspondents have also come from Jerusalem - Ron Ben-Ishai and Nahman Shai. Roni Daniel was the first

military [correspondent] from Tel Aviv. From the perspective of advancement, the highest professional point that can be reached in Tel Aviv is party correspondent, and there was an attempt to split this position into two.

The last two directors of the radio, Gidon Lev-Ari and Amnon Nadav, grew in Tel Aviv; during their candidacies, the taboo on broadcasts of value from Tel Aviv was lifted. Nadav, who reached his position as a manager in the union path, subsequent to being chairman of the journalists' union, broke the convention whereby all of the talents are concentrated in a single geographic place and that the "Afternoon Journal" must be done from Jerusalem. Since the war, Roni Daniel has been broadcasting the journal from Tel Aviv. The same thing has happened with Dalia Ya'iri's "Weekly Journal". During the war, nonetheless, all of the broadcasts were concentrated in Jerusalem, because of both the statehood and the quality of the studios there.

Since the great leavetaking of a group of Jerusalem journalists, a substantial number of the trained and veteran personnel at the news and the radio is in Tel Aviv: Dalia Ya'iri, Razi Barkai, Shlomo Raz, Miron Tzur, Dan Eshel, Roni Daniel, Amikam Rotman, Aharon Barnea, Michael Gordus, and Carmela Menashe.

The survey that reported low listening percentages was kind to Reshet Bet. The survey indicates a substantial rise in its listenership, particularly after the changes that were made in the station subsequent to the war. Nadav says that Reshet Bet now broadcasts six journals, in contrast to three before the war. "Morning Journal" became a morning broadcast, and was expanded to two and a half hours; "Afternoon Journal" grew to two hours. All of the current interviews between one and three in the afternoon take place in Tel Aviv.

In Tel Aviv, too, they have always related to broadcast hours as property. The transfer of the programs between three and six to Jerusalem was virtually a revolution. In Reshet Gimel, as well, there are broadcast hours in both places. Since the war, says Nadav, there is no longer an issue of property. Nadav says that he is aware that in Jerusalem there is a feeling that he prefers Tel Aviv because his friends are in Tel Aviv but, according to him, the working conditions in Jerusalem are immeasurably better than in Tel Aviv, which has only lately begun renovations.

The problems in relations also exists among the divisions: the news division headed by Shalom Kital, the entertainment and light programming division headed by Yoek Rekem, the talk division headed by Yitzhaq Alon, and the classical music [division] currently managed by Avi Hanani. When the management decided to declare a 'defensive strike' of the broadcasts, the Jerusalem Reshet Alef and the Voice of Music, considered weak stations, were made to go on strike. The Voice of Music is considered an exotic station with a low percentage of listenership, while Reshet Alef, despite the characterization of stations that Nadav likes to credit

himself with in this candidacy, is still a station with no direction and it is unclear to whom it is broadcasting. Its popular programs—Rivka Michaeli's "Apple and Tree" and Yovav Katz' "The Two of Us Together and Each on His Own"—were removed from the broadcast schedule, due to the war. As things are done at the Broadcast Authority, no one bothered to inform the listeners that these programs, which had been broadcast for over ten years, had been retired and would not return.

According to the surveys, Reshet Alef has a listenership of one percent, that translates into approximately 26,000 listeners. The psychological advice programs were in first place in terms of listenership, drawing over one percent, even when "Apple and Tree" was broadcast while "Dynasty" was on television. Upon the opening of the special station for immigrants, many broadcast hours are supposed to become available, which will all be devoted to broadcasts in Hebrew.

Nadav blames a procedural problem. Michaeli and Katz belong to the entertainment division, while the programs are under the authority of the director of the talk department, Yitzhaq Alon. "In the wake of the war, we decided in the radio management that a person from the entertainment division shall not work within the framework of the talk division, and someone from the news shall not deal in classical music, so that the supervision will be by the director of the same department. The programs went off and will not return until the issue of personnel structure is taken care of."

According to Nadav, both Mekel and himself attempted to bring about a invigoration of the language broadcasts station and of Reshet Alef, but "if you so much as approach a single program, a massive lobby immediately reports and paralyzes all of the good intentions." So it was with the attempt to reduce the broadcasts in Romanian, Hungarian, and even Ladino, a matter in which the fifth president, Yitzhaq Navon, intervened.

Status of Damascus Jewish Community Described *91AE0460A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Weekend Supplement)* *in Hebrew 21 Jun 91 p 4*

[Article by Aryeh Bendar: "The Torture Cellar of Damascus Jewry"]

[Text] In the heart of the old Jewish Quarter in Damascus, which the locals call Harat el-Yahud, stands a two-storied building that became in recent years the symbol of the distress of approximately 4,000 Syrian Jews. In this building, which belonged previously to the Jaradi family that succeeded in leaving for the West, resides the local headquarters of the Syrian security police, the Mukhabaret. From the cellar of the building, which is used for tortures, are sometimes heard the cries of residents of the quarter who are called in for interrogation.

On the second story of the same building are the rooms of the commander of the security police in the Jewish

Quarter, Issa el-Assad, called "Abu- Muhammed," an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and his second-in-command, Abu-Firaz. El-Assad, a Bedouin from the city of Tadmor, who is considered to be a brutal officer, is corrupt and hates Jews.

According to recent and examined testimony that came recently to the knowledge of Yosef Kalash, the secretary of the Organization of Damascenes-Syrians in Israel, el-Assad himself tends "to handle" the Jews that are brought to him. The mention of his name is enough to cause Damascus Jewry to tremble. More than once, a Jew called for interrogation has fainted even before reaching police headquarters in the Quarter. The corrupt Syrian officer also extorts money from his victims.

In the torture cellar, the interrogators of the Mukhabaret use "traditional" Syrian interrogation methods, such as electric shock, "basaat arikh" (flying carpet—a torture device for stretching the limbs), flogging, extraction of fingernails and teeth, placing the victim in a tire and rolling him around until he loses consciousness, and the like. More than once, Jews who were taken to the cellar have disappeared, and their fate is unknown. Three months ago, a Jewish maiden was kidnapped in Damascus and disappeared.

Approximately three years ago, the brothers Ali and Salim Suweid were taken for interrogation in the cellar. Their trail is unknown since they were last seen at the entrance to the building. Nothing was known of them for a year and a half. Around a year and a half ago, contact with them was suddenly resumed. The interrogators accused the younger brother of having visited Israel and making a telephone call from Israel to his brother in Damascus. The two were sentenced to ten years in prison and were sent to the notorious Maza Prison in Damascus. They were held there in underground cells, without notification having been given to anyone. When their father received news of their arrest, he had a heart attack and died.

Due to the harsh prison conditions and the tortures, the condition of one of the brothers deteriorated. The authorities transferred him to the Damascus hospital for treatment for treatment. A doctor from the [Jewish] community was called in to treat him, and only then did it become clear where the two had disappeared to. After his condition had improved a bit, the two brothers were transferred to the central prison in Damascus. The latest information is that Ali and Salim Suweid are on a hunger strike.

According to the information, 13 Jews are now in Syrian prisons, including the two Suweid brothers, the two Kostika brothers, two Jewish youths from Haleb, and another Jew who was sentenced to two and a half years in prison on the accusation of holding foreign currency. Syrian Jewish emigre activists estimate that among the

Jewish prisoners may be several members of the committee of the Beirut Jewish community who were kidnapped several years ago during the civil war in Lebanon. Some of them were murdered at the time, and others were transferred to the central prison in Damascus.

In a report on the situation of Syrian Jewry, which was compiled recently by the department of countries of [Jewish] distress in WUJS (the World Union of Jewish Students), it is stated that in September, 1990 the Syrian authorities arrested four Jews, including two women—Gracia Kindi, who was pregnant, and Fador Lalo—when they tried to flee from Syria. The two women were released, but the authorities are still holding in prison without trial Rahmun Darwish and Yosef Raful Sabato. According to the report, two Jewish youths from the city of Kamishli—Zaki Sabato and Me'ir Da'oud Pinhas—have been imprisoned since August, 1990 without any specific accusations having been made. According to other testimony, the two were released after six months.

The Jews in Syria live in constant fear. In the Jewish Quarter of Damascus they are subject to the constant surveillance of their Palestinian neighbors, who are employed by the secret police and report to it every movement of Jews or foreigners. The Quarter is made up of courtyards. In each courtyard, the authorities have evacuated a few rooms and housed Palestinian families in them. The Jewish property was registered in the Palestinians' names.

Several cases have been recorded in which Jews succeeded in leaving Syria. Immediately after their departure, their property was confiscated and given to the Palestinian neighbors or to the terrorist organizations. The relatives and acquaintances of the Jews were immediately taken for interrogation and were thrown into prison for long months. The Jews suffer harassment from their neighbors, but they are afraid to complain. Every time a Jew complained to the authorities, he was beaten severely.

The surveillance over the Jews is so close, that in cases when Jewish children are absent from school for more than two hours, agents of the secret police are sent to the parents' home in order to determine the cause of the absence. The absence of a Jew from his place of work also arouses suspicion immediately, as well as if he has not been seen in public for some time.

The agents of the secret police sit regularly in the synagogue during the Sabbath prayers and observe what goes on. The agents are also present at weddings and other festivities. Around a year ago, the Jewish synagogue was demolished on the excuse that a new synagogue would be built in its place, but after the demolition of the old structure, the authorities did not give the necessary permits for the new construction.

The authorities do not permit the unsupervised entry of foreigners into the Quarter. Every such visit is conducted under the watchful eyes of the secret services, and the

Jews do not speak about their true situation. Travel abroad is allowed only in exceptional cases. Even then, those who seek to travel are forced to wait a long time before they receive passports, [which are issued] at a high cost. The relatives who remain behind serve as hostages, to ensure that the traveller will indeed return.

Most of the Jews, 3,000 in number, are concentrated in Damascus. The rest live in Haleb (400 souls) and in Kamishli (180). The Jews work mainly in peddling, trade, and small crafts. There are metal workers, green-grocers, butchers and the like. The percentage of merchants is very small. Among the Jews there are also a few pharmacists and dentists. In Haleb, there are Jews who work as goldsmiths. Jews are not allowed to work in the civil service, and several university courses are closed to them. The Jews' mail and telephone service are under surveillance.

The Jewish women and girls in the Quarter are employed by several Jews who established clothing and textile businesses within the Quarter. The Jews are allowed to leave the confines of the Jewish Quarter in Damascus, but most of them tend to hole up in the houses in the evening, for fear of harassment. The identity papers of the Jews in Syria bear the word "Musawi" (of the Mosaic persuasion) in red letters. The leader of the Jews of Syria is the Haham Avraham Albar Hamra, with whom the authorities are on good terms and who has freedom of movement as a cleric.

The WUJS report gives additional details of the Jews' hardship: there are three Jewish schools in Syria, but the principals are not Jews; Jews who are engaged in foreign trade must have senior partners who are not Jewish; military personnel and civil servants may not buy in Jewish shops.

This week, after long years of silence, Syrian emigres in Israel decided to begin a public campaign for Syrian Jewry. "For more than 40 years they asked us to remain silent. The institutions involved prevented us from coming out in a public struggle. But now we have decided to be silent no longer," says Yosef Kalash.

"We say that the situation in Syria is deteriorating daily, and the Jews there are in a situation where there is no one to turn to. Therefore, we reached the conclusion that it is forbidden to remain silent. In our opinion, silence has damaged the cause greatly, as the Syrian authorities reached the conclusion that the Jews have nothing to rely on, and that there is no one who will cry out and struggle for them."

A delegation on behalf of the Syrian emigres in Israel, which included Yosef Kalash, Yosef Rika, Moshe Mamrud, and David Gindi, met this week with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir for a discussion on this subject. The prime minister promised them that Israel is acting by every means to bring the Jews of Syria here, and was even optimistic.

Housing Units Approved for Arab Neighborhoods

TA0207180291 Jerusalem QOL YISRA'EL in Hebrew
1700 GMT 2 Jul 91

[Text] Dov Qehat, the director general of the Interior Ministry, has approved the building of 7,500 housing units in the Arab neighborhoods in north Jerusalem. Involved is the establishment of several neighborhoods over approximately 8,000 dunams along the Ramallah road north of Jerusalem. The plan was submitted by the Jerusalem municipality.

Work To Replicate Temple Service Utensils

91AE0563B Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 19 Jul 91 pp 28-29

[Article by Haim Shapiro: "Jerusalem Menora of Gold"]

[Text] With the destruction of the Temple on Tisha' be'Av, the ninth day of the month of Av, in the year 70 CE, the Temple vessels, including the massive gold menorah, were looted by the Roman troops. Today, in the Old City of Jerusalem, a new model of the menorah is ready for casting—and for use in a restored Temple.

The menorah is the work of Hayim Odem, a 44-year-old artist and craftsman, who emigrated from Soviet Georgia in 1973. For several years, much of his work has been carried out on behalf of the Temple Institute, which is devoted to creating implements for use in the rebuilt Temple. The menorah project took him an entire year. Odem recalls that in 1969, long before he came to Israel, his mother knitted him a sweater with a menorah and the word "Israel" in Hebrew on it. Now, he says, the sweater seems to be prophetic.

Odem says that before he came to Israel, he was not particularly religious. The religious inspiration came, he says, during his army service, which was in Sinai. "I was inspired by the desert," he says.

The menorah project was initiated three years ago. At that time, the institute held the first of what was to become a regular annual seminar at Hechal Shlomo, the seat of the Chief Rabbinate, under the auspices of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. Haifa Chief Rabbi She'ar-Yashuv Hakohen delivered a discourse on the menorah, culminating in his halachic ruling that we are permitted and obligated to undertake the construction of a menorah today. It was then that Rabbi Yisra'el Ari'el, director of the Temple Institute, began his research, which resulted in a 400-page report.

"Based on that research, I could make 400 different models of the menorah," Odem says. Luckily, Odem adds, it was one person, Ari'el, who had to decide how the final model should look. They went over the various plans together. Odem stresses that he had to consider not only the artistic aspects, but what he describes as the "engineering elements." The shape of the conventional menorah is not rational, from a planning point of view, he says. The arms are too long and heavy and would tend to

sag and bend down or outward. The mass is too heavy for the feet, which would splay out.

Then there is the halachic problem. "We went with exact measurements to all sorts of rabbinical scholars," says Odem. The halachic requirements for the menorah come from the description of the sanctuary in Exodus, in the Talmud and in Maimonides's code, as well as other rabbinical sources. Ari'el and Odem also had before them the famous depiction of the menorah on the Arch of Titus in Rome. This triumphal arch in Rome was erected to commemorate the victory of Titus over the Jews. The Roman forces are shown carrying the spoils from the Temple, including the table of the showbread, the censers, the trumpets, and especially, the menorah, which is held high overhead. A stylized version of this menorah is depicted on the emblem of the state of Israel.

This portrayal, however, is not universally regarded as authentic. Indeed, according to Prof. Gid'on Foerster of the Hebrew University's department of archeology, there is no archeological evidence which can show exactly how the menorah looked. Foerster, who is unfamiliar with the work of the Temple Institute, notes that all we have from the period before the destruction of the Second Temple are schematic representations of the menorah on coins from the Hasmonean period and a crude drawing found on some plaster fragments found in excavations of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. These fragments date from the period of the reign of Herod.

Then, of course, there is the representation on the Arch of Titus, in which the menorah is depicted as having a base instead of the three legs described in Jewish sources. Foerster, together with most scholars, believes that the base was made by the Romans in order to carry the menorah in their parade. At one time, he says, he believed that the base was an integral part of the original menorah. One of the reasons for his present belief is that there are no examples of such a base on any of the candelabra used for similar purposes by non-Jews during the same period. Such candelabra all have round bases, he says. "All that we are sure of is that it had seven branches," Foerster adds.

Part of the problem of describing how the menorah looked is related to the fact that the Hasmoneans installed a simpler menorah when they rededicated the Temple, and that it was later either embellished or replaced with a more elaborate one. A simple silver menorah, which might be similar to that of the Hasmoneans, is also on display at the Temple Institute.

Odern and Ari'el took the archeological evidence into account, but their main consideration was halachic. However, in Halacha too there are differing opinions to take into account. Rashi wrote that the menorah had a base, the Rambam that it had three feet. Their final design is a compromise. It has the double hexagon base, but from it, there are three feet extending. This, says Odem, is a solution which not only takes both portrayals into account, but which is also architecturally sound.

The wide base distributes the weight, while the three feet keep the menorah from wobbling.

Symbolically, he says, the top hexagon represents the 12 tribes, while the bottom hexagon represents the astrological symbols. Odem admits that the pictures on the base of the menorah on the Arch of Titus are not clear, but he believes that they were astrological representations. He had wanted to show figures on the base, but Ari'el overruled him, for fear that such figures might prove distasteful to some. With regard to the decoration on the arms of the menorah, which have been described by one commentator as resembling the branches of the *marva*, a plant which is translated as "sage," there are also different versions. On the Arch of Titus, the buds and flowers are depicted as extending all along the branches, but Maimonides describes them as being all of the same height. In Odem's version, they are all at the top of the branches.

The height of the menorah was determined by the sources, which describe it as 18 handbreaths, a handbreath being 10 cm. according to the Hazon Ish, one of the leading rabbinical luminaries of this century. The lamps on top add height, thus bringing the menorah to about two meters. This is in keeping with the talmudic description which has the priests ascending two steps to light the menorah. On the other hand, the height presents a halachic problem on account of the description of the menorah as being carved out of a solid block of gold and weighing the equivalent of 43 kilos. Such a menorah would be half a millimeter thick.

Odern's solution is to use a skeleton of steel, which is to be electroplated with the requisite amount of gold. "If we weren't going to use steel, we could use aeronautical plastic," says Odem. When asked how it would have been possible to make such a menorah in ancient times, Odem says he does not know. The fact that neither steel nor aeronautical plastic were available in the days of the First and Second Temple does not bar their use today, he says.

Hayim Richman, one of the employees of the Institute, points out there are serious problems regarding the menorah. In three different passages, it is described as being made by God, by Moses and by Bezalel. The descriptive details also seem to be contradictory.

It is not clear how such difficulties were solved in ancient times, Richman says, but today there is no reason not to use modern technology in order to solve halachic problems. For example, he points to one of the items on display at the Institute, a brass cart for taking away the ashes of the sacrifices. It rests on wheels made of rubber, which was unavailable at the time of the First and Second Temple. Elsewhere in the room is a laver equipped with faucets resembling those of a modern bath, together with artifacts such as a priest's robe, a pair of silver trumpets and the lottery box, with which the scapegoat is to be chosen during the Yom Kippur service. Now that the model of the menorah is completed,

Odem is busy working on a silver decanter to be used to take water from the Shilo'ah pool to the Temple on Sukkot. The model of the menorah stands in the Jewish Quarter, waiting to be cast. All that is needed is the benefactor to provide the 43 kilos of gold.

[Boxed item]

Seeking Temple Treasures—The Creators of New Objects for the Temple Are Still Seeking the Originals.

Those involved in creating new utensils for the Temple are often confronted with questions of what has become of the treasure from both the First and Second Temples.

Rabbi Yehuda Getz, the rabbi of the Western Wall, says that not only does the treasure from the First Temple exist, he knows where it is. The only problem is that he can't get to it. He says that Mishna Shekalim describes the location quite clearly. It comes together with an account of how King Josiah buried it in the tunnels and mazes constructed by King Solomon, before the Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians.

Ten years ago, Getz, under the patronage of then Ashkenazi chief rabbi Shlomo Goren, began tunneling from under the Temple Mount. The tunnel led from the present tunnel which extends along the entire length of the Western Wall. At one point, however, the Jewish diggers came into contact with Muslim workmen, employed by the Supreme Muslim Council. The result was Arab riots. The digging was stopped and the access from the Western Wall tunnel was sealed up.

There are various reports about the treasure from the Second Temple. According to Hayim Richman, an employee of the Temple Institute, at least some of this treasure is to be found in the Vatican. He says that rumors that the Vatican has this treasure have been circulating for years. Recently, he says, the rumors have been confirmed by eye-witnesses.

Archeologist Me'ir Ben-Dov recounts a theory according to which the treasure from the Second Temple was taken to the Nea Church, built in the Byzantine period in what is now the Old City. The treasure was found, according to this theory, when the builders of the church took pillars from the site of the Temple.

Other theories report that the treasure is to be found in France, in Turkey or in North Africa. However, even if the objects from the Temple do exist, Richman says, this does not exempt us from the obligation to create new objects for the Temple today.

Many Immigrants Lack Health Insurance

91AE0486D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by Gid'on Levi]

[text] Thousands of new immigrants age 55 and above have no health insurance, six months after their arrival

in Israel. This is because of the lack of attention from the government in general, and the Ministry of Absorption in particular, to creating suitable financial arrangements with the various sick funds, including the Histadrut and Maccabi sick funds, and the National Workers sick fund.

The Cabinet of Ministers for Immigration and Absorption received, a few weeks ago, a document from the Ministries of Health and Absorption on the subject of continuing health insurance for the new immigrants over the age of 55. But it was not acted on, and thousands of immigrants over age 55, who are not working, are still without health insurance, six months after their arrival in Israel. If one of them becomes ill or needs to be hospitalized, he will be forced to pay for the treatments from his resources, which usually means from the "Absorption Basket."

Last Friday, hundreds of new immigrants came to the tax office building on Arlozoroff Street in Tel Aviv, wishing to join a sick fund. Many of them are over 55, and they are having difficulty finding work, and even more so joining the Histadrut's sick fund. A secretary who came out to meet with those who were waiting informed them that anyone who had reached the age of 55 could go home. The immigrants who left the place are wandering around the country without any health insurance.

Menahem Ari'av, municipal council head of Natzeret Ilit, sent a letter on this subject to a number of government ministries, and to the Division for Immigration and Absorption of the Jewish Agency, to bring their attention to the "time bomb" ready to go off.

A "Davar" correspondent checked, and found that the Tax Office had no written instructions on how to deal with older immigrants past the six months that they are insured. It also seems that each sick fund has unwritten instructions that a person over the age of 55, who is not working, must not be accepted as a member of the sick fund, for the time being.

Shmu'el Solar, the Histadrut spokesman, said yesterday in response, that new immigrants wishing to join a sick fund after six months in Israel "can extend their membership in the Histadrut's General Sick Fund only when the government presents their names to the fund on a special list. With this list, the government must commit itself to pay the entire tax for health insurance in the sick fund, about 250 new shekels a month."

The spokesman went on to say that he was very sorry that the government is avoiding its responsibility for funding the medical insurance of immigrants not yet absorbed in jobs, and is trying to throw the responsibility onto the sick funds, "something that is not acceptable to logic."

Health Care Policy Study's Findings Reported

91AE0523E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Jul 91
p B2

[Article by 'Edna Aridor]

[Text] "In Israel, the number of physicians per capita is one of the highest in the world, but patients are compelled to wait in line for two or more years for treatment and operations. This indicates that the obstacle to the efficient exploitation of existing resources in the health system is political. The end of the governmental subsidy for [the Histadrut's] Kupat Holim Clalit [KHC] health fund and the introduction of a health system based on tenders for the supply of services will help increase competition between the different health funds and make it possible to break the resistance of the Histadrut and KHC to the implementation of reforms without need for the government to increase its support of the health system." The preceding determination is made by the authors of a study on "Structural Problems of a Health System in Crisis," which was prepared for the Jerusalem Center for Public and Policy Affairs, an independent research institute that has been in operation in Israel since 1976. The study is the first written on this subject by political science researchers.

The authors of the study, Dr. Gerald Steinberg from Bar-Ilan University, Dr. Eta Beck, and Professor Dani'el El'azar, indicate that the state of Israel spends 7 percent of its GNP on health care, which is equal to the expenditure of large industrialized countries with smaller defense budgets. Additional funding for the health system can be obtained by increasing taxes and fees or making cuts in other systems. Israel has a high taxation level, and an additional increase in the health allocation will endanger the economy and national product, they determine.

Evasion of Supervision

The researchers maintain that KHC's receipt of hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies from the government has enabled it to continue resisting, despite its deficits, the streamlining of the health system. Dr. Steinberg, who headed the research team, emphasizes that KHC claims that it operates national health services for the state and is entitled in that capacity to governmental financing and special protection. However, at the same time, KHC declares itself to be a private organization and as such evades governmental supervision over support funds. The government does not know the true cost of the KHC health fund and the services supplied with state funds. Whereas the KHC administration claims that it is losing money by supplying health services mainly to welfare cases, new immigrants, and the elderly, it continues to maintain these services to strengthen the power of the Histadrut and the Labor Party.

The researchers point to critics who maintain that the support allocations and subsidies which the KHC health fund receives for providing services to these populations

are greater than the fund's expenditures. This arrangement between the government and the fund creates, in effect, an advantage for KHC over other health funds. Ongoing governmental subsidization permits the fund to operate without streamlining, despite its annual operating deficit of 250 million shekels in recent years and a cumulative debt of 1.5 billion shekels (as of 30 March 1990). If not for governmental funding, KHC would be compelled to cut services or staff, and other funds would be able to develop at a faster rate.

In their opinion, the introduction of tenders for the provision of national health services will compel KHC to change its policy and become more efficient. The provision of services to new immigrants, welfare cases, and the disabled must be based on contracts between the government and the service provider. The tendering off of these services will compel the government to decide which services it wants and how much it is prepared to pay for them. If KHC has the means and facilities to provide services at a low price compared to others, it will win the tenders. The Histadrut and KHC could decide, for political and ideological reasons, that they will supply such services on a nonprofit basis. The government does not need to be involved in their decision. The government would not have to provide any subsidy to a service provider because that provider raised its costs due to a failing management or political or ideological considerations, determines Dr. Steinberg. Only the method of tenders is likely to separate KHC from the Histadrut and bodies identified with the Labor Party.

In treating the health system's structure, the researchers indicate that the absence of competition is usually connected to resistance to change. The study's findings indicate that KHC initiated reform in the community clinics system and the services it provides only after competing health funds, such as Maccabbi, did so. Also, only after other health funds began to offer supplementary insurance to cover operations abroad, did KHC follow suit. Because competition regarding hospitalization is nonexistent, there are still no reform processes in this area. KHC, which insures 77 percent of the population, has limited the access of persons insured by the Maccabbi health fund to KHC-owned outpatient clinics in hospitals that supply government-funded medical services.

The researchers maintain that the introduction of competition is likely to weaken the special position and the protection now given to KHC and prevent it from taking measures to prevent competition. For example, the fund succeeded in preventing the establishment of independent medical insurance groups, and it systematically opposed the entry of additional health funds into the health system. KHC and the Histadrut argue that unrestricted competition will lead to a situation in which rich, healthy population groups will go to other health funds to receive service at a higher level, leaving the weak populations to wait in KHC lines.

Creating Conditions for Competition

The researchers' basic assumption is that the health system's problems must be treated as a political rather than a medical problem. All previous reports written by professionals within the system ignored the political factors involved in the system and the Histadrut's characteristics. The researchers reached the conclusion that the political system lacks adequate means to forcefully separate the Histadrut and the KHC. A primary way to handle the problem is to create conditions for competition within the scope of reform. However, KHC's structure does not permit the application of comprehensive reform.

They argue that, in order to introduce changes and innovations in services for persons insured with KHC and decentralization, there must be agreement between the Histadrut's secretary-general, the chairman of the social security branch, and representatives of the parties. By agreeing, they can facilitate reform in the KHC health fund by giving it a mandate to develop state-of-the-art services and pursue a different policy, including the right to determine the uniform tax tariff in order to withstand the competition.

The researchers emphasize that KHC has repeatedly declared its intention to implement structural reforms, chief among which is decentralization, i.e., the provision of administrative autonomy. However, after 15 years of debate over decentralization, and after four years of planning, discussions in the committees, and experimental plans, the pace of change is still too slow. With the contraction of Histadrut's activity in Bank Hapo'alim and Koor, the KHC health fund remains the Histadrut's only source of power. Previous years have seen the rejection of proposals to separate KHC from the Histadrut in order to establish a governmental health insurance system independent of existing health funds. The reason for the rejection is that the membership fees which the Histadrut health fund collects have served as a source of income for the activity of the organization of workers and the Labor Party political branch and the other small parties whose members belong to the KHC health fund.

The researchers indicate, given that there is no reasonable chance of this separation being made, decentralization is less threatening to the Histadrut, especially because decentralization would not result in the Histadrut losing persons insured with KHC; thus, the Histadrut could maintain its strength. The hospitals provide KHC with substantial advantages over other health funds and are currently a serious source of power and control. At the same time, the hospitals are spending most of KHC's resources. It is not clear to the researchers whether a functional separation of the hospitals from KHC would be to the public's advantage. On the other

hand, it is clear that increased coordination between the clinics at the hospitals would certainly be to the public's advantage.

In treating the structure of the governmental hospitalization system, the researchers indicate that this system, which supplies one third of the hospitalization services in Israel, has not responded to changes in Israeli society, advances in medical technology, and the public's demands for different medicine. Therefore, the health minister's plan to transform the hospitals into independent corporations and to introduce private medical services to the hospitals is an important step.

The introduction of private medical services will create a supply of more reasonable health services for the consumer. The spread of black medicine, which is damaging the public health system, leaves sick persons dependent on it unprotected. Recommendations to establish private medical services in the public hospitals have been submitted several times during the past 13 years. However, the opposition of the Labor Party and its partners in the Histadrut have thwarted any action on this matter.

Private Medical Services Will Streamline the System

The introduction of private medical services to public hospitals does not depend on the implementation of the proposed reform of the health system. Private medical services, which would operate during a second shift and be based on the more efficient exploitation of hospital facilities in two shifts, are likely to shorten the duration of waits for treatment and operations. The government should distinguish revenues from private medical services in order to exempt them from taxation and channel them to research and the purchase of equipment. An increase in output achieved through having two shifts and the mobility of specialists from private hospitals in favor of private medical services in the public hospital in which they are employed in the morning hours will compel the private hospitals and private clinics to lower their prices for operations and treatment. The Health Ministry will need to tighten supervision over private organizations to ensure that the increase in output and efficiency will not be obtained at the expense of medical standards. The small health funds, which do not provide hospitalization services, will be a real factor in competition, because the introduction of private medical services will enable them to add new insurance programs to cover treatment.

The authors of the study predict that such an arrangement will be opposed by the Histadrut and KHC. However, the Histadrut and KHC will be unable to prevent governmental hospitals from implementing private medical services if the workers agree to the introduction of these services. Also, KHC's threats to stop sending persons insured with it to governmental hospitals is irrelevant, in the researchers' opinion, because the KHC health fund cannot absorb all of the patients it treats in its own hospitals, and a restriction on hospitalization would increase the dissatisfaction of persons insured by it.

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